GENERAL GUIDANCE ON IRAN PARTICIPATION IN

S E C R E T STATE 067212 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL SUBJECT: GENERAL GUIDANCE ON IRAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE EXPOS REF: MAY 02, 2008 E-MAIL FROM CPS-NSC TO ISN Classified by: ISN P McNerney, Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary: This is an ALDAC action request. Department requests that all Posts review and implement general guidance at paragraph 2 on Iran's participation in international defense expositions. In the view of the U.S. and other allies, Iranian defense entities or foreign companies that directly or indirectly support Iranian defense entities should not be allowed to participate in international ARMS fairs or defense expos on the basis of operative paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 (2007). UNSCR 1747's operative paragraph 5 prohibits Iran's supply, sale, or transfer of "any ARMS or related materiel" and requires States to prohibit procurement from Iran of such items. In this case, "any arms or related materiel" should be interpreted broadly and includes at a minimum all defense articles, including all weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned. Moreover, the Defense Industries Organizations (DIO - Iranian's special weapons agency) was designated by the U.S. under Executive Order 13382 (Blocking the Property of WMD proliferators and their Supporters) on March 30, 2007 for its involvement in uranium enrichment and suspected involvement in Iran's WMD program. In addition to being listed in the Annex of UNSCR 1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for WMD- or missile- related activities under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA),the ARMS Export CONTROL Act, and the Export Administration Act. End Summary. OBJECTIVES ¶2. (S//NF) As described in the background, Iranian entities have engaged in the transfer of ARMS in a manner inconsistent with security in the Middle East and contrary to UNSC prohibition on Iranian ARMS transfers outside Iran. Therefore, Posts should pursue the following objectives, in coordination with other appropriate members of the country team, when Iranian entities are invited to international defense expositions: -- (SBU) Urge host government officials to prevent Iranian participation in any defense-related event as this is a potential violation of operative paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007). -- (SBU) Cite the last two years of Iran's activities 
 supporting the Taliban and Iraq insurgents as described in paragraphs 4 through 6. -- (SBU) Emphasize that retransfer of weapons to insurgents and terrorist groups represents a serious threat to the international community, increasing the threat of terrorism. -- (SBU) Note that UNSCR 1747 prohibits Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring "any ARMS or related materiel" and requires States to prohibit procurement from Iran of such items. Participating in ARMS shows provides Iran a venue for conducting such activities in direct defiance of the UN Security Council resolutions. -- (SBU) Note that there are recent examples in which countries hosting international defense shows disallowed Iranian participation. Provide details from paragraphs 8 and 9 as appropriate. -- (SBU) Explain that other violations of UNSCRs 1737 or 1747 may occur, depending on the exporter. If the participating individuals or entities have been listed by the UN Security Council as subject to targeted sanctions, or are acting on behalf of those so listed, the host government may be obligated to freeze assets owned or controlled by the Iranian individuals or entities and ensure that no funds or other economic resources are provided to them. -- (SBU) Note that UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803 require Member States to freeze not only the assets of entities/ individuals designated in accordance with those resolutions, but also those owned or controlled by them or acting on their behalf or at their direction, as well as to prevent funds or other economic assets from being made available to them. Any transaction involving UNSCR- designated entities or those acting on their behalf would likely run afoul of these requirements. -- (SBU) Note that, as a general matter, U.S. entity participation in events involving Iranian entities, particularly those sanctioned by the UNSC, may not be permitted. BACKGROUND ¶3. (S//NF) Iranian entities have engaged in the transfer of ARMS in a manner inconsistent with fostering security in the Middle East. To prevent Iran's participation in international defense expositions that could both further Iran's ability to transfer ARMS and create an aura of normalcy to Iranian interactions with the international community in ARMS transfers, posts are requested to approach their respective host government and raise this as a potential violation of operative paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007),if Iranian entities are invited to such events in the future. Posts should describe previous attempts by Iran to participate in such shows, as well as the prompt compliance with UNSCR 1747 by other governments hosting the event by preventing Iranian participation -- such were the cases of the Governments of Malaysia and Brazil (paras. 7 and 8). Posts are encouraged to raise this issue with like-minded Embassy counterparts to develop complementary approaches to the host government in question. Posts are encouraged to seek guidance when larger issues arise. If, for example, a host government chooses to ignore the serious concerns raised with respect to adherence to UNSCR 1747, posts should request further guidance but, as an initial step, indicate that U.S. participation may not be permitted. ¶4. (SBU) UNSCR 1803 of March 2008 addresses the international community's concern that Iran comply with all relevant UNSCRs, including 1737 and 1747. Operative 5 of UNSCR 1747 states, "Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related material, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran." However, Iran continues to supply, sell and transfer arms. For example, since 2006, Iran has arranged frequent shipments of small ARMS and associated ammunition rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, plastics explosives, and very likely Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to the Taliban. The following specific events confirmed Iranian retransfers of ARMS to the Taliban: -- In May 2007, a two-truck convoy was intercepted and seized in southern Afghanistan. A similar convoy was intercepted in April. The convoys were suspected to be supplying the Taliban. Iran provided the weapons and arranged the shipments. The two shipments included plastic explosives, small ARMS ammunition, artillery rockets, and rocket fuses. -- A March 2008 raid on a Taliban compound in Helmand Province netted an Iranian- manufactured .50 caliber anti-materiel sniper rifle with a probable 2005 production date. -- Analysis of interdicted weaponry, ordnance, and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) recovered in Afghanistan indicate the Taliban had access to Iranian weaponry produced as recently as 2006 and 2007. ¶5. (S/NF) Iran provides lethal aid to Shia groups willing to target the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces. It is not known if Iran ordered the attacks in Baghdad or Basrah earlier this year, but it did train and arm many of the insurgents and resupplied weaponry to Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and Jaysh al-Mahdi- Special Group (JAM-SG) during the fighting. ¶6. (S) Open source reports have indicated that Iran also continues to smuggle surface-to-air missiles and other advanced weapons into Iraq for potential use against American forces. Military spokesman Rear Admiral Mark Fox said U.S. forces were continuing to find Iranian-supplied weaponry including the Misagh 1, a portable surface-to-air missile that uses an infrared guidance system. Other advanced Iranian weaponry found in Iraq includes the RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenade, 240mm rockets, and armor-piercing roadside bombs known as EFPs. ¶7. (S) Every year, there are numerous defense expositions around the world that promote trade among nations on defense articles and state-of-the-art technologies. Iran has attempted to participate in such events with the purpose of offering its military equipment to other countries. Iran also has shown interest in purchasing military equipment from other exhibitors. Iran's participation in international defense expos allows its entities to make contacts that could be used to trade ARMS at a later stage. ¶8. (SBU) There are two recent incidents where Iran was expelled from international defense shows post-UNSCR ¶1747. The latest one occurred in late April 2008 during an international defense show in Malaysia. Following repeated demarches from the U.S., UK, and France, Iranian companies were ordered out of the Defense Services Asia Show after Malaysian authorities inspected Iran's stand and discovered artillery, missiles and missile systems. The Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak explained to the press that the equipment the Iranian companies planned to exhibit contravened UN Security Council Resolutions.rationale for deletion: don't want to include more than what the Malaysians actually said. ¶9. (C) Another incident occurred in 2007 where an Iranian company, listed by UNSCR 1737 (2006) as a contributor to Iran's nuclear program, was exhibiting arms at a conference sponsored by publishing giant Reed Elsevier in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this case, the Iranian Defense Industries Organization (DIO) had a stall at the Latin American Aerospace and Defense Expo. The British and American Embassies were extensively engaged with the Brazilian foreign ministry (MRE) at the IO Assistant Secretary level, reminding Brazilian authorities of violations of UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. As a result, the DIO exhibit was dismantled on the orders of the Brazilian Chief of Defense Staff. -------------- FUTURE DEFENSE EXPOS -------------- ¶10. (S//NF) The next international defense expo of importance will take place in Indonesia, mid-November ¶2008. Details on the show can be obtained at www.indodefence.com. The Third Indonesia's Official Tri-Services Defense Event is scheduled from November 19-22, 2008 at the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base. MODLEX, the export arm of Iranian Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL),is in the list of potential exhibitors. MODAFL is the head of an overarching enterprise that subsidizes several other Iranian companies including DIO, 7th of Tir, AMIG, Parchin Chemical Industries, SHIG, Fajr Industrial Group, Sanam Industrial Group, and Ya Mahdi Industries Group; these entities are all listed by UNSCRS 1737 and 1747 as subject to targeted sanctions (asset freeze) for the involvement in Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile activities. MODLEX earns foreign currency by selling defense-related exports, which are then used by other partners of the organization to expand their work on conventional weapons, ballistic missile, and their related technologies. ¶11. Washington appreciates Posts' assistance on this matter. Department points of contact are Meg Mitchell, (202) 647-2433, mitchellmt2@state.sgov.gov and Lou Ganem, (202) 647-2329, ganemlc@state.sgov.gov. Please slug all replies to ISN, EUR and SCA. RICE NNNN End Cable Text