G8 NPDG CONSIDERS NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT

UNCLAS STATE 063111 SENSITIVE C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC SUBJECT: G8 NPDG CONSIDERS NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT Summary ¶1. (SBU) At its June 5 meeting, the G8 Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) agreed on most of the nonproliferation language for the G8 Summit statement, but left some key issues unresolved. These included the G8's view of the way forward on nuclear disarmament, the DPRK (whether to mention abductions and how to describe Six-Party commitments),and Iran (whether to mention suspension of enrichment and the need to consider EU High Representative Solana's June 14 trip to Tehran). Compromise U.S.-Canadian language on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology, facilities, and equipment was widely accepted, but the EU and others wanted time to consider its legal ramifications. NPDG representatives will try to resolve outstanding issues by email. end summary ¶2. (U) Mary Alice Hayward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, ISN, led the U.S. delegation to the June 5 meeting of the G8 Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) in Kyoto, Japan. The meeting, the last before the G8 Summit in July, was almost entirely occupied with drafting the nonproliferation section of the G8 Leaders' statement. This report summarizes key points raised in that discussion. ¶3. (SBU) Discussion of the first paragraph on general goals centered on the strong German interest in having a reference to a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. The U.S. had countered on the need to stress the environment necessary to create such a world, and the chair proposed a compromise taking both perspectives into account. France made a strong argument that this was a nonproliferation statement and was not the place to reconcile fundamental differences on disarmament. After a fairly long discussion, the Chair produced a paragraph in which the key last sentence remained bracketed. The paragraph reads: "We are determined to make all efforts to overcome the danger of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means and to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorists, by upholding, strengthening and universalizing all relevant multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments. (We are committed to working towards/realizing a world free of all WMDs by creating an environment conducive to such a goal.)" DPRK ¶4. (SBU) Although all participants recognized that the section on the DPRK and Iran would have to be revised before the Summit depending on developments in the meantime, the Group nevertheless held extensive discussions of these two issues, drawing on revisions proposed by the U.S., as well as language the chair had circulated earlier. Japan and Russia, in particular, had rather heated exchanges on the DPRK section, both referring to the 2005 Six-Party declaration. Among the issues raised were whether to refer only to commitments by the DPRK or whether to mention commitments of all six parties; whether to specifically call for the "complete, verifiable, and irreversible" denuclearization of the DPRK; and whether to mention the abduction issue. On the latter, the Japanese chair (Takeshi Nakane, Director-General, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science Department, MOFA) said he had no flexibility, especially since the Summit was to be in Japan. If the question could not be resolved by the NPDG, he would have to bring it to Political Directors. The Chair said he would provide a re-drafted paragraph. Iran ¶5. (SBU) The discussion on the Iran paragraph led off with Russia proposing that the G8 use the paragraph the P-5 had agreed to at the May NPT PrepCom. Other representatives argued, however, that the context was different and that the G8 should instead draw on language from previous summit statements, which included references to Iranian suspension of enrichment activities (which the P-5 statement did not). All agreed on the need to take into account the upcoming visit of EU High Representative Solana to Tehran on June 14, but not on whether to reflect the recent report of the IAEA Director General. In that connection the Russian representative pointed out that the U.S. and Russia (at a Rood/Kislyak meeting) had agreed there would be no Iran resolution at the June 2-6 IAEA Board of Governors. The Chair said this paragraph would have to be considered by Political Directors, but later clarified that this would not happen at their meeting to take place the week of June 9. NPT Review Process ¶6. (U) The result of a long discussion on the NPT was finally to take a Canadian suggestion and revert to straight-forward language from the G8 Gleneagles statement. In the agreed paragraph, the G8 agree to "work collectively to achieve a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference" and "pledge ... to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty." Nuclear Testing/FMCT ¶7. (U) A brief discussion on these issues led to a technical amendment as to what a testing moratorium applied to. The paragraph was then agreed. BTWC/CWC/Hague Code of Conduct ¶8. (U) There were no substantive comments on this paragraph. Other Nonproliferation Activities ¶9. (U) Russia objected to U.S. proposals for strengthening references to UNSC Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The chair accepted some U.S. language on 1540 ("stress full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540") but not calls for assisting other states in implementing the Resolution. Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction ¶10. (U) With the change of one of three "risks" to "challenges" in the second sentence of this paragraph, the Group accepted the compromise language agreed to at the special meeting of the Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) the previous day (septel). The language reflects determination to "accomplish" priority projects underway and notes agreement that "since the risks of the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide,...the Partnership will address these global challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest." Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ¶11. (U) Apart from some minor fixes and the Russian request to delete a reference to "3S," (referring to nonproliferation safeguards, safety, and security) which the Russians said could not be translated into Russian but which the Chair insisted on retaining, the only debate on this paragraph concerned a final sentence referring to Chernobyl. Canada and the chair argued that such a reference was needed to carry on work on this issue, although others said it was not relevant to the activities of the NPDG. The chair said the Japanese would raise it with the Sherpas. Transfers of Sensitive (Enrichment and Reprocessing--ENR) Technology ¶12. (SBU) The discussion centered on a compromise paragraph that the U.S. and Canadian representatives had worked out on an ad referendum basis just before the meeting began. Other representatives expressed their pleasure that the U.S. and Canada seemed to have reached agreement and -- except for agreeing to a Russian suggestion to use "criteria based approach" to describe what the NSG was coming to agreement on -- did not change the language. The EU representative said that the restriction on certain kinds of transfers of "equipment, facilities and technology" could run up against EURATOM rules and needed to be reviewed by EU lawyers. Others expressed surprise that the EU was raising this concern at such a late date, when the G8 has agreed on even stricter restrictions in the past. All representatives agreed that this paragraph would stay in brackets for review by their authorities. The chair hoped the issue could be settled by email exchanges. ¶13. (U) After some discussion, the chair agreed that the Political Directors would not discuss the text of the statement in their meeting on June 9-10, but that NPDG representatives would attempt to resolve outstanding issues by email. At the conclusion of the meeting, he circulated a text, showing where the discussion had led, except on the DPRK and Iran, where he promised to transmit language later. G8 Initiative on Nuclear Energy Infrastructure ¶14. (SBU) The Japanese introduced to the NPDG a paper on this subject agreed by a recent meeting of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG). It calls for states to take account of the 3S's (see para 11 above),when developing national infrastructures for nuclear power. While France, the U.S., the UK, Italy, and the EU supported the general thrust of the paper, the German representative recalled that at the NSSG, Germany said it could not participate in this activity until it was discussed at more senior G8 levels and higher authorities in Germany had blessed it. After the Russians recalled that their proposal to place the NSSG under the NPDG had been rejected in 2006 and others engaged in further procedural wrangling, the chair announced that Japan would bring the issue to the Sherpas to resolve. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 ¶15. (U) Tomiko Ichikawa, MOFA official responsible for this field, briefed the Group on her May 13 contacts with the chair of the 1540 Committee in New York, at which time she had asked how the G8 could support the Committee's activities. He had replied that since the Committee's program of work was not finalized, he could not provide priorities but noted that the number of countries reporting (140)--some more than once--showed the success of outreach programs. Nevertheless, some 35 states had not reported, indicating a continuing need to raise awareness, particularly in Africa, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. Ichikawa said she would consult with G8 partners to get ideas on what to do next. There were no comments. Bilateral Demarche on FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) ¶16. (SBU) At a bilateral discussion the day before the NPDG meeting, Hayward had brought to Nakane's attention a concern the U.S. had raised in Geneva about the prospect of Japan sponsoring an NGO briefing on FMCT during the UNGA First Committee meeting in October in New York. While the U.S. could not object to a discussion of the subject in general, it found disturbing the notion that at the briefing the NGO might be planning to propose a draft FMCT in competition to the one the U.S. had tabled at the Conference on Disarmament in 2007. The U.S. hoped Japan would not give additional weight to the text by associating itself with its presentation. Nakane took the demarche on board but made no comment. In a June 11 conversation with an officer from Embassy Tokyo, Ayako Hashida of the MOFA's Arms Control and Disarmament Department confirmed that Japan will help organize the meeting but will not support a new draft treaty. ¶17. (U) Text of Draft Nonproliferation Section of the G8 Leaders' Statement (Note: paras 2 and 3 are place holders) Begin Text ¶1. We are determined to make all efforts to overcome the danger of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means and to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorists, by upholding, strengthening and universalizing all relevant multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments. (We are committed to (working towards) (realizing) a world free of all WMDs by creating an environment conducive to such a goal.) (2. We are committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means. We express our continuous support for the Six-Party process towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK and the evnetual normalization of relations between the relevant Six-Party members through the full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, including the resolution of the outstanding issues of concern such as the abduction issue. (We strongly urge the DPRK to immediately fulfill its commitments including providing a complete and correct declaration fo all its nuclear programmes.) We also urge the DPRK to comply with UNSCRs 1695 and 1718, to permit the international community to verify the elimination of all its nuclear weapons and programmes and to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.) (to be further discussed based on the development of actual situation) (3. We express our serious concern at Iran's nuclear programme and continued failure to meet its international obligations. We urge Iran to fuly comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 without further delay, in particular, to suspend all enrichment-related activities as well as to fully cooperate with the IAEA. We firmly support and cooperate with the efforts by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to resolve the issue innovataively through negotiation on the basis of their offers (in June 2006 and in May this year,) and urge Iran to respond to them positively.) (to be further discussed based no the development of actual situation) ¶4. We will work collectively to achieve a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In this context, we reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars (non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament) of the NPT and pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty. We welcome all nuclear disarmament efforts, notably the ongoing reductions of nuclear weapons that the nuclear-weapon States among G8 members have made so far and call on all nuclear-weapon States to undertake such reductions in a transparent manner. ¶5. We urge all states concerned to observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We strongly support immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and urge all states concerned to declare without delay and uphold a moratorium on production of fissile material for weapons purposes. ¶6. We welcome the current progress of the BTWC and the CWC, namely the successful outcome of the CWC 2nd Review Conference and reiterate the vital importance of their full and effective implementation. We stress the importance of and remain committed to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and urge all states to subscribe to the Code without delay. ¶7. Preventing and countering proliferation requires all states to implement effective measures. We will redouble our efforts to work together to that end in a more hormonized and coordinated manner. In this context we welcome the extension of the mandate of the 1540 Committee and stress the importance of full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540. We further stress the importance of: (-the implementation of other relevant UNSCRs,) -- ENTRY MARKED THROUGH - effective export controls, - strengthening of IAEA safeguards and the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol, - the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and - supporting the activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative which has just celebrated its 5th anniversary. ¶8. We are determined to accomplish priority projects under the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction that was launched at the Kananaskis Summit of 2002. Since the risks of the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide, we agree that the Partnership will address these global challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest. ¶9. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all their Treaty obligations. We are committed to and promote the highest possible standards on nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security ((3S)) including the IAEA Additional Protocol. In this context, we appreciate various initiatives in the field of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurance of nuclear fuel supply and encourage all efforts to further develop them. (In relation to nuclear safety, we reaffirm previous G7/G8 summit commitments with regard to Chernobyl and endorse the view of G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group in this regard.) (10. We welcome the significant progress made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in moving toward consensus on criteria based approach to strengthen controls on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment, facilities and technology. We support the NSG effort to reach consensus on this important issue. We agree that transfers of our equipment, facilities and technology to any additional states in the next year will be subject to conditions that, at a minimum, do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.) End Text RICE NNNN End Cable Text