REAFFIRMING RUSSIA,S COMMITMENT TO THE WMD

UNCLAS STATE 063551 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT OTRA PREL PTER RS SUBJECT: REAFFIRMING RUSSIA,S COMMITMENT TO THE WMD TERRORISM WORK PLAN SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY ¶1. (U) This is an action request (see para 3). ¶2. (SBU) At the recent weapons of mass destruction terrorism (Wmd-t) sub-group meeting of the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) in washington in February, the united states and russia adopted a robust work plan that marked a strong U.S. and RUSSIAN INTEREST IN WMD terrorism cooperation. In the plan itself, Russia pledged to RESPOND BY March on two specific U.S. proposals ) a nuclear forensics plan and a MoU on consequence management for incidents in the vicinity of nuclear plants. However, RussiaN interlocutors HAve NOT YET respondED to our proposals, AND subsequently HAVe implied that THEY must SECURE INTERAGENCY APPROVAL before implementation. ¶3. (SBU) IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT WMD TERRORISM INITIATIVES, particularly in advance of the CTWG, department requests post deliver a message to APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN the mfa office of new challenges and threats, drawing on the points below. Department requests that post deliver these points in a tone consistent with our bilateral dialogue, and not pass them verbatim as a non-paper. -- At the february WMD subgroup meeting of the CTWG IN WASHINGTON, we were pleased to adopt a work plan laying out concrete plans for cooperation in the field of wmd terrorism. we regard the plan as a blueprint for success, beneficial to both the U.S. and Russia. -- AT A TIME WHEN al-qa,ida leadership HAS publicly declared ITS belief that weapons of mass destruction are a legitimate form of attack against civilians, COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST. -- IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE EAGER TO MOVE FORWARD IN IMPLEMENTING THE WORK PLAN and undertaking the many important action items. We would welcome information about the status of Russian approval of the work plan, which we hope will be soon. -- ALSO, WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA,S RESPONSE TO the PROPOSALS MADE AT the FEBRUARY SUB-GROUP meeting for Bilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, aN MoU on consequence management for incidents in the vicinity of nuclear plants, and to recent non-papers sent on foreign consequence management and a bioterrorism tabletop exercise. ¶4. (U) department appreciates post,s assistance in conveying these points. RICE