Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE69684
2008-06-27 23:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FOR UN 1267 SANCTIONS AND

Tags:  AG EFIN ETTC KTFN PREL PTER UNSC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5530
OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9684/01 1792347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 272348Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 5462
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 4340
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 8857
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5521
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 2513
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2328
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0830
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 9627
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 069684 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AG EFIN ETTC KTFN PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FOR UN 1267 SANCTIONS AND
FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION TO UNSCR 1735

REF: A. A) STATE 066897

B. B) USUN 000421

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 069684

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AG EFIN ETTC KTFN PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FOR UN 1267 SANCTIONS AND
FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION TO UNSCR 1735

REF: A. A) STATE 066897

B. B) USUN 000421


1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 6,7
and 8.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------

2. (U) The follow-on resolution (Septel) to UNSCR 1735 (2006)
is intended to guide the work over the next eighteen months
of the UN Security Council committee established pursuant to
UNSCR 1267 concerning al-Qaida and the Taliban (1267
Committee). The resolution will also extend for another
eighteen months the mandate of the 1267 Committee's
Monitoring Team, which provides analytical support to the
Council on implementation of the resolution. The 1267
sanctions regime, which requires states to impose an asset
freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo on individuals and
entities found by the Council or its 1267 Committee to be
associated with al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, is
one of the international community's most important
multilateral counterterrorism tools.


3. (SBU) Per ref A, we used the opportunity of the Monitoring
Team's mandate renewal to include in the draft resolution a
series of measures intended to address criticism that the
Council's decisions on sanctions are opaque and that its
procedures for placing individuals on and removing them from
the 1267 sanctions list are neither fair nor clear. In
addition, we urged greater implementation of existing
fairness and transparency procedures in the 1267 sanctions
regime. We want to underscore all of these elements to
remind UN Member States that we continue to take seriously
calls to increase fairness and transparency in listings and
delistings. However, we also want to underscore that the
1267 sanctions regime was created to address the threat posed
by al-Qaida and the Taliban, a threat which persists, and
therefore we believe the Council's focus should be on taking
action to address this threat.


4. (SBU) Prior to drafting this resolution, we worked with a
number of countries to explore options to address criticisms
of the regime and to improve procedures for ensuring fairness
and transparency in sanctions decisions. We have been

briefed on various iterations of proposals to establish an
independent review panel to advise the 1267 Committee (which
is a subsidiary body of the Council) on listing and delisting
decisions. Per Ref B, several of these key interlocutors
presented this idea to the 1267 Committee. We (and several
other Security Council members) have consistently opposed
establishment of a review panel for a variety of reasons.
For example, we believe that an advisory panel would
undermine the authority of the Security Council. We also
think it would be ineffective and unworkable in practice,
given the sensitive nature of much of the information relied
upon to impose targeted sanctions. An advisory panel would
be unlikely to have access to the full record relied upon by
Member States in proposing or reviewing sanctions. This lack
of access would preclude meaningful review. Member States at
the forefront of efforts to advance the idea for an
independent review have acknowledged the shortcomings
inherent in ideas for an independent review mechanism. They
have also told us that they advanced the idea in an effort to
strengthen procedures in the 1267 Committee in order to help
ensure the continued viability of the al-Qaida/Taliban
sanctions regime.

--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------

5. (SBU) Although we (and other Security Council members)
cannot support proposals advanced by some Member States
(including Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Germany) for an independent review panel for
some of the reasons outlined above, we want those Member
States to acknowledge positively and publicly the fact that
we have followed through on our commitment to include new

STATE 00069684 002 OF 003


measures in this draft resolution to strengthen procedures to
ensure fairness and transparency in the 1267 Committee. We
believe these elements of the resolution will significantly
increase transparency of Committee decisions and further
signal the Committee's determination to demonstrate that the
Council continues to take seriously the need for the
sanctions regime to employ fair and clear procedures. We
further want to remind all Member States that ensuring the
continued viability of the regime is a collective effort that
requires their support. We would like Member States to join
us in publicly heralding the adoption by the Council of this
resolution that was designed to help strengthen fair and
clear procedures, and to ensure that the committee remains
focused on the taking action to help deter the threat posed
by terrorists linked to al-Qaida and the Taliban. If any
Security Council Members inform us of plans to make an
"Explanation of Vote" (EOV),we would like to discourage
statements that would undercut the significant achievements
made in this resolution.

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------

6. (U) Action addressee posts in capitals are instructed to
deliver the points in paragraph 7 to appropriate
interlocutors. USUN, at the highest appropriate level,
should approach representatives from all 15 Security Council
members to request that they join us in supporting adoption
(on June 30) of this resolution, and to further join us in
publicly welcoming new measures to improve fair and clear
procedures as a significant, substantial progress on an issue
the Council continues to take very seriously. USUN should
similarly encourage non-Security Council Members from key EU
countries (Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Germany) to make statements in support of
this resolution and ask that they join us in taking steps to
support committee action to deter the al-Qaida/Taliban
terrorist threat.


7. (U) Action addressees may wish to draw upon the following
points, as appropriate:

-- We would like you to join us in publicly welcoming on June
30 the follow-on resolution to UNSCR 1735.

-- This resolution will guide the work of the 1267
(al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions) Committee over the next eighteen
months, and will extend the mandate of the 1267 Monitoring
Team.

-- This resolution is designed to achieve two objectives.
The first is to demonstrate the Council's continued
commitment to addressing the threat to international peace
and security posed by al-Qaida and the Taliban. The second
is to demonstrate that the Council continues to take
seriously the need for the sanctions regime to employ fair
and clear procedures in making listing and delisting
decisions and in considering exemptions to sanctions. We
want UN Member States to know that this is a collective
effort.

-- We have made great efforts to address criticisms that have
damaged the credibility of this important sanction regime and
hope that these efforts demonstrate the Council's continued
commitment to employing fair and clear procedures.

-- We ask that you join us in publicly lauding the
achievements made in this resolution, and that you actively
participate in strengthening the regime including by
proposing, and encouraging other Member States to propose,
names for listing and/or delisting as appropriate.

-- We must work together to ensure that this effective tool
in deterring terrorists and those who support them is fully
exploited, and that the 1267 Committee remains dynamic and
that the Consolidated List reflects realities on the ground.

-- Keeping this sanctions regime up-to-date and effective
requires active participation, support, and implementation of
measures by all Member States.

-- We look forward to working with you to continue to
strengthen this regime, as well as other UN counterterrorism

STATE 00069684 003 OF 003


efforts.


8. (SBU) If action addressees learn that their Security
Council interlocutors plan to provide an "Explanation of
Vote" (EOV) upon adoption of this resolution, action
addressees may draw upon the following points, as appropriate:

-- We understand and sympathize with the desire to send a
signal to the public (and for European Security Council
Members, to courts) that you are working to address
adequately "due process" rights in implementing UN targeted
sanctions.

-- We have made significant concessions to accommodate these
concerns in negotiations of the draft UNSCR to guide the work
over the next 18 months of the 1267 (al-Qaida/Taliban
sanctions) Committee and to extend the mandate of the 1267
Monitoring Team.

-- We had anticipated that the measures introduced in this
resolution would be hailed by you and our other European and
Security Council partners as significant, substantial
progress that should restore public confidence in this
important sanctions regime and allow the Committee to resume
its main focus on deterring the al-Qaida/Taliban terrorist
threat.

-- We do not believe that statements emphasizing that the
Council can and must do more will serve any other purpose
than to cast further doubt on the Council's decisions and
erode Member States' enthusiasm for and confidence in
actively implementing or proposing sanctions for Taliban and
al-Qaida-linked terrorists.

-- The UNSC 1267 Sanctions regime is at a critical juncture.
It is the UN's most effective, important CT tool. It is the
one sanctions regime that heretofore enjoyed widespread
support and sets the pace for measures adopted across UN
sanctions regimes. Its erosion will adversely impact UN
targeted sanctions as a tool if we do not work together to
reverse current trends.

-- We ask that you refrain from statements focusing on the
1267 Committee's weaknesses and instead recognize the
positive changes that will be implemented and encourage
others to do the same.

--------------
Reporting Deadline
--------------

9. Posts should report any substantive comments no later than
July 3, 2008.

--------------
Point of Contact
--------------

10. Questions may be directed to IO/PSC (Erin Crowe,
202-736-7847).
RICE