USG COMMENTS ON VORONIN DRAFT SETTLEMENT PACKAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 057869 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018 TAGS: KCFE MD PBTS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: USG COMMENTS ON VORONIN DRAFT SETTLEMENT PACKAGE REF: CHISINAU 417 Classified By: DAS David A. Merkel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: In an April 14 meeting, President Voronin asked DAS Merkel to review a package of Moldovan proposals meant to serve as the basis for a political settlement with Transnistria. He further requested that the U.S. present this package to the 5 2. DAS Merkel agreed to study the documents and provide Chisinau with the USG,s thoughts on the texts. We have reviewed both the Declaration on the Principles and Guarantees of Transnistrian Settlement and the Law on the Special Legal Status of Transnistria. In providing comments, we do not want to appear either to dictate the terms of Moldova,s national proposals, or to endorse them as a whole. We do want to note our general concerns, express our support for Moldova,s constructive approach in developing this package, and strongly encourage Chisinau to table its proposals for discussion in the 5 2. We also want to provide Moldovan authorities our general assessment of the state of play in the 5 2 talks, and urge them to focus on using the Finnish chairmanship to make as much progress on the ground as possible, while also highlighting publicly Moldova,s constructive approach to achieving a settlement. Chisinau cannot compel either Tiraspol or Moscow to be constructive; but through its own actions, it can draw international attention to its own positive efforts and the other parties, unhelpful policies. Post should draw on para 2 in passing these thoughts to Moldovan officials. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. ¶2. (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS: -- Following up on David Merkel,s visit, we wanted to provide you with Washington,s thoughts on the settlement proposals Moldova has developed and the challenge of making progress in the 5 2 context. -- First, regarding the status of the 5 2 talks. We are concerned about the lack of progress of the working groups that met in Bender on April 18. These working groups focused on issues that should be of broad concern on both sides of the river, so it is hard to understand Transnistria,s reluctance to engage. Is there anything the U.S. or EU can do to help these ideas gain traction? -- We are open to a formal 5 2 discussion as soon as such a meeting would be productive. Looking at the reluctance of the Transnistrian side to engage in working groups, we question if now is such a moment. We would want to see a greater commitment from Russia or Transnistria for concrete results and believe first agreeing on a common basis for discussion is important to ensure an extended 5 2 meeting would be constructive. -- This brings us to the broader question: how can Moldova best use the Finnish chairmanship of OSCE to promote a settlement? The Finns are supportive and energetic. We believe they would be willing to engage on any initiative likely to promote change. Thus, we think it would be to Moldova,s advantage to consider what specific proposals and steps could be advanced or implemented in the next months that might have an impact on the situation on the ground. We think it is a mistake to focus in this regard exclusively on CSBMs unrelated to political-military issues. The current CFE impasse has focused international attention on Moldova; constructive proposals from Moldova to resolve the conflict or make incremental progress would be welcomed by the international community. -- Regarding Moldova,s draft settlement proposals, our reaction is positive. These proposals address core issues in a thoughtful and balanced way, taking on difficult questions like Transnistria,s future status. In particular, the "demilitarization and security" aspects of the Declaration of Principles and Guarantees of a Transnistrian Settlement seem clear and thoughtful. -- The package could only be viewed as a serious effort to make progress. They are, however, Moldova,s proposals, and should be presented by your government, not the U.S. We believe that if Moldova advanced these proposals -- in the right context and at the right moment -- this step would be widely welcomed by the international community. This would serve to demonstrate Moldovan leadership and responsibility. -- Frankly, we think it will not help to achieve a positive outcome for the U.S. to endorse specific measures beyond our discussions with you before negotiations have begun. -- We would certainly be willing to issue a statement of support for your constructive approach if you chose to table this package. We suspect that the EU would be prepared to welcome these proposals as a serious effort to end the current stalemate. We recommend that you share your ideas with the EU, if you have not done so already. -- Having a thoughtful proposal like this on the table would facilitate a return to serious discussions on core settlement issues in the 5 2. -- On the specifics, we have only a few questions and concerns about your proposals, and are ready to discuss these issues in greater detail as necessary. In general: (1) Moldova,s proposals for assistance make sense. However, the United States is not in a position to commit now to future direct involvement in establishing, for example, an international fund for the post-conflict development of Moldova, or to provide U.S. personnel for a new peacekeeping presence. We encourage you to request such assistance, should it be needed. But we cannot make any commitment before the details have been worked out. (2) We are also curious about the clause granting Transnistria the right to secede from Moldova if Moldova voluntary renounces its sovereignty and "international legal status." While we expect the phrase "international legal status" is not intended to refer to neutrality, we are concerned that it might be interpreted as such, which would imply a limit on your future options in this matter. What was your intention in using this language? (3) The Demilitarization and Security section of the Declaration sends a useful and clear message. We agree that transformation of the existing PKF and withdrawal of Russian forces are key aspects of a political settlement. We noticed, however, that the withdrawal of foreign forces from Moldova does not appear in the "general provisions" section of the Declaration -- something we think is important -- and were interested in your thinking on this. Additionally, while we understand completely Moldova,s desire to agree on specific timelines for withdrawal of Russian forces, it is important to ensure that any proposed timeline is clear and achievable. As you know, the U.S. supports the idea of transforming the armed peacekeeping force into a civilian monitoring mission, as demilitarization steps are agreed by the parties. (4) In our view, demilitarization is an issue where a well-considered implementation plan will be key to reaching agreement, or to making that agreement meaningful. We would be interested in whether you plan to treat those details in a separate roadmap document. Specific steps, or benchmarks, could also be included in appropriate provisions of the Declaration. END TALKING POINTS RICE