SUDAN - ABYEI MEETING IN LONDON AND NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 066284 SENSITIVE SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO CONGEN JUBA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL SOCI UNSC AU SU SUBJECT: SUDAN - ABYEI MEETING IN LONDON AND NEXT STEPS REF: A. KHARTOUM 889 B. KHARTOUM 898 C. KHARTOUM 899 Classified By: A/S Jendayi Frazer; Reasons (a) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 12. Background - Convening of International Partners -------------- ¶2. (U) Michael O'Neill, Special Envoy to Sudan for the United Kingdom, convened a gathering of capital-based representatives on Friday, June 13 to discuss the current situation in Sudan with respect to Abyei, particularly in light of the June 8 roadmap document reached by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Canada, the European Union, The Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and the United States (AF/SPG) convened to discuss recent events and next steps. The group underscored that our counterparts on the ground in Khartoum should maintain close communication as the front line operators on these issues. Arbitration - Looking a Little Scary -------------- ¶3. (U) Arbitration, Abyei administration, security, and oil issues, not to mention the humanitarian situation, were top items of discussion. Acknowledging the roadmap as a political, vice legal document, the group expressed significant concerns about the idea of arbitration as articulated in the roadmap for its vagueness and capacity to further delay any true resolution to the Abyei impasse. The UK legal advisor, Daniel Bethlehem, provided an outline entitled "Abyei: Options for Arbitration" briefly describing major concerns of this procedure; AF/SPG will provide to post via email. ¶4. (U) The Terms of Reference (TOR) document, to be decided by the parties, is the most crucial aspect to any arbitration proceeding. In the case of this roadmap, it is not immediately clear which issue the parties intend to send to arbitration, thus the importance of the TOR in defining the role of any arbitral body is even more important. All attendees underscored the importance of supporting the parties in these proceedings at the outset, and the Dutch are actively making plans to dispatch a private sector lawyer with arbitration experience to Khartoum to work with the parties on development of the TOR. ¶5. (U) AF/SPG is prepared to dispatch an attorney from the Legal Advisor's Office (Christina Sanford) to support the advancement of the roadmap's arbitration provisions. Though technically this legal assistance can go to support both parties, we anticipate the bulk of the support will be spent on assisting the SPLM in its participation in the formation of the TOR and other legal issues under the roadmap. Ms. Sanford can arrive in Khartoum as early as June 27. UNMIS - Wherefore art thou? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) General frustration over the role of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in the recent Abyei clashes mirrored those complaints from UNSRSG Qazi himself (ref c). There is an appetite to push for expansion of the UNMIS mandate in an attempt to make it more responsive, for example by authorizing a policing capability within UNMIS. However, a recognition of UNMIS unwillingness to use its current mandate and continued lack of access due to the SAF and SPLA were among factors that weighed in favor of continuing to push UNMIS to use its current capabilities, as opposed to merely broadening its mandate. The recent changes in UNMIS command leadership, including departure of Force Commander Lidder and ongoing transition to his replacement, were thought to be a contributing factor in the breakdown in UNMIS response to the looting and fighting in Abyei. General confusion over the Joint Defense Board (JDB) process, perhaps attributable to UNMIS lack of access (ref c),had international partners pondering which next steps were the best ones with respect to strengthening UNMIS. ¶7. (SBU) The group bemoaned the absence of capable Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),and the UK and Dutch indicated they were reviewing ways of offering more assistance in this area. Discussion of the seemingly now defunct "JIU Support Cell" underscored that the absence of international leadership, no doubt coupled with Khartoum's intransigence, had negatively impacted the capacity of JIUs at this time. Oil - Perhaps a Glimmer of Hope? -------------- ¶8. (C) Norwegian Petroleum Envoy Anders Hannevik (protect) gave a thorough presentation of the oil production situation in Abyei, outlining that Abyei's oil production is likely to begin decreasing in 2011. Thus, Abyei is not lucrative enough for either party to derail the CPA over it. Of particular note, Hannevik explained that the roadmap demonstrated a willingness of the parties to separate the land of Abyei from the oil there as a way to break the impasse. ¶9. (C) In particular, paragraph 3.10 calls for the parties to place percentages of their oil wealth from areas under arbitration into development funds. Heglig oil field, he points out, is considered part of the roadmap's arbitration but not within the roadmap's interim border. Prior to the roadmap, the South did not receive any oil wealth from this area because it was within the region covered by the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report and thus rejected. Under the June 8 roadmap, according to Hannevik, those fields (i.e. Heglig) are now subject to revenue splitting as "areas under arbitration". (Comment: The precise interpretation of the roadmap's provisions on oil sharing is not entirely clear at this point. Hannevik is quite protective of his oil information given the amount of access he has been given in both Northern and Southern ministries and would not provide copies of his presentation. End comment.) The Assessment and Evaluation Commission - The Chance for a Bigger Part? -------------- ¶10. (SBU) All parties acknowledged the extremely helpful role played by the AEC in the days immediately following the Abyei clashes. AEC leadership under Chairman Sir Derek Plumbly had appropriately cast the body in a concerned and proactive light. All representatives agreed that the AEC should be encouraged to take a strong role in following up on the issues outlined above in parallel track to any bilateral or multilateral support that was agreed upon between international partners and the parties. ¶11. (SBU) COMMENT ON ARBITRATION: Assessing the seriousness of the parties in their desire to pursue arbitration, it was agreed, would be best done in a phased approach. Though full international community support is essential, the roadmap is not an alternative to the CPA and should not become grounds for continued delay by either party. Recognizing the genuine pitfalls of the "solution" the parties have reached in this case, such as continued delay or the ultimate refusal to abide by arbitration proceedings, we join our international partners in their concern about the implications of failure for this particular deal on lasting peace. ¶12. (U) ACTION REQUEST EMBASSY KHARTOUM: The Department is poised to be as supportive as possible in pursuit of implementing the June 8 roadmap. All requests for support will be considered and evaluated with as forward leaning approach as possible with existing resources. Post is encouraged to consult with international partners on these points during ongoing discussions of the June 8 roadmap. Drawing from the readout above, post is requested to provide feedback on the following areas: a. Provision of U.S. legal advisor for purposes of developing a TOR for arbitration: Post is requested to confirm acceptance of USG legal advisor available to assist with the development of the TOR or other related issues as they arise; an advisor can only arrive in Khartoum on June 27 at the earliest. b. Increased military support: USG direct support to JIUs is largely limited under the existing legislative restrictions, but we are nonetheless eager to know of discreet areas to push donors, or to focus ourselves, with respect to improving the impact of the JIUs in the south. c. UNMIS mandate review and increased pressure on UNMIS: We are sensitive to Qazi's complaints (ref C),but recognize that the UNMIS position is often marked by a "wait and see" approach. Were we to pursue efforts both to push UNMIS to use its existing authorities and to consider enhancing the existing UNMIS mandate, which authorizes full unrestricted UNMIS monitoring and verification in the Abyei region, what specific items should be considered for inclusion in a resolution expanding or revising UNMIS's mandate? d. Evaluation of current UNMIS military leadership: Please identify the relevant actors within that structure and highlight any perceived strengths or weaknesses in their approach to the force command, particularly with regard to Abyei. e. Support to Abyei: Previous suggestions on supporting the Abyei region, for example through cross-border confidence building measures, remain under consideration. Post is encouraged to provide supporting detail on envisioned projects. ¶13. (U) DEADLINE: The Department requests feedback no later than Monday, June 23, COB Khartoum. ¶14. (U) Post's continued and ongoing efforts are greatly appreciated in this regard. RICE