COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE FOLLOW UP: MAYROW

S E C R E T STATE 081076 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 07/22/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC IR AE SUBJECT: COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE FOLLOW UP: MAYROW REF: A) ABU DHABI 325 B) ABU DHABI 729 Classified By: NEA/ARP William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b,c,d -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Post is requested to deliver the nonpaper in para 3 to Director, International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yacoub al Hosani. End action request. -------------- OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (S) Post should achieve the following objectives: -- Thank UAE officials for hosting the third Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting. -- Note the United States, appreciation for the growing collaboration our countries have on counterproliferation as a result of this process. -- Provide the information in the nonpaper below that the UAE requested on Mayrow during the February Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting. -- Inform the UAEG that in the United States there are legal restrictions placed on sharing information about active criminal investigations and assure them that we will share information as it becomes available. End objectives. -------------- MAYROW INFORMATION -------------- ¶3. (U) Begin nonpaper: (S/Rel UAE) The United States thanks the United Arab Emirates for the information provided regarding your investigations into the Mayrow companies and associated individuals as well as your additional questions on Mayrow. We appreciate the shared commitment our countries have in ensuring that items for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),ballistic missile programs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) do not reach countries of concern or terrorist groups. We also respect the time, energy, and other resources your country has expended to investigate these companies. As requested, we are providing information, where possible, that we hope will help facilitate your investigations. As you will note, in some cases, where our information is connected to ongoing legal actions in the U.S., we are unable to provide details at this time. U.S. Response to UAE Questions: -- UAE Question 1: How did the U.S. agency come to the conclusion that of all the companies in the world, the Mayrow Company was &the only firm that is suspected of, sending electronic circuits from Dubai to Iran and from there to Afghanistan and to Iraq?8 How did the U.S. agency confirm that it was Mayrow or other intermediary companies that sent these circuits directly to Iran? -- U.S. Response 1: The USG did not state Mayrow was the only firm suspected of this illegal activity. Several other companies have also been named in the General Order. -- UAE Question 2: How did the U.S. agency come to the conclusion that the circuits that were used in Afghanistan and in Iraq came from Iran and Dubai and, specifically, from Mayrow and no other company in the world? It is known that the Chinese firm WING in China sells these circuits to Mayrow and to others. The same applies to other firms all over the world. -- U.S. Response 2: This was determined during the course of the criminal investigation. The USG welcomes any information the UAE may have concerning other firms mentioned above. -- UAE Question 3: Has a conclusion been reached regarding the Iranian agencies that brought these circuits into Afghanistan and Iraq? Are they Shi,te or Sunni? -- U.S. Response 3: We do not have an answer to this question at this time. -- UAE Question 4: Was al-Qa,ida using the circuits that were acquired in Afghanistan? -- U.S. Response 4: The United States government has conducted forensic exploitation of IED triggers built by al-Qa,ida in Pakistan and recovered in Afghanistan since 2002, revealing that the AT89C2051-24PI microprocessor was a key component. The Dubai-based company Atlinx, a Mayrow associate, was identified as the only distributor of that part in the Middle East. -- UAE Question 5: Was al-Qa,ida using the circuits that were acquired in Iraq? -- U.S. Response 5: The United States government assesses that al-Qa,ida used many of the circuits that were acquired in Iraq. For example, on 12 August 2006, a Coalition convoy traveling in Baghdad was attacked using an IED made from artillery rounds buried in a road and triggered by remote control. Two soldiers were killed and another was injured. Examination of the post-blast site uncovered an electrical wire from the crater to a circuit board plugged into a cellular phone. The circuit board was attached to the phone and used to initiate the IED and contained a PIC 16F628A processor ) a part that has been sold by Mayrow. We assess that most of these devices are linked to al-Qa,ida in Iraq. Nearly 100 identical devices have been seized by Coalition forces. -- UAE Question 6: During the last meeting that took place in the offices of our agency, U.S. explosives experts indicated that the explosives used by Shi,ites in Iraq were more advanced than those used by al-Qa,ida in Iraq. Does the U.S. believe that whoever sent the circuits to al-Qa,ida in Afghanistan also sent them to Shi,ites in Iraq? -- U.S. Response 6: The United States government does not believe that the entity that sent the circuits to al-Qa,ida in Aghanistan also sent them to Shi,ites in Iraq. The circuits used by Shi,ites in Iraq are different than the circuits used by al,Qa,ida in Afghanistan. -- UAE Question 7: Are there any companies that are sending these circuits from China or from any other Asian, European, or African state to Syria, Turkey, and Pakistan? -- U.S. Response 7: The Department of Commerce has named companies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Lebanon and Syria to General Order 3. Again, the USG welcomes the information the UAEG alluded to in question 2. -- UAE Question 8: Is it possible for these circuits to be brought into Iraq across the Syrian border, or into Afghanistan across its border with Pakistan? It should be noted that the circuits that are being used in Iraq are circuits of a different kind; and they also have different manufacturers. -- U.S. Response 8: General Order 3 targets the procurement channels that the Department of Commerce has specific and clear facts about. -- UAE Question 9: We were surprised during our last meeting with U.S. explosives experts by their assertion that Iraq,s ports were being inspected by Iraqis loyal to Imam Sadr. Does the U.S. have any information about who is engaged in inspecting the goods that are imported from abroad into Iraq. -- U.S. Response 9: We do not have an answer to this question at this time. -- UAE Question 10: Is it possible to have these circuits brought into the country through checkpoints that are controlled by Imam Sadr loyalists? -- U.S. Response 10: We do not have an answer to this question at this time. -- UAE Question 11: In the first statement he made about Mayrow, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for U.S. Exports, whose name is Chris Padilla, said that what they found basically was that &those people and other entities associated with them were involved in shipping components that are used specifically in manufacturing primitive explosive charges.8 -- U.S. Response 11: See response to Question 6 -- UAE Question 12: We would like to have the office of the Assistant Secretary or any other official clarify for us what is meant by &specifically.8 -- U.S. Response 12: The General Order targets commodities that have been and continue to be used in the construction of improvised explosive devices. The U.S.-origin items being used have broad commercial applications and were not specifically manufactured for use in IEDs. -- UAE Question 13: Is the office of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Controls, whose name is Chris Padilla, aware that these circuits, which have no serial numbers, are available throughout the world in a large number of electronic devices? Is Mr. Padilla or his office aware that these circuits can be removed from the electronic devices in which they were installed and that they are being imported and exported without export licenses by some countries that have laws for monitoring and controlling exports? -- U.S. Response 13: General Order 3 targets the procurement channels that the Commerce Department has specific and clear facts about. -- UAE Question 14: Is the office of the Assistant Secretary aware that these circuits were not imported by Mayrow General Trading from the United States of America? -- U.S. Response 14: The Department of Commerce believes that Atlinx, MME Middle East Company and Mayrow General Trading are affiliated with each other. -- UAE Question 15: Is the office of the Assistant Secretary aware that Atlinx Electronics and MME Middle East Company Micro Middle East Electronics are the companies importing these circuits from America, from Britain, and from other countries? -- U.S. Response 15: The Department of Commerce believes that Atlinx, MME Middle East Company and Mayrow General Trading are affiliated with each other. -- UAE Question 16: What is the incontrovertible evidence that Chris Padilla, Assistant Secretary for Export Controls, relied upon to accuse one company out of all the companies in the world that are working in the same field? Your agency has not compiled a list of these companies, nor has it confirmed the number of companies that are sending these circuits to Iran directly from all over the world. -- U.S. Response 16: General Order 3 names multiple companies in several countries. Due to the nature of the criminal investigation, we are unable to provide additional details at this time. -- UAE Question 17: Why is it that the Assistant Secretary did not mention in his statements that Atlinx Electronics and Micro Middle East Electronics import these circuits from the United States and elsewhere and that these circuits are available everywhere in the world at a very low price? -- U.S. Response 17: The USG acknowledges these commodities are available commercially and are often inexpensive. General Order 3 targets the IED related procurement channels in which the Commerce Department has specific and clear facts. -- UAE Question 18: How did the Assistant Secretary single out Mayrow, out of all the other companies that are run by a man whose name is Ali Akbar Yahya, when it is known that Atlinx Electronics is the firm that imports these circuits from the United States? -- U.S. Response 18: The Department of Commerce has reason to believe Atlinx, MME Middle East Company and Mayrow General Trading are affiliated with each other. -- UAE Question 19: Did your agency request from China any information on the Chinese firms that sent these circuits directly to Iran during the past years? -- U.S. Response 19: The Department of Commerce has named several Hong Kong firms to General Order 3. We can not comment on interactions we may have had with the Hong Kong Government on this matter. It has been the general policy of the Department of Commerce to provide nations with advance notice when companies in their countries are being named to General Order 3. -- UAE Question 20: Does your agency have any information, or know of, any new developments in this case? -- U.S. Response 20: We are not able to share additional details at this time. -- UAE Question 21: We would like your agency to confirm the information about the circuits: that they are the ones that were imported by Mayrow, and that they were the ones used against Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. -- U.S. Response 21: We are not able to share additional details at this time. -- UAE Question 22: We would like the office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce to present documented Mayrow shipping documents regarding shipping integrated circuits manufactured by ATMEL Company. -- U.S. Response 22: We are unable to do so at this time. -- UAE Question 23: To assist us in identifying these circuits that have these specifications, we would like to be informed about the control list on which they are included, and we would like to have the state that is strictly monitoring these circuits as well as the other materials listed on the control lists identified. -- U.S. Response 23: We do not have an answer to this question at this time. -- UAE Question 24: As you indicated to us in the past, thousands of these integrated circuits are being manufactured. They are inexpensive and widely available. Are we to understand that these integrated circuits are not listed on any international control list? -- U.S. Response 24: The fact that these items did not require a license to the UAE is the reason General Order 3 was necessary. The USG felt it was in the best interest of both nations not to implement licensing requirements on the export of these types of items to the UAE, thereby minimizing the impact on bi-lateral trade. -- UAE Question 25: We would like the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce to provide us with an explanation regarding the charges that were made against the United Arab Emirates: that it was not interested in monitoring Mayrow and its related entities, nor was it interested in monitoring exports of these integrated circuits, which, we believe, are not on any control list. As you know, the statements made by the Assistant Secretary were specific in this regard. He said that he will take measures against the United Arab Emirates for exporting inexpensive materials that are not listed on any control list. -- U.S. Response 25: We have no information on the former Assistant Secretary,s comments. End nonpaper. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶4. (S) On February 25, Acting ISN Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney led an interagency delegation for the third CTF meeting with the UAEG (ref A). During this meeting, BG Al-Qemzi reacted strongly to the inclusion of Mayrow General Trading in the CTF agenda. (Note: Mayrow was a trading firm in Dubai that we believe was involved in supplying electronic components that were being used to develop IEDs in Iraq. End note.) The UAEG had closed Mayrow, he stated, despite the lack of information from the USG needed to complete the investigation. BG Al Qemzi asserted that the UAEG had submitted a paper on Mayrow with specific requests for evidence needed to further its investigation and never received any answers. The USG did in fact provide answers to the UAE in February 2007 were unable to answer many of their questions because of the ongoing legal investigation. DAS Borman asked Al-Qemzi to resubmit the requests. A/AS McNerney also emphasized that this issue should remain in the CTF as it involved issues related to Iran,s proliferation activities. (Reftel A) ¶5. (S) BG Al Qemzi also took the opportunity to raise the issue of Mayrow during Under Secretary of Commerce Mario Mancuso,s recent trip to the UAE. Al Qemzi complained that the U.S. had not adequately responded to a number of questions raised by UAE authorities. He also repeatedly emphasized that the CTF was not the appropriate forum to discuss Mayrow issues since it has nothing to do with counterproliferation. Al Qemzi pointed to the repeated inquiries in which the UAE asked the USG for clarification but did not receive any response. Al Qemzi explained that the government can be held liable under UAE law for closing Mayrow related companies without any justifiable legal cause and that is why they were asking for answers to additional questions. He explained they wanted to protect themselves from a suit by the closed companies. Al Qemzi concluded by stating that cooperation is a two-way street and that he considers the Mayrow issue to be closed, a comment he also made at the most recent Counterproliferation Task Force meeting. U/S Mancuso stated that the U.S. had responded to the UAE's request for more information as fully as practicable (this occurred in February 2007). While he agreed that improvements in communication should be made, he urged the UAE to not rely exclusively on the U.S. for 3rd party information and or tips. (Reftel B) End background. -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶6. (U) Please report response by August 1, 2008. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶7. (U) Department point of contact for follow-up is Chris Herrington ISN/CPI (202) 647-5035. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and NEA. Washington appreciates Post,s assistance. RICE