IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL TO IAEA BOARD OF

UNCLAS STATE 081808 UNVIE FOR IAEA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IAEA TRGY ENRG KNNP ABUD AORC SUBJECT: IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL TO IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG) MEETING, 1 AUGUST 2008 REF: A. UNVIE 392 ¶B. UNVIE 393 ¶C. UNVIE 395 ¶D. UNVIE 397 ¶E. U.S. POSITION PAPERS EMAILED TO UNVIE BY IO/T ON 29 JULY 2008 ¶F. STATE 72255 ¶G. STATE 77866 ¶H. STATE 81299 ¶1. Department appreciates the Mission,s reporting and analysis for the August IAEA BOG meeting (Refs A, B, C and D). Instructions for the U.S. Delegation (USDel) follow in paragraphs 2 through 4. ¶2. AGENDA ITEM 1 ) Nuclear Verification: Safeguards Agreement with India ISSUE: The BOG will be asked to approve the agreement with the Government of India for the application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities found in document GOV/2008/30. U.S. POSITION: BACKGROUND: On 9 July 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulated the draft India Safeguards Agreement for the Board of Governors' review. The Agreement provides for appropriate, effective safeguards in perpetuity, based on accepted safeguards principles, while taking into account India's unique circumstances. The Agreement is based primarily on INFCIRC/66, the approved IAEA safeguards system appropriate for states not under NPT full-scope safeguards. INFCIRC/66 is not a model safeguards agreement, and there will be differences in the texts of INFCIRC/66-based agreements to accommodate the circumstances in which safeguards are applied, as well as the scope of facilities and materials being offered for safeguards. Nonetheless, the technical safeguards methods that are applicable under INFCIRC/66 agreements are the same as those applicable to states with NPT full-scope safeguards, so that we expect that safeguards on reactors in India, for example, would resemble very closely those applied to reactors in NPT states. India has made public a plan to separate its civil and military facilities, in which 14 reactors and other facilities would be offered for safeguards under the agreement; the separation plan has been circulated to the Board as INFCIRC/731. Placement of a large majority of India's civilian reactors under safeguards is a major gain for nonproliferation. Under this agreement, once India places a civilian facility into the list of facilities under safeguards in the Annex, it cannot be withdrawn from safeguards unless the IAEA and India jointly determine that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Some preambular language in the safeguards agreement (particularly that on &corrective measures8) has drawn criticism. This language reflects the history and context of the application of safeguards in India. It does not alter the substantive provisions governing the application of safeguards. Approval of the Indian safeguards agreement is a necessary step in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. Following a positive Board decision, the United States will seek to gain consensus in the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) for an India-specific exception to the NSG's full-scope safeguards requirement; any linkages between the IAEA Board and NSG processes should be avoided. Washington believes swift consideration and positive action on the India safeguards agreement will bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream and represents an important step toward realizing the economic and energy benefits foreseen by the Initiative. U.S. POSITION: Delegation should welcome the conclusion of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and India and work to ensure its approval at this Board of Governors Meeting. In so doing, Delegation should focus on arguments that this is a credible safeguards agreement, based on accepted principles, recommended by the Secretariat, and deserving of broad international support. Delegation should attempt to ensure that the Board of Governors takes its decision on the IAEA-India Safeguards Agreement by consensus. Delegation should ensure that Washington is kept informed fully of any efforts to defeat or delay adoption of the Agreement. Delegation should work to prevent any Board member from proposing any amendment to the Safeguards Agreement, keeping in mind that such amendments to the Agreement will be voted on before consideration of the Agreement itself (Rules 31 and 44). Delegation should work to defeat any proposal to vote paragraph by paragraph on the Agreement (Rule 43). Should any Board member oppose the Safeguards Agreement, Delegation should induce them not to block a consensus on approving the agreement and instead to formally state reservations about the consensus decision under Rule 42. Such reservations may be made before or after the vote is taken. If a vote is taken on the Safeguards Agreement, Delegation should work to ensure that Rule 37 requiring a two-thirds majority is not invoked. Should a vote be called, Delegation should encourage Board Members opposed to the Agreement to abstain, vice voting against the Agreement, since abstentions and absences are counted as not voting (Rule 37). Delegation should bear in mind that on a procedural matters, points of order have the first preference, followed by motions to suspend the meeting, adjourn the meeting, adjourn the debate, postpone a decision until a fixed date, and for closure of the debate (Rule 29). No debate is permitted on a motion to adjourn the meeting (Rule 28). Delegation should work to defeat any motion to adjourn the meeting or to postpone a decision until a fixed date, provided that Delegation is confident that there are sufficient votes to approve the Safeguards Agreement should it come to a vote. In no case, should the measure be brought to a vote if it would fail, since, under Rule 33(b),the Agreement could not easily be brought back to the Board before December 2008. The U.S. Delegation is instructed to deliver a brief statement, drawing on the language below. U.S. Statement: IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, August 1, 2008 Agenda Item 1 Nuclear Verification: Safeguards Agreement with India Mr. Chairman, I will be brief, because in fact the issue before the Board is a simple one. India came to the IAEA seeking a safeguards agreement to enable it to place nuclear facilities and materials under safeguards, for the purpose of engaging in peaceful nuclear activity and commerce. The agreement was carefully negotiated by the Secretariat, which has recommended it for approval by the Board. The agreement is based solidly on INFCIRC/66, the document entitled &The Agency,s Safeguards System.8 The elements of this agreement are little different than those of other agreements based on INFCIRC/66 that have come before this body, agreements which have invariably been adopted by this body swiftly, and by consensus. Under this agreement, safeguards would be applied to nuclear facilities in India using the same methods as applied elsewhere in the world. The Board has had ample opportunity to consider the agreement, and both India and the IAEA have provided occasions for questions to be answered regarding the agreement. We commend both for their efforts, and for the openness and thoroughness with which questions were addressed. Every substantive issue raised has been given a thorough hearing. Due to the unique circumstances of this arrangement, the document was structured as an umbrella agreement, without identification of specific facilities that would be placed under safeguards upon entry into force. In its separation plan, however, India has identified the facilities it intends to offer for safeguards, and the Secretariat has circulated this information to you as INFCIRC/731. The document lists 14 reactors along with other facilities. Precisely because it is an umbrella agreement, India will also be able, in the future, to add other facilities engaged in peaceful nuclear activities to that list and place them under safeguards. Moreover, this agreement allows for replacing the current agreements with an updated, more uniform, set of safeguards arrangements for India. Without this agreement, the safeguards activities, and the assurance of peaceful use provided by them, will not be possible. The only real issue before the Board is whether we allow the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under its Statute to provide these safeguards and these assurances. We urge the Board to do so, and to approve the Agreement before us. Thank you Mr. Chairman. ¶3. AGENDA ITEM 2 ) Technical Cooperation Fund Targets for 2009-2011 triennium ISSUE: The Co-Chairs of the open-ended Working Group on TCF targets for 2009-2011 and Indicative Planning figures for 2012-2013 will present a report on the outcome of consultations they have held since the June BOG. U.S. POSITION: Instructions for USDel are in Refs G and H. ¶4. AGENDA ITEM 3 ) Funding of Agency-wide Information System for Programme Support (AIPS) ISSUE: The BOG will be asked to approve document GOV/2008/21/Rev.1. U.S. POSITION: Instructions for USDel are in Ref F. RICE NNNN End Cable Text