(S) RESPONSE TO TURKEY ON SHIPMENT OF

S E C R E T STATE 079656


E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 07/15/2033
TAGS: PARM PK PREL TU

SUBJECT: (S) RESPONSE TO TURKEY ON SHIPMENT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN.

REF: A. A) STATE 003747

B. B) STATE 1198

C. C) ANKARA 92

D. D) STATE 3747

Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt For 1.4 B,D

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Action Request
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1. (S/NF) In January 2008, the U.S. approached Turkish
officials concerning a shipment of a Turkish-origin machine
tool that was destined for Pakistan (Refs A and B). At that
time, we informed the GOT that this shipment consisted of a
computer numerically controlled (CNC) five-axis machining
center produced by a German company and brokered by a Turkish
subsidiary. Additionally, our information indicated that the
machine was controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement and
listed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual-Use Annex.
Following an investigation, Turkey reported that the cargo
shipped to Pakistan consisted of a CNC 3-axis machine and
therefore was not controlled by the NSG. Turkey also
indicated that it believed the machine was manufactured in
Taiwan (Ref C). Post should approach Turkish officials
involved in the investigation of this shipment, draw on
appropriate background and non-paper in Para 7, clarify
inconsistencies between the Turkish and U.S. information, and
stress the importance that Turkey conduct an end-use check on
this machine.


2. (S/NF) During this cargo's voyage from Turkey to Pakistan
it was transshipped in Singapore, and loaded onto a
Japanese-owned vessel. Washington approached the GOJ (Ref D)
and requested that it take steps to reroute the cargo so that
it could be inspected prior to arriving in Karachi, Pakistan.
The GOJ took action, but did not have enough time to
redirect the vessel before the shipment was offloaded in
Pakistan. The GOJ has approached Washington with a variety
of follow-up questions regarding the final disposition of
this machine tool. Washington would like to inform Japan
that we believe that the machine did arrive in Pakistan, but
that Turkey cooperated in this effort and investigated the
shipment. Embassy Ankara should seek Turkey,s concurrence
with sharing the results of Turkey,s investigation with
Japan, an NSG member.

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Objectives
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2. (S) Embassy Ankara should pursue the following objectives:

--Thank host government officials for their ongoing
cooperation on issues of proliferation concern and for their
investigation into this shipment.

--Clarify discrepancies between U.S. information and what
Turkish officials learned in their investigation.

-- Inform interlocutors that Turkey is correct in its
assessment that the machine in question is a 3-axis CNC
machine.

-- Emphasize that while the U.S. agrees with the results of
Turkey's investigation, we continue to assess that this
machine has a 5-axis capability.

--Reinforce the U.S. position that this machine, even as a
3-axis machine, is controlled by the NSG Dual-Use Annex
section 1.B.2, and that we continue to be concerned that it
could be diverted to the Pakistani nuclear or missile
program.

--Request that, as an NSG member, Turkey conduct an end-use
check on this machine to determine whether it might have been
diverted to the Pakistani nuclear or missile program.
Post-shipment checks are a valuable tool to verify that an
item authorized for export arrived at the stated end-user and
is being put to the authorized end-use. The U.S. regularly
conducts such inspections.

-- Request to share certain details on this case with the GOJ.


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Background
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3. (S/Rel Turkey) In January 2008, Turkish authorities
investigated U.S. information indicating that an
NSG-controlled machine tool that was shipped by the Turkish
firm Spinner Takim Tezgahlari Sanayi Ve Ticaret, Ltd.
(Spinner Takim) to a company in Rawalpindi, Pakistan named
New Auto Engineering (Refs A, B and C). In the course of
this investigation Turkish authorities discovered information
that appeared to contradict U.S. information. Specifically,
Turkish officials stated that the machine was not
NSG-controlled because of its 3-axis configuration and that
the machine was manufactured in Taiwan (as opposed to Germany
where Spinner Takim,s parent company and manufacturer is
located).


4. (S/Rel Turkey) Background Continued: (5-axis v. 3-axis)
Washington has examined Turkish information and determined
that this machine is technically classified as a 3-axis
machine tool; however, the U.S. assessment of this machine is
that even as a 3-axis machine, this item is still controlled
per section 1.B.2.b in the NSG Dual-Use Annex. Additionally,
because this machine was equipped with a Siemens 840D
controller, it is capable of performing 5-axis machining
operations.


5. (S/Rel Turkey) Background Continued: (Location of
Manufacture) Turkey's investigation also indicated that the
machine was produced in Taiwan rather than Germany. The U.S.
concurs with this finding and we believe it is likely that
this machine was produced in Taiwan, as the German-based
manufacturer Spinner has a production facility there.

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Talking Points
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6. (S/Rel Turkey) Begin Points

-- In January 2008, we provided you with information
concerning a vertical machining center that was shipped from
the Turkish firm Spinner Takim to Pakistan. We raised this
transfer with you in January 2008.

--We appreciate the effort that Turkish authorities put into
this investigation and your willingness to share the
information that you uncovered.

--The U.S. has closely reviewed all available information in
this case and would like to discuss with you the results of
our analysis.

--We understand that your investigation into this shipment
indicated that the machine shipped to Pakistan was a 3-axis
machine and therefore not controlled by the Wassenaar
Arrangement or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

-- We agree with you that the machine in question is a 3-axis
vertical machining center (Spinner Model MC1020). However,
we assess that because this machine was exported with a
Siemens 840D controller, it has the full 5-axis machining
capability.

-- Even absent this controller, this machine would still be
controlled by the NSG. Machine tools with this model,s
positioning accuracy and that have greater than 2 axes are
controlled by 1.B.2 of the NSG dual-use annex.

-- Turkish officials also pointed out that the machine in
question was produced in Taiwan rather than in Germany.

--The U.S. previously indicated that this machine was
manufactured by the German company Spinner. Spinner Takim,
the Turkish firm identified as the exporting firm in this
transaction, is the partner of the German firm Spinner. The
German firm Spinner has a manufacturing facility located in
Taichung, Taiwan, named Euma-Spinner (Euma). Euma is the
original equipment manufacturer for Germany,s Spinner, and
gets its machining parts from Germany. In this case we
believe that the machine was assembled in Taiwan by Euma,
using parts from Germany,s Spinner, and was then shipped to
Spinner Takim in Turkey and then ultimately to Pakistan.

--In light of this analysis we ask that Turkish authorities
reopen its investigation of this shipment. In particular we
ask that you examine the exports by Spinner Takim to
Pakistan.

--As an NSG member, Turkey has committed to prevent the
diversion of dual-use equipment from reaching programs that
are not under full scope IAEA safeguards. Because the risk
of diversion in Pakistan is quite high we ask that Turkish
authorities perform an end-use check on this machine.

--As discussed in the U.S. paper "Combating Proliferation
with End-Use Checks" presented at the 2007 MTCR Plenary,
post-shipment checks are a valuable tool to verify that an
item authorized for export the stated end-user received the
item and that it is being put to the authorized end-use.

-- End-use checks provide additional information to verify
the bona fides of specific end-users and end-uses of
controlled exports, and help combat proliferation by
preventing subsequent transfers to entities that have been
the subject of unfavorable post-shipment checks.

End points.

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Reporting deadline and POC
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7. (U) Post should report results by July 29, 2008. Please
slug replies for ISN. Department point of contact is ISN/CPI
Matt Zartman, 202-647-7588. Department thanks Post for its
assistance.
RICE


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