GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATION FOR A PRST ON UNSCR 1701

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 080665

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: UNSC PREL LE IS SY
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATION FOR A PRST ON UNSCR 1701

Classified By: Classified by IO Acting Assistant Secretary Brian Hook
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3, 4
and 5.


2. (C) Background. The French government has proposed a
Security Council Presidential Statement, in reaction to the
Secretary General,s June 30 report on UNSCR 1701
implementation. The French waited until now to deconflict
their draft from the contentious Arab Group attempt at a
Council resolution focusing on Israeli settlement activity.
USUN should engage first with the French and UK missions and
then more generally to ensure that any PRST would meet the
objectives at para 3 and not exceed the redlines at para 4.
As with the Arab Group draft resolution, USUN should make
sure that other missions understand that the U.S. will not be
able to join a consensus on a PRST that does not meet the
minimal requirements described here.

3.(C) Objectives: USUN should seek a PRST text maximizing the
following objectives:

a) Support the Lebanese government. Emphasize that it must
be the sole authority in Lebanon. Link this to the urgent
need for effective enforcement of the arms embargo without
exception, citing smuggling from Syria specifically, and full
disarmament of militia groups, listing Hizballah by name.
Note prominently Syria and Lebanon,s agreement, announced in
Paris, to exchange diplomatic missions and call for immediate
implementation. Note also the need for progress in the
delineation of the Lebanese-Syrian border in this regard.
Welcome the election of a new president and formation of a
new government.

b) Support the Israeli government. Resist the tendency of
many Council members to produce an unbalanced text that
criticizes only Israel, not Syria or Hizballah. Minimize
references to cluster munitions and over-flights, noting that
they are not fundamentally destabilizing in the same way that
rearmament of non-governmental militia groups within Lebanon
are. Note selectively in negotiations, if pressed, that
information-gathering by both sides via means such as over
flights can actually have a stabilizing effect in avoiding
misperceptions that can lead to a resumption of hostilities.
Note that the Lebanese government confirmed on July 24 its
acceptance of UNIFIL,s plan for Israeli withdrawal from
Ghajar north of the blue line, acceding to Israel,s request
that no timeline be specified. Accept language on
overflights only as written in previous PRSTs and resolutions
on 1701.

c) Support the Secretary-General,s efforts. Draw from the
report text verbatim as much as possible particularly the
paragraphs on disarmament, the arms embargo and Hizballah
activities in violation of UNSC resolutions, and welcome,
support or note his efforts as appropriate. Welcome the
arrival of his LIBAT assessment team in Lebanon.

d) Support the Secretary,s initiative for diplomatic
progress on Sheba,a, noting that all action should be
coordinated with the relevant parties. This should be drawn
in general terms that do not cite specifically the language
of her June 14 Beirut statement, a specific outcome or what
the basis for negotiations should be. Ask the
Secretary-General to dispatch a team to discuss the
cartographer,s report in detail in Beirut, Damascus, and Tel
Aviv. With respect to the Lebanese &seven point plan8 go
no further than noting the SYG,s characterization in his
report, that he is &continuing to investigate the
implications8 of this interim proposal.

e) Support progress toward Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar
north of the Blue Line, noting Lebanon,s June 24 letter to
UNIFIL Commander Graziano formally agreeing to UNIFIL,s plan
after acceding to Israel,s request that no timeline be
specified for eventual UNIFIL-LAF handover.

f) Press for Syrian compliance on the arms embargo. Ensure
that Syria is mentioned by name. Syria remains the primary
source and conduit of massive arms transfers in flagrant
violation of resolution 1701 and Lebanese sovereignty.

g) Press for disarmament of Hizballah and other militias.
Ensure that Hizballah is mentioned by name as frequently as
possible. Emphasize in negotiations that the purpose of
Security Council action is to safeguard international peace
and security--fundamentally threatened by the rearmament of a
militia with a track record for instigating violence--not to
score political points. Note that this concern is an
objective assessment unrelated to our views of Hizballah,s
political objectives. Others, violations of 1701 may be
cited in a PRST, but must not be at the same level of
concern.

4.(C) Redlines: Mission should not exceed the following
redlines in agreeing to PRST text. Mission should refer
modification of these redlines to Washington, but should note
to interlocutors that Washington is unlikely to agree to go
beyond these.

a) References to violations of airspace and the cluster
munitions issue may not go beyond &deep concern.8

b) References to violations of the arms embargo should not be
anything less than &grave concern8.

c) References to disarmament must mention Hizballah by name
and should not be anything less than &grave concern.8

d) There should be no explicit or implicit congratulation of
Hizballah or the GOL with respect to the recent prisoner
exchange. If a reference cannot be avoided entirely, it must
be limited to anodyne language casting the exchange in the
wider context of UNSCR 1701 implementation.

5.(SBU) Mission should make it clear that it cannot be rushed
into a decision, and must fully vet the final text with
Washington, particularly to allow time for legal review. It
should report to the Department periodically on the progress
of negotiations and whenever there are significant
developments.
RICE