Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE70009
2008-06-30 16:20:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM ATTEMPTING TO

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL TW IR 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0009 1821617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 301620Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T STATE 070009 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL TW IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM ATTEMPTING TO
PROCURE TESTING EQUIPMENT FROM A TAIWAN FIRM

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON 1.4 (C).

S E C R E T STATE 070009 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2033 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL TW IR SUBJECT: IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM ATTEMPTING TO PROCURE TESTING EQUIPMENT FROM A TAIWAN FIRM Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON 1.4 (C). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. AIT Taipei, please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (S) Background: We have information that between January and March 2008, Taiwan's Gotech Testing Machine Incorporated was working to sell a thermal shock chamber and associated spare parts to Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), the organization responsible for developing and producing Iran's liquid-propellant ballistic missiles and is an entity designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737. Gotech's representative in Iran, Farvardin Tech Company Ltd., was helping facilitate this transaction. The shock chamber being sought is not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime, but it could be used to support temperature and humidity testing of missile components. ¶3. (S) We also understand that Gotech and Farvardin Tech Company may be working to route this sale through intermediaries in third countries in an effort to avoid scrutiny by Taiwan export control authorities. Because of the missile-related utility of this equipment and the apparent efforts by these entities to evade Taiwan export controls, we want to urge Taiwan officials to take measures to prevent this transfer to Iran. ¶4. (S) Objective: We want to ask Taiwan authorities to immediately investigate this information and take all available measures to prevent Gotech from using third country intermediaries to facilitate transfers of dual-use equipment to UNSCR-designated entities in Iran. ¶5. (S) Action Request: Request AIT Taipei approach appropriate officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET REL TAIWAN) -- In the spirit of our export control and nonproliferation cooperation, we would like to alert you to a matter of proliferation concern and request your assistance in investigating this activity. -- The U.S. has information that between January and March 2008, Taiwan's Gotech Testing Machine Incorporated was working to sell a thermal shock chamber and associated spare parts to Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). -- This transaction was being facilitated by Gotech's representative in Iran, Farvardin Tech Company Ltd. -- SHIG is the organization responsible for developing and producing Iran's liquid-propellant ballistic missiles and is an entity designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 as subject to targeted sanctions. -- Although not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),the shock chamber being sought by SHIG could be used to support temperature and humidity testing of missile components. -- As you know, paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737 requires all UN Member States to freeze assets of and prevent provision of economic resources by their nationals or from their territories to entities designated under that resolution. Provision of the shock chamber to SHIG would trigger these requirements. -- We also understand that Gotech and Farvardin Tech Company may be working to route this sale through intermediaries in third countries in an effort to avoid scrutiny by your export control authorities. -- Given the missile-related utility of this equipment and the apparent efforts by these entities to evade your export controls, we urge you to immediately investigate this information and take all available measures to ensure Gotech is unable to use third country intermediaries to facilitate transfers of dual-use equipment to UNSCR-designated entities in Iran. -- We look forward to future cooperation on export control and nonproliferation issues and would appreciate your sharing with us the results of your investigation into this activity at the earliest possible time. End talking points/non-paper ¶7. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's Sarah Beane with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case (202-647-4019 - beanesa@state.sgov.gov) and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR. ¶8. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. RICE

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