STATE LEAHY AMENDMENT VETTING IN IRAQ

UNCLAS STATE 069301 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM SUBJECT: STATE LEAHY AMENDMENT VETTING IN IRAQ REF: A. 05 BAGHDAD 04271 B. 05 BAGHDAD 02829 C. 05 BAGHDAD 01681 D. 05 BAGHDAD 02760 E. 06 BAGHDAD 0462 F. 05 STATE 225765 G. 03 STATE 034981 H. LEAHY VETTING GUIDE 24 APRIL 2007 ¶1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 6. SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) prohibits units of security forces from receiving assistance if the Department has credible evidence of gross human rights violations by such units. This cable identifies specific activities in Iraq that are subject to the Leahy Amendment and seeks Post,s recommendation on the most feasible way to effect compliance, given the security environment. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. The "Leahy Amendment" applies to all foreign assistance funds appropriated to the Department of State and requires that "(n)o assistance shall be furnished under this Act (the FAA) or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights." (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 620J). Congress has previously recognized the uniquely difficult security conditions in Iraq may necessitate modification of Leahy vetting procedures for an interim period until security conditions improve. ¶4. INL programs in Iraq are currently vetting trainees for security risks by using a mixture of the following practices: performing background checks and reviewing Iraqi criminal records; gathering biometric information that is checked against the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System and in some cases U.S. military and/or intelligence databases; and checking local records whenever practical. However, these vetting procedures screen for security risks, not human rights abuses relevant to the Leahy Amendment. ¶5. Since 2006, Iraqi military personnel nominated for IMET have been vetted using the automated fingerprint identification system described in paragraph 4, and then the candidates, nominations are forwarded to the Department for standard Leahy vetting by NEA/I, INR and DRL. ACTION REQUEST ¶6. The Department seeks to comply with the Leahy amendment consistent with current worldwide guidance promulgated by cable and the Leahy vetting guide (REFS G and H) and as further described in relation to Iraq programs below. Recognizing the unique security concerns present in Iraq, we seek post,s views on the best approach to doing so and on what additional resources, if any, may be required at post to fully implement the guidance. We request post,s views by July 16, 2008. -------------- ¶7. Proposed application of Leahy vetting to INL-supervised, IRRF and INCLE-funded programs: (a) Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF): The approximately 12 current (and any future) Iraqi investigators assigned to MCTF will be vetted using standard procedures described in the Leahy vetting guide. If candidates are found to have credible evidence of gross human rights violations against them, they will be removed from their posting to the MCTF (or, if future recruits, from consideration for assignment to the MCTF),the Government of Iraq will be told the reason for exclusion, and another candidate will be selected. Any future tactical component dedicated to the MCTF will be vetted as a unit, as will its commander, using standard procedures described in the Leahy vetting guide. (b) Commission on Integrity (COI): Embassy should be aware the Leahy vetting Guide states &In broad terms, any division or entity (to include an individual) authorized by a state or political subdivision (city, county, etc.) to use force (including but not limited to the power to search, detain and arrest) to accomplish its mission would be considered a &security force8. The Department has determined that the COI is a security force unit given its training-including a forced entry team, equipment and organization. In coordination with the Anti-Corruption coordinator at Embassy Baghdad, the COI as an organization, its commissioner, and the top level of officials, including the head of each COI geographical office, directly reporting to the commissioner, should be vetted. Request specific post recommendations on vetting methodology. (c) Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) ) Prisons and Other ICS facilities (the ICS equivalent of units) and Senior ICS and KRG prison officials and prison wardens will be vetted, as will individuals in charge of jails operated by the Ministry of Justice or KRG. (d) Judicial Protection Service (JPS) ) The JPS, as a unit, and its commander/director will be vetted. (e) The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) - State administered IRRF funded training to the Iraqi Police Service in such competencies as intelligence gathering and countering kidnapping, terrorism, and organized crime. Approximately 250 police are trained per-year under this program, which is distinct from the wider police development mission executed by Multi-National Force ) Iraq. The program will expire at the end of FY 2009. Standard Iraq Leahy vetting of candidates trained under this program will be done. ¶8. Proposed application of Leahy vetting to IMET programs: a. Since 2006, Iraqi military personnel nominated for IMET have been vetted in accordance with standard Leahy procedures, using the automated fingerprint identification system described in paragraph 4, then the candidates, nominations are forwarded to the Department for vetting by NEA/I, INR and DRL. b. All IMET candidates will continue to be vetted using standard procedures described in the Leahy vetting guide. Candidate information required for vetting will include at a minimum: full name, date of birth, place of birth, and unit. Proposed training location, curriculum, and dates are also required. If candidates are found to have credible evidence of gross human rights violations against them, they will be removed from consideration, the GOI will be notified and another candidate will be nominated. ¶9. General principles for application of the Leahy Amendment to IMET and the INCLE programs described in this cable: (a) Future funding. Every organization receiving assistance subject to section 620J of the FAA, Leahy amendment will be vetted on a yearly basis. Newly funded units/organizations and their commanders will be vetted before receiving State funding. Assistance will be denied to units against which there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations by the units or their commanders. (b) Credible evidence of gross human rights violations. Consistent with the current worldwide guidance and vetting guide, should there be credible evidence of gross human rights violations related to organizations (to include prisons) or their commanders/wardens/directors, the Department will take steps to prevent assistance from going to the organization identified in the allegation until effective measures are taken to bring responsible members to justice. Assistance and training will be withheld at the lowest possible applicable level. (c) Acknowledging the security situation cited in paragraph 3 above, proposed vetting procedures have been modified from standard procedures in that all members of large newly formed units (MCTF, Prisons and JPS) would not have to be vetted individually. Under normal procedures, all members of newly formed units receiving assistance would be vetted individually. As security improves in Iraq, this modification of standard policy will be re-evaluated. RICE