Secretary Rice's Meeting with Turkish FM

S E C R E T STATE 065812 E.O. 12958: DECL: AS: 06/05/2028 TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PTER PGOV IZ, IR, TU SUBJECT: Secretary Rice's Meeting with Turkish FM Babacan in Washington, DC, on June 5, 2008. ¶1. (U) Classified by Kurt Volker, EUR/FO. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶2. (U) Participants: United States Secretary Rice S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Dailey NEA Assistant Secretary C. David Welch PA Sean McCormack EUR Acting Assistant Secretary Kurt Volker ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patty McNerney SCA Acting Assistant Secretary Don Camp EUR/SE Acting Director Baxter Hunt EUR/SE Turkey Desk Officer Paul Malik (notetaker) Turkey Foreign Minister Ali Babacan Ambassador Nabi Sensoy Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Affairs Haydar Berk Deputy Undersecretary for the Middle East Feridun Sinirlioglu Ersin Ercin, Deputy Director General for Americas Burak Ozugergin, Deputy Director General and Spokesman Deputy Chief of Mission Burak Akcapar Damla Say, Head of Department for Americas Counselor Murat Karagoz (notetaker) ¶3. (S) SUMMARY: In Babacan's first official visit to the State Department, the Secretary spoke of the close working relationship with Turkey in many key areas. He thanked the Secretary for U.S. cooperation with Turkey in combating PKK terrorism. The Secretary assured Babacan of strong U.S. support for Turkey's EU vocation. The Secretary thanked Turkey for its role in helping Iraqi officials understand the advantages of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),but stressed our concerns over Turkey introducing new elements into the Iraqi election law. Babacan returned repeatedly to Turkey's proposed participatory formula for Kirkuk. Both the Secretary and Babacan expressed optimism for a renewed Cyprus settlement process under UN auspices. The Secretary asked Babacan for additional flexibility in EU-NATO cooperation, including by agreeing on the KFOR OpPlan before the upcoming NATO MOD's meeting. Babacan said Turkey supports closer NATO-EU relations, but that the sinking of the Annan Plan on Cyprus in 2004 had poisoned relations between the two organizations. The Secretary thanked Babacan for the constructive role Turkey has played in Lebanon, but cautioned not to allow the Syrians and Lebanese minority to hijack the elections. Finally, the Secretary expressed her belief that Iran would not accept the recent P5/1 package, and pressed Turkey to support efforts to impose additional sanctions against Tehran. Babacan reiterated his government's opposition to Iran's nuclear and missile proliferation ambitions, but seemed surprised by the Secretary's warning not to underestimate U.S. will. END SUMMARY. ¶4. (S) Following a restricted bilateral meeting between Secretary Rice and Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan, the expanded meeting atmospherics were very positive but frank. Both the Secretary and FM Babacan underscored their close and frequent cooperation on a host of interests, acknowledging the two countries shared the same values. Babacan noted that, although Turkey and the United States share the same goals, each takes its own route to achieve them. He added that Turkey is seeking to expand its influence beyond its own neighborhood by opening an additional 15 embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as more in Latin America, and new consulates in India. Turkey and its successful reform program, undertaken as part of the EU accession process, are seen as an example for others. ¶5. (S) Babacan criticized French President Sarkozy for undermining Turkey's EU accession negotiations, citing new proposed French constitutional reforms that will discriminate against Turkey (by requiring a referendum on Turkish EU membership, but not that of other current aspirants). This latest potential setback came on top of the five chapters that the French had earlier frozen, and continued unhelpful rhetoric. He asked that Turkey be treated fairly and not prejudged. The Secretary reassured Babacan that the United States is highly supportive of Turkey's accession and suggested the Europeans would be making a strategic error if they drew the line at Turkey. She said we could raise the issue next week during the President's visit to France, with the aim of quieting the rhetoric, and keeping the process going and chapters open. Babacan was appreciative and said that his government's April 2007 EU roadmap kept domestic reforms moving forward on all fronts, regardless of the negative rhetoric from some European capitals. He lamented the fact that Turkish public support for EU accession had dropped from about 75% in 2004 to 50% currently. ¶6. (S) On the PKK and Iraq, Babacan heartily thanked the Secretary for support against the PKK, citing the November 5, 2007, meeting between Prime Minister Erdogan and President Bush as a watershed that also helped boost U.S. approval ratings in Turkey. Babacan talked of Turkey's new strategic dialogue with Iraq, the Talabani visit to Turkey, and the impending visit of Erdogan to Baghdad. But, he also warned that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) needed to move to interdict the PKK. The Secretary thanked Turkey for the role it is playing in educating Iraqi officials about how a SOFA can help to build an enduring relationship without undermining sovereignty. ¶7. (S) The Secretary warned Babacan that Turkey's proposal for a power-sharing deal in Kirkuk was unhelpful and threatened to derail an agreement on Kirkuk, which had been close to conclusion before the Turks became involved. She pressed Babacan to take his cues from the UN Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI) and Di Mistura. Babacan, clearly not grasping the Secretary's tone, argued that the multicultural nature of Kirkuk and the forced repopulation of the city demanded the kind of formula the Turks were proposing. He claimed that Talabani shares this view. The Secretary retorted that there was no consensus on the formula and that it would have exactly the opposite effect, making people suspicious. The best guidance comes from UNAMI and any new elements at this late stage will only torpedo a fragile compromise, she added. Babacan took a third run, arguing that Turkish Special Envoy for Iraq Ozcelik had already met with Nechirvan Barzani but believed Massoud Barzani held the key to reaching consensus on acceptance of the Turkish formula. The Secretary recommended that Babacan have Ozcelik discuss this further with Ambassador Satterfield. ¶8. (S) In response to Babacan's question regarding the status of the Iraqi hydrocarbons law, the Secretary said that the holdups are not because of revenue sharing or contracting issues, but really the role of the state, and that it should be resolved soon. She said that Nechirvan Barzani, in his recent Washington visit, said that the law would be discussed in Baghdad. It appears that an Iraqi state oil company would make the Kurds nervous about attracting capital and foreign investment. Babacan reminded the Secretary that, on the margins of the recent Iraq Compact meeting in Stockholm, he had told her that Iraq appears to have excluded Turkish companies from the initial list of 45 companies approved for the oil/gas sector. He hoped to see Turkish companies on the next list, especially since Turkey is keen to help get Iraqi oil/gas to European markets. ¶9. (S) The election of President Cristofias in Cyprus ushered in renewed optimism for an UN-led settlement process on the island, Babacan and the Secretary agreed. Babacan said that Turkey fully supports the ongoing technical committee and working group meetings, and expects an end of June announcement about the comprehensive negotiations. He cautioned that it is paramount that well- established UN parameters for a bizonal, bicommunal state be honored. Babacan characterized the June 4 London statement from Christofias and the UK's Gordon Brown as unhelpful, changing the parameters away from the Annan Plan and toward Government of Cyprus negotiating positions. She said that President Bush had worked hard in 2004 to get both communities on Cyprus to agree to the Annan Plan, and when it failed, the Secretary told the Cypriot and Greek governments that it had been a "wasted opportunity." ¶10. (S) The Secretary asked Babacan to be more flexible on NATO-EU cooperation. Babacan noted that Cyprus unfortunately has negatively impacted EU-NATO cooperation. He said that they had discussed this at NATO, but that NATO SecGen de Hoop Scheffer encouraged the EU also to take this up directly. Babacan claimed that Turkey supports greater cooperation with the EU, and between the EU and NATO, but that this is being systematically blocked by the EU because of Cyprus. That said, Turkey has conducted informal meetings and struck arrangements on important issues, such as Kosovo. EUR PDAS Volker urged Babacan to allow the KFOR Op Plan, which is currently stuck in the NATO military committee, to move forward before the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting. Language protecting Turkish interests concerning Cyprus and the EU can be negotiated in a cover note, Volker suggested, and urged that the Turkish PermRep at NATO be authorized to work this out with US Amb. Nuland. Babacan responded that the Turkish General Staff has adopted a strict position on the issue, but he would look for ways to be flexible. On a related matter, Babacan said that Serbian President Tadic had asked for Turkish help with his government's coalition. ¶11. (S) The Secretary thanked Babacan for the facilitative role Turkey is playing in the Syria- Israel talks, as well as its constructive engagement on Lebanon. She said the Lebanese majority needs Turkish involvement so that Syria and the Lebanese minority cannot hijack the elections. Turkey has a positive role to play in preventing Syrian meddling. ¶12. (S) Babacan seemed surprised by the strong message the Secretary delivered on Iran. She said that Iran is lying to the IAEA and that it is improving its enrichment capabilities. The Secretary asked for Turkey's assistance in supporting additional sanctions if Iran does not accept the recent P5/1 package, which she did not expect Tehran to do. Babacan said Turkey will encourage Iran to take the package. Secretary Rice said firmly that the message to deliver to Iran is one of isolation. The United States cannot keep waiting; time is short. We will take steps that will be costly and painful for Iran, she said. The United States should not be underestimated. RICE