GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATION FOR A PRST ON UNSCR 1701

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 080665 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 TAGS: UNSC PREL LE IS SY SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATION FOR A PRST ON UNSCR 1701 Classified By: Classified by IO Acting Assistant Secretary Brian Hook for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3, 4 and 5. ¶2. (C) Background. The French government has proposed a Security Council Presidential Statement, in reaction to the Secretary General,s June 30 report on UNSCR 1701 implementation. The French waited until now to deconflict their draft from the contentious Arab Group attempt at a Council resolution focusing on Israeli settlement activity. USUN should engage first with the French and UK missions and then more generally to ensure that any PRST would meet the objectives at para 3 and not exceed the redlines at para 4. As with the Arab Group draft resolution, USUN should make sure that other missions understand that the U.S. will not be able to join a consensus on a PRST that does not meet the minimal requirements described here. 3.(C) Objectives: USUN should seek a PRST text maximizing the following objectives: a) Support the Lebanese government. Emphasize that it must be the sole authority in Lebanon. Link this to the urgent need for effective enforcement of the arms embargo without exception, citing smuggling from Syria specifically, and full disarmament of militia groups, listing Hizballah by name. Note prominently Syria and Lebanon,s agreement, announced in Paris, to exchange diplomatic missions and call for immediate implementation. Note also the need for progress in the delineation of the Lebanese-Syrian border in this regard. Welcome the election of a new president and formation of a new government. b) Support the Israeli government. Resist the tendency of many Council members to produce an unbalanced text that criticizes only Israel, not Syria or Hizballah. Minimize references to cluster munitions and over-flights, noting that they are not fundamentally destabilizing in the same way that rearmament of non-governmental militia groups within Lebanon are. Note selectively in negotiations, if pressed, that information-gathering by both sides via means such as over flights can actually have a stabilizing effect in avoiding misperceptions that can lead to a resumption of hostilities. Note that the Lebanese government confirmed on July 24 its acceptance of UNIFIL,s plan for Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar north of the blue line, acceding to Israel,s request that no timeline be specified. Accept language on overflights only as written in previous PRSTs and resolutions on 1701. c) Support the Secretary-General,s efforts. Draw from the report text verbatim as much as possible particularly the paragraphs on disarmament, the arms embargo and Hizballah activities in violation of UNSC resolutions, and welcome, support or note his efforts as appropriate. Welcome the arrival of his LIBAT assessment team in Lebanon. d) Support the Secretary,s initiative for diplomatic progress on Sheba,a, noting that all action should be coordinated with the relevant parties. This should be drawn in general terms that do not cite specifically the language of her June 14 Beirut statement, a specific outcome or what the basis for negotiations should be. Ask the Secretary-General to dispatch a team to discuss the cartographer,s report in detail in Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. With respect to the Lebanese &seven point plan8 go no further than noting the SYG,s characterization in his report, that he is &continuing to investigate the implications8 of this interim proposal. e) Support progress toward Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar north of the Blue Line, noting Lebanon,s June 24 letter to UNIFIL Commander Graziano formally agreeing to UNIFIL,s plan after acceding to Israel,s request that no timeline be specified for eventual UNIFIL-LAF handover. f) Press for Syrian compliance on the arms embargo. Ensure that Syria is mentioned by name. Syria remains the primary source and conduit of massive arms transfers in flagrant violation of resolution 1701 and Lebanese sovereignty. g) Press for disarmament of Hizballah and other militias. Ensure that Hizballah is mentioned by name as frequently as possible. Emphasize in negotiations that the purpose of Security Council action is to safeguard international peace and security--fundamentally threatened by the rearmament of a militia with a track record for instigating violence--not to score political points. Note that this concern is an objective assessment unrelated to our views of Hizballah,s political objectives. Others, violations of 1701 may be cited in a PRST, but must not be at the same level of concern. 4.(C) Redlines: Mission should not exceed the following redlines in agreeing to PRST text. Mission should refer modification of these redlines to Washington, but should note to interlocutors that Washington is unlikely to agree to go beyond these. a) References to violations of airspace and the cluster munitions issue may not go beyond &deep concern.8 b) References to violations of the arms embargo should not be anything less than &grave concern8. c) References to disarmament must mention Hizballah by name and should not be anything less than &grave concern.8 d) There should be no explicit or implicit congratulation of Hizballah or the GOL with respect to the recent prisoner exchange. If a reference cannot be avoided entirely, it must be limited to anodyne language casting the exchange in the wider context of UNSCR 1701 implementation. 5.(SBU) Mission should make it clear that it cannot be rushed into a decision, and must fully vet the final text with Washington, particularly to allow time for legal review. It should report to the Department periodically on the progress of negotiations and whenever there are significant developments. RICE