SUDAN: RESPONSE TO DUTCH QUESTIONS CONCERNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 005491 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018 TAGS: PHUM PREL SU NL SUBJECT: SUDAN: RESPONSE TO DUTCH QUESTIONS CONCERNING SUPPORT FOR JIUS REF: A. A) THE HAGUE 41 ¶B. B) LONDON 92 ¶C. C) OTTAWA 53 ¶D. D) ROME 52 ¶E. E) STATE 1335 Classified By: E.O 12958, by L.Thomas-Greenfield ¶1. (SBU) The United States welcomes The Netherlands, willingness to providing training to Joint Integrated Units (JIU),as well as financial support for airlift. (Reftel a) We recognize Khartoum,s historic opposition to military support from the international community. The recent agreement between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to accelerate JIU deployment, combined with the demonstration of leadership by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to form a JIU support cell, provides a window of opportunity to constructively support UNMIS in the capacity it needs without, perhaps, obstruction from the Government of Sudan (GOS). ¶2. (SBU) In response to The Netherlands, questions per reftel a, Post is instructed to respond by drawing from the following points: -- Willingness of GOS to receive JIU assistance: We understand UNMIS is reviewing modalities for requesting and processing international contributions to its JIU support cell. Despite past opposition from the GOS to international community support for the JIUs, we believe there may be a new willingness in Khartoum for such support given the renewed SPLM-NCP partnership. Additional discussions with the GOS, in coordination with UNMIS, are necessary. -- Management of aid to SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF): Under current U.S. law, the United States is strictly prohibited from providing assistance to the SAF. We are authorized to only provide limited assistance to the Sudan People,s Liberation Army (SPLA). While we understand the importance of supporting the JIUs, our role may best be limited to security sector reform efforts in the South and encouragement of other donors to support the JIUs. We understand that donors, such as The Netherlands, may decide to equally support SAF and SPLA elements of the JIUs to avoid generating friction with the parties. -- USG coordination with JIU support cell: We remain willing to explore options for supporting the coordination efforts of UNMIS as allowed by applicable U.S. law. We are looking into the extent to which we can provide military liaisons to work with UNMIS. -- Military information: We are confident that arrangements could be made with the Defense Attaches of donor nations in Khartoum to regularly brief the Dutch Embassy on military developments related to the JIUs. Perhaps as an element of renewed JIU support, the key donors could jointly demarche the GOS to permit the assignment of appropriate military attaches to support the program. -- Reaction of other partners: The UK is prepared to provide substantial support to assist in the formation of JIUs (reftel b). We are in the process of following up with other key donors. We believe that a commitment from the Netherlands to support the JIUs would help encourage other donor interest. End points. ¶6. (U) Minimize Considered. RICE