(S) SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL TO SYRIAN WEAPONS ENTITY

S E C R E T STATE 058193 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2033 TAGS: IT MNUC PARM PREL SP SY SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL TO SYRIAN WEAPONS ENTITY Classified By: ISN Acting DAS Ken Staley, Reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d) -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (S//NF) Posts are requested to approach appropriate-level host nation officials regarding a shipment of steel destined for an end user in Syria that has acted as an intermediary for Syria's weapons programs in the past. Posts may draw from objectives, background, and talking points/non-paper below, as appropriate. -------------- OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (S//NF) Posts should request that host nations investigate the cargo involved in this shipment to determine whether: -- It involves any items that are controlled by multilateral nonproliferation export regimes, -- It contains any material prohibited for export by the DPRK under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, or -- Could make a material contribution to Syria's WMD or ballistic missile programs. -- Posts should urge host nations to prevent the onward shipment of these items to Syria if it meets any of these criteria. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (S//NF) We have received information that the Maltese-flagged vessel M/V Fifth Ocean is transporting 12 containers, the contents of which are described as "steel materials for construction." The consignee for this cargo is the Syrian entity Mechanical Construction Factory, an entity associated with Syria's weapons development program. The M/V Fifth Ocean will make port calls at the Spanish ports of Valencia on 31 May and Barcelona on 2 June. It will subsequently make a port call at Genoa, Italy on 4 June. Our information also indicates that the DPRK's Korean Foreign Transportation Corporation was probably also involved in this shipment -------------- TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER: -------------- ¶4. (S//REL SPAIN, ITALY) Begin talking points/non-paper: -- We would like to bring to your attention a possible shipment of proliferation concern. -- According to our information, the Maltese-flagged vessel M/V Fifth Ocean is transporting 12 containers, the contents are described as "steel materials for construction." -- However, the consignee for this cargo has previously acted as an intermediary for Syria's weapon development program. -- (FOR MADRID ONLY) According to our information, the M/V Fifth Ocean is due to make a port call at Valencia on 31 May and Barcelona on 2 June. -- (FOR ROME ONLY) According to our information, the M/V Fifth Ocean will make a port call at Genoa on 4 June. -- Our information indicates that the consignee for this shipment is Mechanical Construction Factory (MCF) in Damascus, Syria. MCF is an entity associated with Syria's weapons development program. The shipper of this cargo was the Chinese shipping company COSCO Logistics (Dalian) Company. -- Our information indicates that the DPRK's Korean Foreign Transportation Corporation was probably also involved in this shipment. -- The cargo in question is loaded into 12 containers, and was shipped under bill of lading number 8DLCLTK2G0365, dated 10 April. It is loaded into twelve containers, with the following container and seal numbers: -- CCLU2969571/92066F -- CCLU3774445/92068F -- CCLU3879050/92410F -- CCLU2960260/92064F -- GLDU3040498/92078F -- GLDU3862587/92074F -- CCLU4109579/92067F -- CCLU4125543/92060F -- CCLU4261370/92073F -- CCLU4394202/92076F -- CCLU4764400/92061F -- CCLU4803471/92069F -- We are uncertain whether the items in question are controlled by any multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes, prohibited for export by the DPRK under UNSCR 1718, or can be used for any WMD, ballistic missile, or weapons purposes. However, due to the consignee's past involvement in activities related to Syria's weapons programs, we request that you investigate this shipment to determine whether it involves any prohibited items or other items that could make a material contribution to Syria's WMD or ballistic missile programs. -- We appreciate your consideration of this matter and request that your government quickly share the results of your inspection with us. -- (For Madrid Only) We would request timely notification of your decision to act as we may consider approaching other partners if you decide not to take action. -- If your investigation does discover prohibited items or goods or other items that could contribute to Syria's WMD and missile programs, we would request that your government prevent its onward shipment to Syria and would be willing to discuss with you disposition options for the cargo as necessary. END POINTS. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT AND REPORTING REQUIREMENT -------------- ¶5. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up is Mark Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov. ¶6. (U) Please report delivery of points and any immediate response by 6 June. ¶7. (U) Washington thanks posts for assistance. Please slug responses for EUR, ISN, and T. RICE NNNN End Cable Text