G8 NPDG CONSIDERS NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT

UNCLAS STATE 063111


SENSITIVE

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION)

GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC

SUBJECT: G8 NPDG CONSIDERS NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT

Summary


1. (SBU) At its June 5 meeting, the G8 Nonproliferation
Directors Group (NPDG) agreed on most of the nonproliferation
language for the G8 Summit statement, but left some key
issues unresolved. These included the G8's view of the way
forward on nuclear disarmament, the DPRK (whether to mention
abductions and how to describe Six-Party commitments),and
Iran (whether to mention suspension of enrichment and the
need to consider EU High Representative Solana's June 14 trip
to Tehran). Compromise U.S.-Canadian language on transfers
of enrichment and reprocessing technology, facilities, and
equipment was widely accepted, but the EU and others wanted
time to consider its legal ramifications. NPDG
representatives will try to resolve outstanding issues by
email. end summary


2. (U) Mary Alice Hayward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations,
ISN, led the U.S. delegation to the June 5 meeting of the G8
Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) in Kyoto, Japan. The
meeting, the last before the G8 Summit in July, was almost
entirely occupied with drafting the nonproliferation section
of the G8 Leaders' statement. This report summarizes key
points raised in that discussion.


3. (SBU) Discussion of the first paragraph on general goals
centered on the strong German interest in having a reference
to a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. The U.S. had
countered on the need to stress the environment necessary to
create such a world, and the chair proposed a compromise
taking both perspectives into account. France made a strong
argument that this was a nonproliferation statement and was
not the place to reconcile fundamental differences on
disarmament. After a fairly long discussion, the Chair
produced a paragraph in which the key last sentence remained
bracketed. The paragraph reads: "We are determined to make
all efforts to overcome the danger of the proliferation of
WMD and their delivery means and to prevent acquisition of
WMD by terrorists, by upholding, strengthening and
universalizing all relevant multilateral non-proliferation
and disarmament instruments. (We are committed to working
towards/realizing a world free of all WMDs by creating an
environment conducive to such a goal.)"

DPRK


4. (SBU) Although all participants recognized that the
section on the DPRK and Iran would have to be revised before
the Summit depending on developments in the meantime, the
Group nevertheless held extensive discussions of these two
issues, drawing on revisions proposed by the U.S., as well as
language the chair had circulated earlier. Japan and Russia,
in particular, had rather heated exchanges on the DPRK
section, both referring to the 2005 Six-Party declaration.
Among the issues raised were whether to refer only to
commitments by the DPRK or whether to mention commitments of
all six parties; whether to specifically call for the
"complete, verifiable, and irreversible" denuclearization of
the DPRK; and whether to mention the abduction issue. On the
latter, the Japanese chair (Takeshi Nakane, Director-General,
Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science Department, MOFA)
said he had no flexibility, especially since the Summit was
to be in Japan. If the question could not be resolved by the
NPDG, he would have to bring it to Political Directors. The
Chair said he would provide a re-drafted paragraph.

Iran


5. (SBU) The discussion on the Iran paragraph led off with
Russia proposing that the G8 use the paragraph the P-5 had
agreed to at the May NPT PrepCom. Other representatives
argued, however, that the context was different and that the
G8 should instead draw on language from previous summit
statements, which included references to Iranian suspension
of enrichment activities (which the P-5 statement did not).
All agreed on the need to take into account the upcoming
visit of EU High Representative Solana to Tehran on June 14,
but not on whether to reflect the recent report of the IAEA
Director General. In that connection the Russian
representative pointed out that the U.S. and Russia (at a
Rood/Kislyak meeting) had agreed there would be no Iran
resolution at the June 2-6 IAEA Board of Governors. The
Chair said this paragraph would have to be considered by
Political Directors, but later clarified that this would not
happen at their meeting to take place the week of June 9.

NPT Review Process


6. (U) The result of a long discussion on the NPT was finally
to take a Canadian suggestion and revert to straight-forward
language from the G8 Gleneagles statement. In the agreed
paragraph, the G8 agree to "work collectively to achieve a
successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference" and
"pledge ... to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen
the Treaty."

Nuclear Testing/FMCT


7. (U) A brief discussion on these issues led to a technical
amendment as to what a testing moratorium applied to. The
paragraph was then agreed.

BTWC/CWC/Hague Code of Conduct


8. (U) There were no substantive comments on this paragraph.


Other Nonproliferation Activities


9. (U) Russia objected to U.S. proposals for strengthening
references to UNSC Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation
Security Initiative. The chair accepted some U.S. language
on 1540 ("stress full implementation of UNSC resolution
1540") but not calls for assisting other states in
implementing the Resolution.

Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction


10. (U) With the change of one of three "risks" to
"challenges" in the second sentence of this paragraph, the
Group accepted the compromise language agreed to at the
special meeting of the Global Partnership Working Group
(GPWG) the previous day (septel). The language reflects
determination to "accomplish" priority projects underway and
notes agreement that "since the risks of the spread of
weapons and materials of mass destruction exist
worldwide,...the Partnership will address these global
challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism
and proliferation are greatest."

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy


11. (U) Apart from some minor fixes and the Russian request
to delete a reference to "3S," (referring to nonproliferation
safeguards, safety, and security) which the Russians said
could not be translated into Russian but which the Chair
insisted on retaining, the only debate on this paragraph
concerned a final sentence referring to Chernobyl. Canada
and the chair argued that such a reference was needed to
carry on work on this issue, although others said it was not
relevant to the activities of the NPDG. The chair said the
Japanese would raise it with the Sherpas.

Transfers of Sensitive (Enrichment and Reprocessing--ENR)
Technology


12. (SBU) The discussion centered on a compromise paragraph
that the U.S. and Canadian representatives had worked out on
an ad referendum basis just before the meeting began. Other
representatives expressed their pleasure that the U.S. and
Canada seemed to have reached agreement and -- except for
agreeing to a Russian suggestion to use "criteria based
approach" to describe what the NSG was coming to agreement on
-- did not change the language. The EU representative said
that the restriction on certain kinds of transfers of
"equipment, facilities and technology" could run up against
EURATOM rules and needed to be reviewed by EU lawyers.
Others expressed surprise that the EU was raising this
concern at such a late date, when the G8 has agreed on even
stricter restrictions in the past. All representatives
agreed that this paragraph would stay in brackets for review
by their authorities. The chair hoped the issue could be
settled by email exchanges.


13. (U) After some discussion, the chair agreed that the
Political Directors would not discuss the text of the
statement in their meeting on June 9-10, but that NPDG
representatives would attempt to resolve outstanding issues
by email. At the conclusion of the meeting, he circulated a
text, showing where the discussion had led, except on the
DPRK and Iran, where he promised to transmit language later.

G8 Initiative on Nuclear Energy Infrastructure


14. (SBU) The Japanese introduced to the NPDG a paper on this
subject agreed by a recent meeting of the Nuclear Safety and
Security Group (NSSG). It calls for states to take account
of the 3S's (see para 11 above),when developing national
infrastructures for nuclear power. While France, the U.S.,
the UK, Italy, and the EU supported the general thrust of the
paper, the German representative recalled that at the NSSG,
Germany said it could not participate in this activity until
it was discussed at more senior G8 levels and higher
authorities in Germany had blessed it. After the Russians
recalled that their proposal to place the NSSG under the NPDG
had been rejected in 2006 and others engaged in further
procedural wrangling, the chair announced that Japan would
bring the issue to the Sherpas to resolve.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540


15. (U) Tomiko Ichikawa, MOFA official responsible for this
field, briefed the Group on her May 13 contacts with the
chair of the 1540 Committee in New York, at which time she
had asked how the G8 could support the Committee's
activities. He had replied that since the Committee's
program of work was not finalized, he could not provide
priorities but noted that the number of countries reporting
(140)--some more than once--showed the success of outreach
programs. Nevertheless, some 35 states had not reported,
indicating a continuing need to raise awareness, particularly
in Africa, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. Ichikawa
said she would consult with G8 partners to get ideas on what
to do next. There were no comments.

Bilateral Demarche on FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty)


16. (SBU) At a bilateral discussion the day before the NPDG
meeting, Hayward had brought to Nakane's attention a concern
the U.S. had raised in Geneva about the prospect of Japan
sponsoring an NGO briefing on FMCT during the UNGA First
Committee meeting in October in New York. While the U.S.
could not object to a discussion of the subject in general,
it found disturbing the notion that at the briefing the NGO
might be planning to propose a draft FMCT in competition to
the one the U.S. had tabled at the Conference on Disarmament
in 2007. The U.S. hoped Japan would not give additional
weight to the text by associating itself with its
presentation. Nakane took the demarche on board but made no
comment. In a June 11 conversation with an officer from
Embassy Tokyo, Ayako Hashida of the MOFA's Arms Control and
Disarmament Department confirmed that Japan will help
organize the meeting but will not support a new draft treaty.


17. (U) Text of Draft Nonproliferation Section of the G8
Leaders' Statement (Note: paras 2 and 3 are place holders)


Begin Text


1. We are determined to make all efforts to overcome the
danger of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means
and to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorists, by
upholding, strengthening and universalizing all relevant
multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments.
(We are committed to (working towards) (realizing) a world
free of all WMDs by creating an environment conducive to such
a goal.)

(2. We are committed to resolving regional proliferation
challenges by diplomatic means. We express our continuous
support for the Six-Party process towards the complete,
verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK and
the evnetual normalization of relations between the relevant
Six-Party members through the full implementation of the
Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, including the
resolution of the outstanding issues of concern such as the
abduction issue. (We strongly urge the DPRK to immediately
fulfill its commitments including providing a complete and
correct declaration fo all its nuclear programmes.) We also
urge the DPRK to comply with UNSCRs 1695 and 1718, to permit
the international community to verify the elimination of all
its nuclear weapons and programmes and to return to full
compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.) (to be further
discussed based on the development of actual situation)

(3. We express our serious concern at Iran's nuclear
programme and continued failure to meet its international
obligations. We urge Iran to fuly comply with UNSCRs 1696,
1737, 1747 and 1803 without further delay, in particular, to
suspend all enrichment-related activities as well as to fully
cooperate with the IAEA. We firmly support and cooperate
with the efforts by China, France, Germany, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States to resolve the issue
innovataively through negotiation on the basis of their
offers (in June 2006 and in May this year,) and urge Iran to
respond to them positively.) (to be further discussed based
no the development of actual situation)


4. We will work collectively to achieve a successful outcome
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In this context, we
reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars
(non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
disarmament) of the NPT and pledge ourselves to redouble our
efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty. We welcome all
nuclear disarmament efforts, notably the ongoing reductions
of nuclear weapons that the nuclear-weapon States among G8
members have made so far and call on all nuclear-weapon
States to undertake such reductions in a transparent manner.


5. We urge all states concerned to observe a moratorium on
nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear
explosions. We strongly support immediate commencement and
early conclusion of negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and urge all states
concerned to declare without delay and uphold a moratorium on
production of fissile material for weapons purposes.


6. We welcome the current progress of the BTWC and the CWC,
namely the successful outcome of the CWC 2nd Review
Conference and reiterate the vital importance of their full
and effective implementation.
We stress the importance of and remain committed to the
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
and urge all states to subscribe to the Code without delay.


7. Preventing and countering proliferation requires all
states to implement effective measures. We will redouble our
efforts to work together to that end in a more hormonized and
coordinated manner. In this context we welcome the extension
of the mandate of the 1540 Committee and stress the
importance of full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540.
We further stress the importance of:
(-the implementation of other relevant UNSCRs,) -- ENTRY
MARKED THROUGH
- effective export controls,
- strengthening of IAEA safeguards and the universalization
of the IAEA Additional Protocol,
- the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources, and
- supporting the activities of the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security
Initiative which has just celebrated its 5th anniversary.


8. We are determined to accomplish priority projects under
the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction that was launched at the
Kananaskis Summit of 2002. Since the risks of the spread of
weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide, we
agree that the Partnership will address these global
challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism
and proliferation are greatest.


9. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the
NPT to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with
all their Treaty obligations. We are committed to and
promote the highest possible standards on nuclear
non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security ((3S))
including the IAEA Additional Protocol. In this context, we
appreciate various initiatives in the field of multilateral
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurance of nuclear
fuel supply and encourage all efforts to further develop
them. (In relation to nuclear safety, we reaffirm previous
G7/G8 summit commitments with regard to Chernobyl and endorse
the view of G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group in this
regard.)

(10. We welcome the significant progress made by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) in moving toward consensus on criteria
based approach to strengthen controls on transfers of
enrichment and reprocessing equipment, facilities and
technology. We support the NSG effort to reach consensus on
this important issue. We agree that transfers of our
equipment, facilities and technology to any additional states
in the next year will be subject to conditions that, at a
minimum, do not permit or enable replication of the
facilities.)

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