REAFFIRMING RUSSIA,S COMMITMENT TO THE WMD

UNCLAS STATE 063551

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT OTRA PREL PTER RS
SUBJECT: REAFFIRMING RUSSIA,S COMMITMENT TO THE WMD
TERRORISM WORK PLAN

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY


1. (U) This is an action request (see para 3).


2. (SBU) At the recent weapons of mass destruction terrorism
(Wmd-t) sub-group meeting of the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism
Working Group (CTWG) in washington in February, the united
states and russia adopted a robust work plan that marked a
strong U.S. and RUSSIAN INTEREST IN WMD terrorism
cooperation. In the plan itself, Russia pledged to RESPOND
BY March on two specific U.S. proposals ) a nuclear
forensics plan and a MoU on consequence management for
incidents in the vicinity of nuclear plants. However,
RussiaN interlocutors HAve NOT YET respondED to our
proposals, AND subsequently HAVe implied that THEY must
SECURE INTERAGENCY APPROVAL before implementation.


3. (SBU) IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT WMD
TERRORISM INITIATIVES, particularly in advance of the CTWG,
department requests post deliver a message to APPROPRIATE
OFFICIALS IN the mfa office of new challenges and threats,
drawing on the points below. Department requests that post
deliver these points in a tone consistent with our bilateral
dialogue, and not pass them verbatim as a non-paper.

-- At the february WMD subgroup meeting of the CTWG IN
WASHINGTON, we were pleased to adopt a work plan laying out
concrete plans for cooperation in the field of wmd terrorism.
we regard the plan as a blueprint for success, beneficial to
both the U.S. and Russia.

-- AT A TIME WHEN al-qa,ida leadership HAS publicly declared
ITS belief that weapons of mass destruction are a legitimate
form of attack against civilians, COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD
IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

-- IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE EAGER TO MOVE FORWARD IN
IMPLEMENTING THE WORK PLAN and undertaking the many important
action items. We would welcome information about the status
of Russian approval of the work plan, which we hope will be
soon.

-- ALSO, WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA,S RESPONSE TO the
PROPOSALS MADE AT the FEBRUARY SUB-GROUP meeting for
Bilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, aN MoU on
consequence management for incidents in the vicinity of
nuclear plants, and to recent non-papers sent on foreign
consequence management and a bioterrorism tabletop exercise.


4. (U) department appreciates post,s assistance in conveying
these points.
RICE