HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 063666 UNVIE FOR S. AMADEO ¶E. SANDBERG ¶T. OSTOWSKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2033 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA SUBJECT: HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION (HCOC) -- RESULTS OF THE SEVENTH REGULAR MEETING OF SUBSCRIBING STATES, MAY 29-30, 2008 (SBU) REF: A. STATE 54671 ¶B. STATE 42285 ¶C. UNVIE 243 Classified By: IO/T Acting Director Dennis Delehanty. Reason: 1.4. H. ¶1. (U) The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) held its Seventh Regular Meeting of Subscribing States on May 29-30, 2008, at the Vienna International Center (VIC),in Vienna, Austria. 75 of 130 Subscribing States registered for the meeting. Many Subscribing States were represented by their UN missions in Vienna. Ambassador Gyorgyi Martin Zanathy, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations, IAEA, CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, chaired the meeting. //////////////////////////// Report of the Outgoing Chair //////////////////////////// ¶2. (C) Outgoing HCOC Chair Ivica Dronjic, Alternate Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, IAEA, CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, reiterated the importance of the HCOC as the only global instrument in the area of ballistic missile proliferation and underscored the achievements of the HCOC in the past year - four new countries joined the HCOC, the number of Annual Declarations (ADs) increased, and the successful organization of an outreach seminar for countries in the Middle East. He urged all Subscribing States to diligently implement their commitments under the HCOC, noting that its role and importance in addressing ballistic missile proliferation will be a direct reflection of their willingness to vigorously implement the Code. Finally, he hoped that the two HCOC countries that possess the most missile capabilities (e.g. Russia and the United States) would resolve the Prelaunch Notification (PLN) issue as soon as possible and begin (U.S.) or resume (Russia) issuing HCOC PLNs. ///////////////////////////// Remarks by the Incoming Chair ///////////////////////////// ¶3. (C) Newly-elected HCOC Chair Ambassador Martin Zanathy pledged her commitment to upholding the principles of the HCOC and working for its full implementation and universalization. She said Hungary believes effective multilateralism is the cornerstone of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems and looks forward to working with HCOC Subscribing States on outreach and other activities to realize their shared nonproliferation objectives. ///////////////////////////////////////////// Report of the Executive Secretariat/Immediate Central Contact (ES/ICC) ///////////////////////////////////////////// ¶4. (C) The Austrian Executive Secretariat/Immediate Central Contact(ES/ICC) reported that four countries -- the Dominican Republic, San Marino, Maldives, and Samoa -- had subscribed to the HCOC since the 2007 annual meeting, bringing the current membership to 130. The ES/ICC also reported that the domain name of the HCOC public website had been changed to www.hcoc.at. In addition, the ES/ICC noted that it had continued to disseminate ADs and PLNs and had circulated a revised annual declaration form for "Nil reports" to further facilitate the submission of ADs. It also had updated the HCOC distribution list. ///////////////////////// Annual Declarations (ADs) ///////////////////////// ¶5. (C) The ES/ICC reported that 72 Subscribing States had submitted ADs for 2007. This was 15 more than had been submitted for 2006. This positive increase was due in large part to the extensive "inreach" efforts of the ES/ICC and the incoming and outgoing chairs. However, while the number of ADs continues to increase, approximately 45% of HCOC Subscribing States have yet to submit ADs. The ES/ICC encouraged all HCOC states to use "inreach" to remind those who had not submitted ADs of their HCOC commitments. The ES/ICC also reminded Subscribing States that ADs for 2008 would be due on March 31, 2009. ////////////////////////////// Prelaunch Notifications (PLNs) ////////////////////////////// ¶6. (C) The ES/ICC reported that since the HCOC's 2007 annual meeting, 50 PLNs had been submitted. Approximately 54% of all PLNs were submitted by Russia - 27. In addition to Russia, Argentina, France, Japan, Norway, and Ukraine had submitted PLNs. The ES/ICC called on all Subscribing States to file PLNs when called for in a timely manner. The ES/ICC also reported that it had received a notification from Russia on December 29, 2007 that Russia would suspend submission of PLNs for an initial period of one year, beginning on January 1, 2008. Russia added that the reason for this decision was the persistent noncompliance by other HCOC states with their obligations on transparency (i.e., the U.S. not submitting PLNs). Russia added that the decision to impose the moratorium on PLNs was made by former Russian President Vladimir Putin. ////////////////////////// General/Opening Statements ////////////////////////// ¶7. (C) Australia, Benin, Chile, France, Japan, South Korea, Libya, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Slovenia (on behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine),Switzerland, Ukraine, and the U.S. made general statements. ¶8. (C) Australia said the continuing proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of WMD delivery is of great concern and noted that the complementary and reinforcing nature of the HCOC and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is central to addressing the global missile threat. In this context, Australia sees the true value of the HCOC in its effectiveness as a confidence building measure where transparency measures help build trust. But the effectiveness of the HCOC can only be realized if all HCOC members implement their HCOC obligations and submit ADs and PLNs. Accordingly, Australia urged all HCOC states to take their obligations seriously, noting that the issues the HCOC was designed to address remain as relevant now as when the HCOC was established. ¶9. (C) Benin proposed holding a conference in Benin prior to the next HCOC annual meeting to promote HCOC universalization and to raise awareness among developing countries about the global and regional security challenges posed by ballistic missile proliferation. ¶10. (C) Chile (on behalf of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) expressed concern about the growing threat to peace and security from ballistic missiles and affirmed its support for the HCOC as an important and relevant arms control tool. Chile said the HCOC complements other initiatives in the missile nonproliferation area and welcomed the HCOC's four newest members. It also urged all HCOC states to work to help fill the membership gaps in key areas, including via greater outreach to Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, Chile encouraged all HCOC members to fully comply with their HCOC obligations. ¶11. (C) France reiterated its strong support for the HCOC but regretted that universalization of the Code has not yet been achieved and called on all states to subscribe. France also called on all HCOC states to notify, or resume notification of, space and missile launches. Finally, France announced its readiness to serve as HCOC Chair in 2010-2011. ¶12. (C) Japan noted that the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to be a serious threat to international peace and security and expressed particular concern about missile developments in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. In light of this, Japan has been pleased by the steady expansion of the HCOC in terms of membership. However, Japan regrets that not all HCOC countries are submitting ADs and PLNs. Echoing Australia's comments, Japan noted the value and significance of the HCOC in promoting confidence and transparency, and urged all HCOC states to give serious thought to the importance of meeting their HCOC obligations. To promote universalization, Japan encouraged greater outreach to countries in Asia. Japan also encouraged HCOC Subscribing States to host voluntary site visits. ¶13. (C) South Korea agreed that the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities continues to pose a serious challenge to the security and stability of the international community, and said that addressing this urgent issue must be at the top of the international agenda. The ROK believes the HCOC can play a role in missile nonproliferation and reaffirmed its support for the HCOC as the only international norm against ballistic missile proliferation. The ROK also urged all HCOC states to submit ADs and PLNs, and encouraged additional "inreach" to HCOC countries to remind them to implement the Code's transparency measures and encourage their participation at HCOC meetings. In addition, the ROK urged further outreach -- particularly to countries with significant ballistic missile and space launch capabilities -- noting that there is still a long way to go before the HCOC is universalized. Finally, the ROK urged the HCOC to table a resolution on the HCOC at the 63rd UNGA, explaining that this would be additional way to promote the HCOC. ¶14. (C) Libya called on all states to support the HCOC and urged that monies now being spent to develop missiles be redirected to peaceful purposes and to meeting the needs of developing countries. Libya also asked all Subscribing States to fulfill their transparency and other obligations under the Code and reported that it is taking steps to adopt national legislation consistent with international agreements and resolutions on missile issues. Libya also said that it continues to seek MTCR membership. ¶15. (C) The Netherlands said the HCOC remains an essential instrument in the fight against missile proliferation. To be successful, it must have the active support of all HCOC countries. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands has sent a written message to all Subscribing States urging them to meet their HCOC obligations and to participate in the HCOC annual meeting. The Netherlands also supported increased outreach to promote universalization and the tabling of a resolution on HCOC at the upcoming UNGA. ¶16. (C) Russia focused on improving the HCOC, saying that it is of the utmost interest to Russia that the Code runs effectively and at full capacity because Russia considers the HCOC as the first step toward a global regime on missile nonproliferation. In this context, Russia greatly appreciated the message sent by the Dutch Foreign Minister urging all countries to fulfill their HCOC obligations. Russia also welcomed the addition of four more countries to the HCOC membership roster but noted that these countries do not make a qualitative difference. Instead, Russia believes, the HCOC should work to bring in those countries like Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan that have significant missile programs. In 2004, Russia put forward three proposals to amend the HCOC to make it more attractive to these countries, but so far there has been no interest in them. Russia would like a good discussion of these proposals or other ideas to make the Code more effective and more interesting. Until this is done - and until the HCOC is working properly - Russia sees noneed to promote the HCOC at the UN or to do more outreach. In Russia's view, the HCOC needs to get its house in order and become an attractive venue for countries with a real perspective on missile issues. Only when Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan are inside the door can the HCOC be an international venue for developing confidence on missile issues and become a launching pad for a multilateral dialogue aimed at elaborating a legally binding agreement for a global missile nonproliferation regime. ¶17. (C) Slovenia (on behalf of the EU and associated states) stressed the importance of faithful implementation of the Code by Subscribing States and regretted that the submission of PLNs and ADs and attendance at HCOC annual meetings remains weak. The EU feared that a persistent lack of full implementation of the HCOC threatens its viability and called on all HCOC countries to meet their obligations in full. The EU also urged continued outreach to encourage more counties in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America to subscribe, as well as the tabling of a resolution on the HCOC at the 63rd UNGA. Finally, noting that the proliferation of ballistic missile delivery systems for WMD is of growing concern and citing Iran and North Korea as particularly worrisome in this regard, the EU stressed the importance of a multilateral response to ballistic missile proliferation and the role of the HCOC in fulfilling this need as it is the sole multilateral confidence building and transparency instrument in the field of missile proliferation. ¶18. (C) Switzerland agreed that the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD poses a threat to global and regional security and said no effort should be spared to address this issue. Switzerland therefore hoped that the UN Panel on Missiles scheduled to meet during the first week of June 2008 would have a good outcome. Switzerland similarly noted with interest Russia's proposal for a global INF. It also agreed with the need for continued outreach to states with significant missile capabilities and strongly encouraged all HCOC countries to submit their ADs. While the number of ADs submitted each year continues to rise, it is still not enough. Switzerland also hoped that the PLN issue could be resolved soon and that all countries that launch SLVs and missiles would submit HCOC PLNs. ¶19. (C) Ukraine echoed the call for all states to fulfill their HCOC commitments and urged further outreach to the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia in order to truly universalize the Code. Ukraine also supported discussing ways to strengthen and enhance the HCOC. ¶20. (C) In response to a decision taken at the November 2004 HCOC meeting, the U.S. included in its opening statement discussion of the nature of the missile proliferation threat, its significance for Subscribing States, and measures that could be taken to address this threat. The U.S. noted that the trend is toward missiles of increasing ranges, payload, lethality, and sophistication, and stressed the particular concerns raised by the missile programs in Iran and North Korea. The U.S. urged all HCOC states to fully and effectively implement UNSCRs 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803, and to cooperate in establishing a global network of interlocking national export control systems consistent with the requirements of UNSCR 1540. In addition, the U.S. noted the value of taking steps to stem the flow of financial support for activities of missile proliferation concern and underscored the critical role export control organizations and experts can play in assisting financial jurisdictions in restricting proliferation activities. The U.S. also called on all countries to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). ////////////////////////////// Proposals to Improve the HCOC ///////////////////////////// ¶21. (SBU) The Chair asked countries to comment on the issues raised during opening statements and/or on any of the proposals that had been tabled for discussion. German Proposal on PLNs, ADs, Definitions, and Consultations ///////////////////////////////////////////// / ¶22. (C) Germany clarified that its proposal was a resubmission of a paper first circulated in 2003. The ROK welcomed the German paper as a useful best practices guide for PLNs and ADs. The ROK also agreed that for PLNs, the MTCR definition of a Category I missile should be used as the HCOC standard. The U.S. disagreed, noting that the HCOC had long ago determined there was no need for formal definitions in the HCOC - or definitions borrowed from other organizations -- as long as each country explained its approach. The U.S. also thought there was no need for a formal consultative mechanism and said the HCOC needed to be flexible in terms of formats for ADs and PLNs. However, the U.S. did agree that Germany's paper could be a useful reference tool. France also urged a flexible approach to ADs and PLNs, noting that the current system seems to be working well. Poland supported the German proposal, especially with regard to formatting PLNs and ADs. German Paper Providing Statistics on HCOC PLNs Compared with Launches Registered Through Open Sources ///////////////////////////////////////////// ////////// ¶23. (C) Germany noted that the paper was self-explanatory and welcomed any questions or feedback. There was no discussion of the paper. Russian Proposal to Enhance the HCOC //////////////////////////////////// ¶24. (C) Russia explained that it had tabled the same three proposals every year for the last four years and was doing so again because it believed this was the way to attract " important" countries to the Code. In Russia's view, the only way to have a viable HCOC is to bring in all countries with ballistic missile programs and space programs. In other words, Russia said, the HCOC does not need to achieve full universality. Instead, Russia believes what is needed is for the HCOC to be a club that represents the opinions of all countries with ballistic missile and space programs. In Russia's view, once the HCOC is such a club, it can move forward to create a system to affect positively missile development worldwide. ¶25. (C) In light of this, and keeping in mind Russia's assessment that the meetings that led to the formation of the HCOC did not properly take into account the concerns of many countries with missile and space programs, Russia has, since 2004, put forward three proposals to address these countries' concerns. Russia would like to discuss these proposals - and any other ideas for attracting key missile possessing countries to the HCOC. In Russia's view, unless there is change, the HCOC will never be inclusive, nor will it be of interest to key countries. Moreover, and as Russia has said many times before, the HCOC needs to discuss these matters seriously. The HCOC also needs to fully implement all transparency measures if it wants to avoid further aggravating the situation. ¶26. (C) Germany agreed on the importance of bringing the countries mentioned by Russia into the HCOC. However, Germany said its outreach activities have shown that the biggest obstacle to these countries joining the HCOC is not that HCOC states are obliged to make ADs or PLNs but the fact that most current HCOC countries do not implement the HCOC's confidence building measures (CBMs). ¶27. (C) Noting the numerous implicit, if not explicit, comments made by HCOC participants thus far about the lack of PLNs from the United States, the U.S. underscored its ongoing and active support of the HCOC and reminded participating countries of its position on PLNs. In particular, and as it made clear at the HCOC launching conference in 2002, the U.S. intends to make PLNs under the provisions of an agreement worked out with the Russian Federation which predates the HCOC. This system is to be established and operated in connection with the U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). However, the necessary implementing arrangements for the JDEC have not been finalized, and the U.S. has not yet been able to provide HCOC PLNs in the manner announced in ¶2002. But although it is not yet established, neither is the JDEC "on hold." The U.S. continues to discuss this matter with Russia at senior levels - most recently at the May 19 Rood-Kislyak talks in Oslo - and both sides have agreed to further technical talks on the JDEC in June 2008. The U.S. is hopeful that these talks will be productive and help advance the HCOC PLNs issue. ¶28. (C) Russia responded that it had never linked HCOC PLNs to progress on the JDEC. In Russia's estimation, if a country makes a political commitment, it should honor it fully. Continuing, Russia said it is serious about its commitments and did not take the decision to suspend its PLNs lightly. This decision was made by the Russian President. Moreover, Russia said, the GOR does not appreciate emotional demarches urging it to restart PLNs. Instead, countries should talk to Russia seriously about important issues like how to bring the remaining missile possessors into the HCOC. ¶29. (C) Russia also did not agree with Germany's assessment that countries like China are not joining the HCOC because all countries inside the HCOC are not fulfilling their commitments. Russia views this as a pretext or excuse for countries to stay away from the HCOC. Russia believes the problem is that the important missile possessor countries are being ignored by the HCOC. What the HCOC needs to do, Russia said, is adopt an approach like the UN Panel on Missiles in New York, where the views of countries around the global are taken into account. The point is to bring in serious countries, not to universalize the Code for the sake of universalization. ¶30. (C) The Netherlands noted that Russia seems to attach great importance to a certain type of HCOC expansion - expansion that Russia believes will strengthen the HCOC. However, this seems to be inconsistent with Russia's proposal to make ADs and PLNs voluntary. In the Dutch view, making HCOC CBMs voluntary would weaken the Code. Moreover, the HCOC should not want to admit countries that are not interested in participating fully. ¶31. (C) Denmark pointed out that a great deal of effort has been expended during the past year to animate Subscribing States. This has begun to pay off: discussion at the annual meeting has been more robust than in the previous two years, and more ADs have been submitted. However, there is a problem with PLNs. Denmark cannot understand why Russia and the U.S. are not submitting them. While it is true that the U.S. position has not changed since 2002, the fact that the JDEC system is not yet up and running has changed the environment and it is reasonable to expect that the U.S. would reconsider its position. By the same token, Russia's cessation of PLNs seems to be inconsistent with its repeated statements of support for the HCOC. In short, Denmark noted, transparency measures are the very heart of the Code, and all HCOC countries need to implement them fully. Denmark also disagreed with Russia's contention that no attention was paid to the concerns of "certain countries" when the HCOC was being created. ¶32. (C) Germany agreed and urged more "inreach" to other Subscribing States to animate them further. Germany also urged additional outreach activities to understand why countries like China and India have not subscribed. ///////// Outreach //////// ¶33. (C) The U.S. reported that since the 2007 HCOC annual meeting, it had demarched more than 30 countries to urge them to subscribe to the Code. Both Bahrain and Oman indicated that they are actively considering subscription, and the U.S. believes it would be helpful if other countries would follow-up with them. ¶34. (C) France briefly outlined its proposed action plan for universalizing the HCOC, and asked for reaction. The proposal includes measures to increase awareness of the Code, as well as targeted outreach activities. ¶35. (C) Germany, Greece, Poland, the Netherlands, South Korea, the UK, and the U.S. all supported the proposal. South Korea highlighted France's suggestion for designating HCOC sponsors to help shepherd potential members through the subscription process. The UK and the U.S. both strongly endorsed the idea of creating a helpful and informative HCOC website, with the U.S. suggesting that the HCOC think seriously about adding Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to the website. NOTE: As a result of this intervention and related discussions during the Heads of Delegation luncheon, the Chair asked the U.S. to take responsibility for drafting a set of HCOC FAQs for review by all Subscribing States. The U.S. agreed to do so. END NOTE. ¶36. (C) Russia said it would study the French proposal and provide an official assessment at a later date. However, Russia's preliminary reaction is that the French proposal is aimed in a direction Russia does not want to go. Russia does not support universalization for the sake of universality. Russia wants the HCOC to be expanded to include key missile possessors. To do this, the HCOC must first fix its internal problems. Additionally, Russia thinks that the idea of an HCOC country sponsoring a new member is problematic: Russia cannot imagine any current HCOC country wanting to "put China or Pakistan on its shoulders." ¶37. (C) Norway thought the French paper offered a good way forward and welcomed further discussion. Norway also thought that universalization could be pursued in parallel with efforts to promote full implementation of HCOC CBMs. ¶38. (C) France appreciated the feedback. At the Chair's request, it agreed to work with the Chair to revise the paper and circulate a new draft via the ES/ICC. Ukrainian Proposal on Definitions and Formats ///////////////////////////////////////////// ¶39. (C) Ukraine noted that it had previously circulated its paper in 2005. The intent of the paper is to clarify which missiles are covered under the HCOC by using the MTCR's terms for ballistic missile, range, and payload. Ukraine appreciated the comments made earlier by the U.S. on definitional issues and planned to follow-up off-line. Ukraine also welcomed comments from other Subscribing States as well. ¶40. (C) The Netherlands noted that the MTCR is an export control regime and that the HCOC is a transparency arrangement. Given their different approaches, it is probably not necessary or desirable to have identical definitions. Denmark agreed that it would be better not to intermingle the HCOC and the MTCR and to preserve flexibility by keeping the HCOC language general. If and when there ever is agreement on specific parameters, this could be put in a separate internal document. ¶41. (C) The ROK also agreed that it probably was not wise to conflate the HCOC and the MTCR. However, the ROK did like the idea of borrowing the MTCR's 300km/500kg range/payload parameters. ¶42. (C) France shared the Dutch view on the differing objectives and purposes of the HCOC and the MTCR and said it would need more time to study Ukraine's paper. France also noted that there are some very concerning missile systems that would not be captured by Ukraine's proposed definitions. ¶43. (C) With regard to Ukraine's suggestions concerning formats for ADs and PLNs, the ES/ICC reminded Subscribing States that the HCOC had decided in 2003 that there would be no prescriptive formats for ADs and PLNs. ¶44. (C) Ukraine appreciated the various inputs and said it would continue working this issue with interested countries off-line. ///////////// UN Resolution ///////////// ¶45. (C) The Chair asked HCOC participants for their views on promoting the HCOC in the UN and tabling another HCOC resolution at the UNGA as a means of increasing awareness of the HCOC and ballistic missile proliferation more generally. Slovenia then introduced a proposed draft UNGA resolution on the HCOC endorsed by the EU countries participating in the HCOC. ¶46. (C) Norway supported the proposal, as did Japan and South Korea. However, Russia objected to advertising the HCOC in the UN. Russia said that when the HCOC has its house in order, Russia will support promoting it but not until then. As Russia has said previously, the HCOC is close to a crisis, and Russia thinks the priority needs to be on fixing the HCOC, not on promoting it. Once all countries are making PLNs and ADs and important missile possessors have joined the HCOC, Russia will be prepared to promote it. Beyond this, Russia is concerned that tabling a resolution on the HCOC in the UN will have a divisive effect as it did in 2005. Some countries view the HCOC resolution as a counter weight to an Iranian resolution on missiles. This is not a good thing, and creates an antagonistic situation, whereas the HCOC should be about hearing the voices of all countries that have something to say about ballistic missile proliferation. ¶47. (C) South Africa said it also had concerns about putting forward an UNGA resolution on the HCOC. It also shared Russia's view that the 2005 resolution was divisive. ¶48. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Chair concluded that further consultations on this matter would be needed. //////////// Next Meeting //////////// ¶49. (U) It was agreed that the next regular meeting of Subscribing States would be held in Vienna on May 28-29, ¶2009. ////////// Next Chair ////////// ¶50. (C) The HCOC elected Costa Rica to serve as Chair in 2009-2010 and welcomed France's offer to Chair the HCOC, beginning with the 2010 annual meeting. France will be formally elected to serve as HCOC Chair for 2010-2011 at the HCOC's 8th annual meeting in 2009. /////////////////////////// HCOC Communications Systems /////////////////////////// ¶51. (C) France asked whether the ES/ICC had given any thought to establishing an internet-based information system to exchange HCOC documents, and offered to assist with such a project. The ES/ICC was willing to look into the matter but noted that costs would be involved in such an effort. It was agreed to discuss this matter further at a later date. ////////////////// Chairman's Summary ////////////////// ¶52. (C) The Chair circulated a draft Chairman's Summary report for consideration by participating countries. Following several hours of discussion, a revised text was adopted by consensus. The ES/ICC was mandated to distribute the agreed final text to all HCOC Subscribing States. //////////////// DECISIONS TAKEN /////////////// ¶53. (C) The following decisions were taken by the Subscribing States present at the Seventh Annual Meeting of Subscribing States to the HCOC, held May 29-30, 2008, in Vienna: (C/RELEASABLE HCOC SUBSCRIBING STATES) -- Ambassador Gyorgyi Martin Zanathy, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations , IAEA, CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, was elected Chair of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the HCOC. --HCOC Subscribing States confirmed that Annual Declarations on Subscribing States' national space and ballistic missile policies are to be submitted to the Austrian HCOC Executive Secretary/Immediate Central Contact (ES/ICC) by March 31. --The HCOC adopted a Chairman's Summary of the 2008 HCOC annual meeting. It has been circulated to all Subscribing States by the Austrian ES/ICC. --The HCOC will hold its Eighth Annual Meeting on May 28-29, 2009, in Vienna. --Costa Rica will chair the 2009 annual meeting of the HCOC and serve as Chair for 2009-2010. /////////////// U.S. DELEGATION /////////////// ¶54. (U) The U.S. delegation to the Seventh Annual Meeting of HCOC Subscribing States included ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham (head of delegation),ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann, UNVIE Tom Ostrowski, UNVIE Eric Sandberg, and UNVIE Stefanie Amadeo. RICE NNNN End Cable Text