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2008-05-21 22:01:00
Secretary of State
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DE RUEHC #4639/01 1422214
O R 212201Z MAY 08
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 12 STATE 054639 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/18

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 12 STATE 054639


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/18

1. (U) Classified by William Lucas, Office Director,
EUR/ERA. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 27.

3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their
next General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on May 26-27. We expect the
agenda to include: Western Balkans, Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and Georgia. As
of now, Belarus, Iran and Lebanon are not/not on the GAERC
agenda, but this may change and we want to raise these
subjects in any case. This GAERC will be the last prior
to the U.S.-EU Summit in Brdo, Slovenia on June 10, and we
therefore are flagging where we want the EU to agree to
stronger language on the issues above within the Summit
communiqu currently under negotiation with the Slovenian
Presidency and the Commission. Posts are requested to
include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables. A
background section covering some of these issues is
provided prior to a section containing talking points.
Points are to be delivered as soon as possible at the
appropriate level to EU members only. Other posts should
not/not deliver these points.



4. (SBU) President Tadic's "For a European Serbia"
coalition won a plurality of votes in the May 11
parliamentary elections, though it had been trailing in
the polls the week prior. The EU decision to sign a
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia as
well as to start the process of visa liberalization for
Serbian citizens traveling to EU Member States likely
helped boost support for Tadic's pro-Europe coalition.
The coalition won with nearly 39% of the vote, to the
Radical Party's 29%. The coalition did not win enough
seats to form a government. Tad
ic has ruled out an
alliance with the DSS of former Prime Minister Kostunica,
but may ally with the Socialist Party despite ideological
differences. A coalition of Radicals, Socialists and the
DSS remains a possibility, however.

5. (SBU) UN leadership in New York continues to block the
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from
cooperating with the EU on handing over rule of law
responsibilities in Kosovo. It is now clear from recent
discussions with the UN Secretariat that the UN will not
downsize UNMIK and hand over administration of Kosovo to
the GOK on June 15 when Kosovo's constitution takes
effect. We now expect a delay until at least August
before the EULEX rule of law mission can potentially
phase-in the policing and justice transition. A
successful transition from UNMIK administration of Kosovo
would allow the international community to complete the
transition of Kosovo's status to supervised independence
as stipulated by the Ahtisaari plan. In the face of
staunch opposition to a EULEX presence in northern Kosovo
from Serbia and Russia, however, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has ended all cooperation
(including planning for the transfer of property and other
logistical issues) with EULEX, while Secretary-General Ban
attempts to find a formula for a transfer of authority
that Russia and Serbia would approve.


STATE 00054639 002 OF 012

6. (C) Respect for human rights and democracy in Belarus
has worsened in recent months, at the same time that the
Belarusian regime has expelled all but a skeletal staff
from the U.S. embassy. After pledging to release all six
political prisoners that the regime held at the start of
the year, and releasing five of the six by February, the
regime refused to release the last and most prominent
political prisoner, Alyaksandr Kazulin, and has recently
sentenced two more citizens on politically motivated
charges. The regime also cracked down violently on a
peaceful demonstration by democratic opponents of the
regime in March. Also in March, in retaliation for U.S.
sanctions imposed in response to the denial of democracy
and human rights in Belarus, the Belarusian regime began
pressing for reductions in the staff of the U.S. embassy.
Following expulsions of U.S. diplomats, the U.S. embassy
now remains with only a skeletal staff. The Belarusian
regime is likely trying to divide the Europeans from what
it perceives as a tougher U.S. position toward Minsk. The
United States and EU need to stick to a joint policy of
pressure on the GOB that withholds any positive gestures
toward the regime until all political prisoners are
released unconditionally and that retains a strong focus
on promoting democratic transition in Belarus. The United
States also seeks strong signs of support from the EU,
including in the U.S.-EU Summit communiqu, in response to
Belarusian actions against the U.S. embassy.


7. (C) The EU is actively exploring options for engaging
more directly with Iraq. From 2003-2007 the European
Commission provided more than $1 billion in assistance to
Iraq, given largely to the International Reconstruction
Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) - the main multilateral
mechanism for assisting Iraq. In the future, however, the
EC wants to deliver its assistance bilaterally so that the
EU's contributions can be more clearly identified and
recognized. On March 13, the European Parliament adopted
a report recommending an enhanced EU role in Iraq,
including proposals to increase the EC diplomatic and
assistance presence (key to this is finding new premises
in Baghdad, those currently located at the British Embassy
are too small); step-up support for UN activities; assist
refugees; and support democracy, national reconciliation
and government institutions with technical assistance and
capacity building. France assumes the European Union
presidency on July 1 and is also expected to encourage
greater EU engagement.

8. (C) Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Brussels on April
16 and 17 was a welcome step in building the EU-Iraq
relationship. Maliki met with High Representative Javier
Solana and thanked the EU for its Integrated Rule of Law
Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX). The EU committed to extend
and expand this program, which to date has trained more
than 1,450 Iraqi judges and other rule of law
professionals in 18 EU member states. Solana expressed
interest in visiting Baghdad as a follow-up to Maliki's
visit to Brussels; this would further cement the EU-Iraq
relationship and internationalize support for Iraq as it
strives to achieve security and prosperity.

9. (SBU) Negotiations for a new EU-Iraq Trade and
Cooperation Agreement will resume in June. Four rounds of
talks have focused on such topics as human rights, trade
in goods and services, and customs and taxation. The EU
and Iraq are also negotiating an agreement for Iraq to
supply gas to EU countries. We would like the EU to offer
strong language on its intention to enhance its role in
Iraq in the context of the U.S.-EU Summit communiqu.

10. (C) As of now, Lebanon is not/not on the GAERC agenda,
but given recent events, we think it likely that the EU
foreign ministers will end up discussing it in one venue
or another at the GAERC. In any event, we believe EU
foreign ministers should be encouraged to discuss EU
efforts to support the democratic government of Lebanon

STATE 00054639 003 OF 012

and apply pressure to the Hizballah-led opposition and its
foreign backers, Iran and Syria. Lebanon is once again on
the brink. The Hizballah-led opposition has violently
confronted Lebanon's legitimate government and fomented
instability in an effort to use political violence to
promote political objectives and to protect its state-
within-a-state. On May 6, the Lebanese cabinet acting
under its legitimate authority declared Hizballah's
clandestinely-built internal communications network and
surveillance of Beirut International Airport illegal and
resolved to root out these threats to government authority
and internal security. On May 7, Hizballah and its
opposition allies responded with demonstrations,
orchestrated violence, and threats of escalation if the
government did not withdraw its decisions. As
demonstrations continued on May 8, Hizballah SYG Nasrallah
called the government decisions "a declaration of war" in
a belligerent public speech. Hizballah and its allies
subsequently launched attacks against Lebanese civilians
in pursuit of its narrow political agenda, in Beirut and
in other parts of the country. Last week, Arab League-
mediation resulted in a temporary cessation of Hizballah-
directed hostilities. However, the calm is fragile, and
discussions in Doha over the weekend have demonstrated
Hizballah's unwillingness to compromise and its commitment
to keep its weapons. Additional measures are necessary to
improve the bargaining position of PM Siniora, the
Lebanese government, and our March 14 allies, to condemn
violence as a political tool, and to address Hizballah's
state-within-a-state and violations of UNSC resolutions.

11. (C) By taking up arms against Lebanese civilians and
paralyzing Beirut, particularly the international airport,
Hizballah shed the pretext of being a Lebanese entity
working on behalf of Lebanon and in "resistance" to some
external threat. Hizballah's actions threaten the
authority of the Lebanese government, the sovereignty of
the Lebanese state, and the security of the Lebanese
people. More importantly, they constitute acts of
terrorism and a threat to international peace and
security. Hizballah's chosen path threatens the authority
of the Lebanese government, sovereignty of the Lebanese
state, and security of the Lebanese people. We need
European governments, both individually and through the
EU, to pressure Iran, Syria and Hizballah through
diplomatic or financial sanctions, and by designating
Hizballah as a terrorist entity. We also strongly
encourage Europe to take action against Iran and Syria to
demonstrate that their systematic violations of
international resolutions and support for terrorism and
political violence has a cost. Accordingly, we expect the
EU to back a strong statement within the U.S.-EU Summit

12. (C) Unfortunately, European support for both Lebanon's
legitimate government and our pro-sovereignty March 14
allies has wavered. Some EU members have suggested a
political equivalency between March 14 and the Hizballah-
led, Syrian and Iranian-backed opposition. EU UNIFIL
contributors have been especially conciliatory, worrying
that political confrontation could invite attacks against
UNIFIL. European vacillation on Lebanon also stems from
conflicting European opinions on whether to engage or
isolate Syria. Most EU members share our concerns about
Syrian interference in Lebanese politics, support for
militant groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian
territories, facilitation of flows of foreign fighters
into Iraq, efforts to undermine the peace process, and
possession of weapons of mass destruction and an
unreported nuclear program. However, robust European
economic ties with Syria leave little appetite for full
isolation. For its part, Syria has effectively courted
European engagement by promising breakthroughs in Lebanon
or on the peace process. Syria is exploiting European
engagement to legitimize its destabilizing foreign
policies and repressive domestic rule. The EU Council has

STATE 00054639 004 OF 012

several times designated High Representative Solana as its
sole interlocutor with Syria, but members have
consistently broken ranks.


13. (C) For several months now, we have urged the EU to
take three new actions on Iran in order to pressure it to
suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and
come to the negotiating table: 1) Adopt UNSCR 1803 into
EU policy, 2) designate 20 additional entities (including
Bank Melli) and 15 additional individuals associated with
Iran's nuclear and missile programs under existing EU
policy, and 3) adopt a series of truly new autonomous
measures that go beyond existing EU policy. If the EU is
able to take all three of these steps, it will send a
strong signal to Iran and encourage others to do likewise.
The additional designations have been moving forward since
Italy and Cyprus lifted their holds on them in late April.
We expected the full additional designation list to be
formally adopted without discussion at an EU Council
meeting (Agriculture and Fisheries ministers) on May 19,
but the EU again delayed action.

14. (C) Unfortunately, the situation with the adoption of
UNSCR 1803 into EU policy and adoption of new autonomous
measures to go beyond existing EU policy is not so
positive. Adoption of 1803 into EU policy has been
delayed by internal EU discussion on whether to carry out
a minimalist, literal implementation of the resolution or
to go beyond mere transposition of 1803 and include new EU
measures in the updated policy and regulations. A meeting
of EU Political and Security Committee ambassadors in late
April failed to reach consensus on these issues and the
Slovenian EU Presidency has not set a time line for future
deliberation on 1803 implementation and new measures.
Behind the scenes, the UK and France want to ensure that
they have the support of a critical mass of countries for
a concrete (and expansive) 1803 package before holding
another discussion with all 27 member states. In
particular, they wish to avoid any open-ended,
undisciplined debate on the matter. EU Iran watchers in
Brussels tell USEU that it is unlikely the Slovenians have
enough time or the desire to pursue this task before the
end of their Presidency on 30 June. Thus, even though we
have urged the EU to act on all three measures described
above at the May 26-27 GAERC, some may want to wait for
the start of the French Presidency on July 1. We should
not accept this delay, however, and should press EU
members to take quick action, lest they send Tehran the
signal that Europe does not want to keep pressure on Iran.
We place particular priority on the EU taking action prior
to the June 10 U.S.-EU Summit, rather than postponing
decisions until after the Summit.

15. (C) On May 13, the Iranian government delivered
letters from FM Mottaki to the P5+1 calling for
negotiations on a wide range of issues. These letters
were accompanied by a two-page memorandum listing possible
areas of discussion, including terrorism, drugs, organized
crime, trade, investment, and the nuclear issue. However,
the package broke no new ground and offered no specific
proposals. At the same time, Iranian President
Ahmadinejad stated publicly that Iran would not/not
suspend its nuclear enrichment and other proliferation-
sensitive nuclear activities, as required by the UNSC.
The P5+1 will deliver to the Iranians the refreshed
package offering incentives in exchange for Iran
suspending enrichment and other proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities.


16. (SBU) The United States is working toward the vision
of a two-state solution with Israel and Palestine living
side by side in peace, stability, prosperity, and dignity.

STATE 00054639 005 OF 012

The Annapolis Conference in November 2007 re-launched
Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations with the shared
goal of a peace agreement before the end of 2008. The
parties further undertook to fulfill their commitments
under the 2003 Roadmap, and agreed that implementation of
any peace agreement must be subject to implementation of
the Roadmap. The U.S. agreed at Annapolis to monitor and
judge the parties' progress under the Roadmap. Since
Annapolis, we have been working to achieve progress on
four tracks: bilateral negotiations, implementation of
the Roadmap and improving conditions on the ground,
building Palestinian institutional capacity and supporting
economic development, and sustaining and expanding
regional support for the process.

17. (SBU) Bilateral negotiations began in earnest shortly
after Annapolis with the creation of a negotiating
structure and a vigorous schedule of bilateral talks on
the full spectrum of issues. The parties have kept the
substance of these talks private, which reflects the
seriousness of their effort. As part of this effort,
Secretary Rice has enlisted the services of General (ret.)
Jim Jones, former Commandant of the Marine Corps and NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, who is looking at the security
aspects of permanent status. The Secretary and Assistant
Secretary Welch are also deeply and personally engaged in
supporting the parties' efforts in this area. We must
recognize, however, that a peace agreement cannot be
imposed from outside, and it is the parties themselves who
must work through the difficult compromises necessary for
peace. The United States will support them in this task,
will work to ensure the talks stay on track, and when
appropriate we will offer ideas to help facilitate

18. (SBU) We are working to promote progress by the
parties in fulfilling their commitments under the Roadmap.
For the Palestinians, this means combating and dismantling
the infrastructure of terrorism, undertaking institutional
reforms, and ending incitement. For Israel, it means
halting settlement expansion, removing unauthorized
outposts, easing movement and access to improve
Palestinian economic and humanitarian conditions,
facilitating security coordination, and re-opening
Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem consistent with
previous agreements. The President and Secretary Rice
have asked LTG William Fraser III to monitor developments
in this area and to work with the parties to promote
progress on Roadmap implementation. Given the secret
nature of the bilateral negotiations, progress on the
ground is crucial to reflect the seriousness of the
process as well as progress that is being achieved in the

19. (SBU) We are also working to support Palestinian
economic development and institutional capacity building.
France hosted a donors' conference in December which
generated pledges of $7.7 billion dollars in budgetary and
programmatic support for the PA. The Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee met on May 2 to maintain close donor
coordination. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his
role as Quartet Representative, has taken a leadership
role on this issue, identifying priority projects and
working with the parties and international donors to
facilitate implementation on the ground. The United
States is doing its part. In Paris, we pledged $555
million in support for the PA, including $150 million in
budgetary support, which was delivered to the Fayyad
government in mid-March. Additionally, LTG Keith Dayton,
the U.S. Security Coordinator, is working to reform and
professionalize the Palestinian security forces, including
a program providing training and non-lethal equipment.
There is a particularly urgent need for budgetary support
for the Palestinians, and we are strongly encouraging Arab
governments to do their part.

STATE 00054639 006 OF 012

20. (SBU) Finally, we are working to sustain and expand
regional support for the parties' efforts. Arab political
and financial support will be crucial in order for both
Israel and the Palestinians to make the painful
compromises necessary for peace. The Arab Peace
Initiative was an important step. Now, as President Bush
said in July 2007, "Arab nations should build on this
initiative - by ending the fiction that Israel does not
exist, stopping the incitement of hatred in their official
media, and sending cabinet-level visitors to Israel."

21. (SBU) We will continue to work to promote progress on
each of these four tracks, each of them vital to the goal
of a peace agreement by the end of the year. Secretary
Rice is traveling regularly to the region to advance the
process. President Bush's January trip to Israel and the
West Bank, his first as President, and his second trip in
May reflect his personal engagement and commitment to this
issue. There are substantial obstacles that must be
overcome to reach the goal of a permanent status
agreement. Hardliners on all sides are working to
undermine the leaders' efforts as evidenced by the serious
escalation of violence in Gaza and southern Israel in
February and March, and the tragic terrorist attack in
Jerusalem on March 6. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful
that an agreement can be reached before the end of 2008.


22. (SBU) The European Commission has expressed support
for our plan to include all pledges made since the 2006
London Conference in our pledges at the June 12
Afghanistan support conference in Paris. This allows the
Commission to include its 600 million Euro, four year
commitment (2007-2010) and its 2007 33 million Euro pledge
of humanitarian assistance. This totals roughly $1
billion for the Commission alone. We need to convince
Member States to follow this scheme in their bilateral


23. (SBU) The United States continues to support the
transitional political process outlined by Somalia's
Transitional Federal Charter, which provides the mandate
for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and outlines
a process leading to national elections in 2009, as the
best framework for achieving lasting peace and stability
in Somalia. We are currently supporting the efforts of
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) to facilitate discussions between the TFG and the
opposition in Djibouti. In order for the transitional
political process to move forward successfully, however,
we must also continue our efforts to improve the security
environment inside Somalia by supporting the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and longer-term security
sector reform efforts. We also continue to focus on the
issue of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of
Somalia, are working with our Security Council partners,
and hope to adopt soon a UNSC resolution on this subject.


24. (SBU) Russia has recently taken a number of
provocative actions in the Abkhazia region of Georgia. On
March 6, Russia unilaterally withdrew from CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States) economic and military
sanctions on Abkhazia, opening the way for Russia to
provide arms and military equipment to the Abkhaz
(although thus far, the Russians have said they have no
intention to do so). On April 16, President Putin issued
instructions to Russian ministries authorizing them to
establish direct contacts with separatist institutions in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On April 20, a Russian plane
shot down a Georgian UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) over
Abkhazia in violation of Georgia's sovereignty. On April

STATE 00054639 007 OF 012

29 the Russian Foreign Ministry announced it would
increase the number of CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia by
deploying additional troops, further heightening tensions
in the region and increasing the risk for miscalculation.
Finally, Russian officials have publicly stated that if
Georgia were to undertake military actions in Abkhazia or
South Ossetia, Russia would intervene militarily.

25. (SBU) Georgia has responded with restraint, but has
publicly and privately expressed its alarm over the
situation. President Saakashvili has announced new
initiatives to peacefully solve the conflict by granting
Abkhazia wide autonomy, and the Georgian government has
created several working groups on the proposals. In
addition, efforts are underway to re-energize the Abkhaz
peace process, specifically through a meeting of senior
Georgian/Abkhaz officials in Sweden next month; a follow
up meeting in Berlin in July; and convening of a peace
conference (with U.S., EU, Russian, UN and other states)
to offer a new forum for Georgian-Abkhaz talks. In the
U.S.-EU Summit communiqu, we believe it is important that
the U.S. and EU reflect a strong consensus in support of
Georgia' territorial integrity, call on Russia to reverse
its actions, and encourage direct talks between the
Georgian government and the Abkhaz to advance the peace

26. (SBU) The campaign for May 21 parliamentary elections
in Georgia is proceeding without major incident so far.
Clean elections - including a fair and transparent
election grievance process - would help restore Georgia as
a regional leader in democratic reform after the violent
dispersal of demonstrations in November 2007 and a flawed
presidential election on January 6, 2008.

27. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of the May 26-27 GAERC).



-- We welcome the results of the May 11 Serbian
Parliamentary elections and the desire of the Serbian
people for a European future. We applaud the EU for its
decision to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) with Serbia and to begin the process of visa
liberalization for Serbian citizens. We need to wait and
see what the new government does, but we hope Serbia will
remain on a path toward EU integration. Regardless of
which coalition emerges, we need to continue to urge
Serbia to cooperate with us on Kosovo to support peace and
stability and to avoid provocative acts.

-- We strongly encourage the EU to sign the Stabilization
and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia-Herzegovina at
the May GAERC meeting. We understand the technical
complexity of the translation, but a rapid signature is
essential to maintaining positive political momentum in
BiH and sending a clear signal of the EU's commitment to
BiH's European future. As we've seen in the recent
Serbian elections, the prospect of a European perspective
remains a strong and vital force for change in the Western

-- We urge the EU to develop and implement a contingency
plan for fully implementing the EULEX Kosovo mission
regardless of UNMIK's current inability to cooperate. The
EU and UN need to begin now an intensive dialogue to
determine the operational parameters of a "staged
deployment" of EULEX.

-- The U.S. supports an initial EULEX deployment which
could, as necessary, proceed along functional lines in
coordination with a residual operation role of UNMIK.

STATE 00054639 008 OF 012

However, we must all impress upon UN SYG Ban the
importance of an arrangement with EULEX that does not
phase-in EULEX along ethnic or geographic lines or hint at
partition, does not allow security "gaps," and respects
the EU's need for decision-making and budgetary autonomy.

-- UNMIK cannot continue to "administer" Kosovo after June
15, when the International Civilian Office (ICO) assumes
supervisory authority over an independent Kosovo on that
date as envisioned by Ahtisaari. We are open to a
residual UN presence in Kosovo, but it must not in any way
govern Kosovo or interfere with the ICO's work.

-- (For Prague, Lisbon and Valletta only:) We strongly
encourage your government to join us, the nearly three-
fourths of EU member states and the many other European
nations which have recognized Kosovo's independence. Your
recognition would send a positive sign of solidarity with
the people of Kosovo who crave stability and normalcy
after years of conflict and would greatly assist Kosovo's
rapid transition into the international family of nations.
Continuing not to recognize Kosovo only complicates the
difficulty the EU is facing in ensuring the smooth,
peaceful transition from UNMIK to the EULEX mission.


-- We urge the EU to maintain pressure on the GOB, and to
withhold any incentives to the regime until it releases
all political prisoners unconditionally.

-- We ask that the EU postpone the formal opening an EU
office in Belarus and that Sweden postpone opening an
Embassy in Belarus while the GOB maintains its campaign of
actions to hobble the U.S. embassy in Minsk. Lukashenka's
clear objective is to divide the U.S. and EU regarding
Belarus policy, and we must not allow his regime to
succeed in muddying our strong joint message against the
GOB's repressive policies.

-- We invite the EU to consider other measures to increase
the pressure on the GOB so that the USG and EU present a
united front to the GOB regarding political prisoners to
secure their timely release so that we can overcome this
impasse and focus on promoting democratic transition in
Belarus. We believe it is important to reflect a strong
message of U.S.-EU solidarity at the June 10 U.S.-EU
Summit by, within the communiqu, 1) calling for the
unconditional and immediate release of all political
prisoners, 2) indicating our willingness to continue to
take action against Belarusian officials responsible for
human rights abuses as cultivating a climate of
repression, and 3) condemning the use of coercive measures
taken against the U.S. Embassy.

-- An expanded European presence (including more
Embassies/diplomatic offices from Member States and a
larger EC office) would be welcomed by the U.S. and the
Iraqis. The EU can also be helpful by encouraging Iraq's
neighbors to play a more constructive role (including by
asking them to send Ambassadors/open Embassies), speaking
out against Iran's lethal aid to select Shia militant
groups, and by continuing to contribute generously to
humanitarian programs assisting displaced Iraqis.
-- We welcome the April 14 decision to extend and expand
the rule of law mandate of the EUJUST LEX mission and
encourage the EU to engage in other assistance programs.
We encourage the EU to offer strong language on its
intention to enhance its role in Iraq in the context of
the U.S.-EU Summit communiqu.
-- A visit to Iraq by High Representative Solana would be
an effective follow-up to Maliki's visit to Brussels. We
encourage an early visit, as well other exchanges of
senior-level visitors.

STATE 00054639 009 OF 012

-- We need Europe to stand with us in support of the
legitimate Lebanese government and our pro-sovereignty
March 14 allies, who need our help now more than ever. We
are deeply concerned by the current situation, where
Hizballah and its allies have used intimidation and
violence to challenge the authority of the Lebanese
government. We view the current situation as a serious
threat to international peace and security.

-- We need to send stronger public and private messages
that (1) distinguish between the legitimate authority of
the Lebanese government and illegitimate resort to
violence by Hizballah and its allies, (2) stress the
deleterious social and economic effects for all Lebanese
of the demonstrations and violence, (3) urge all sides to
maintain the fragile ceasefire and withdraw from the
streets, (4) hold Hizballah, its allies, and its
international backers responsible, and (5) condemn Iran
and Syria for their continued interference in Lebanon and
provision of lethal support to Hizballah in violation of
UNSCRs 1559 and 1701.

-- We ask that the EU and/or members states immediately
designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist
organization. This is critical to our long-term efforts
to mitigate the international terrorist threat posed by
Hizballah and prevent further unrest in Lebanon. We have
made this request to the EU and its member states to
designate Hizballah in the past. We are asking again now
given our firm conviction that Hizballah's recent actions
in Lebanon have ended debate about the true nature of the
organization. Hizballah is using violence against
Lebanon's civilian population in pursuit of its narrow
political agenda. This is terrorism.
-- We also need to demonstrate to Syria and Iran that
their support for political violence and illegal armed
groups - in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions -- has
a cost. Hizballah and the opposition feel they have won
and hope to trade their gains made at gunpoint for
political concessions. We need to level the playing
field. We believe Syria can be prevented from playing a
harmful role in this crisis and might be moved to do so if
Europe held it to account for the actions of its proxies.
We also urge you to forego high-level engagement with
Syria. We expect the U.S.-EU Summit communiqu to address
these issues clearly, particularly calling on Syria to end
its interference with Lebanon's democratic development.

-- (If the pending EU designations have been adopted by
the time of the GAERC): We were pleased by the EU's
designation of a large number of additional individuals
and entities associated with Iran's nuclear and missile
programs. The announcement and application of these new
restrictive EU measures will send a strong message to Iran
and the international community.

-- (If the pending EU designations have not/not been
adopted): We regret that the EU has thus far moved so
slowly in all three areas of pending action on Iran
sanctions. We had expected, at a minimum, that the
pending list designating additional individuals and
entities associated with Iran's nuclear and missile
programs would be adopted by now.

-- We regret that the EU has still been unable to reach
consensus on implementation of UNSCR 1803 and a strong
package of new EU measures to accompany the implementation
of the resolution. This delay weakens the impact of UNSCR
1803 and the new EU designations, and dilutes the message
of EU resolve. Iran has deepened its defiance of the UNSC
by beginning testing of an advanced centrifuge design
using nuclear material and expanding its installation of
centrifuges at its Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.

STATE 00054639 010 OF 012

-- Additional, substantive actions are critical to
demonstrate to the Iranian regime that it cannot continue
to ignore the international community. This, in turn, is
an essential element of our effort to secure a diplomatic
solution to this issue.

-- It is critical that the EU demonstrate a strong, united
front toward Iran. A strong package of EU sanctions would
not only send a clear signal of EU resolve, but will also
remove the excuse of other countries for not acting
against Iran. Middle Eastern states and other key members
of the international community are looking to the EU for
leadership on Iran, and are likely to follow its lead,
either in taking decisive steps or in delaying action.

-- We would like the EU to adopt the provisions in UNSCR
1803 into EU policy and regulations as soon as possible,
along with the strongest possible package of new
autonomous sanctions. Ideally this would happen at the
May 26-27 GAERC. We urge the EU to take these steps as
soon as possible, and no later than the June 10 U.S.-EU
Summit. The credibility of the EU, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and the UNSC is at stake.

-- We have received the package of proposals for
negotiations presented by the Iranian regime on May 13.
We do not, however, see it as a serious offer of good
faith negotiations. We are, however, presenting again the
generous incentives package first proposed by the P5+1 in
June 2006 as a basis for cooperation by Iran. At the
center of our concern is Iran's nuclear program and the
need for Iran to comply with its UNSCR obligations.


-- The U.S. remains firmly committed to a two-state
solution and is working to support Israeli and Palestinian
efforts to achieve a peace agreement before the end of

2008. President Bush and Secretary Rice are personally
engaged and view this as a U.S. national interest.

-- It will be vital for the international community to
continue to support not only the negotiating process, but
also Palestinian institutional capacity building and
economic development. Budgetary support is especially
crucial as the Palestinian Authority faces a projected
budget shortfall of approximately $400-600 million in


-- We appreciate critical EU assistance to date, and urge
that EU and Member States continue to do all they can to
support Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas and
Prime Minister Fayyad and help meet the needs of the
Palestinian people and support the negotiations.

-- The new PA government has made clear it will not
negotiate with Hamas - we should respect this decision.

-- The situation in Gaza is complicated and poses a
serious challenge, as the security, economic, and
humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. There is
no easy solution to this problem, but a new approach is
needed and we are talking with Israel, Egypt and the
Palestinian Authority leadership about developing an
approach that would provide security for Israel, Egypt and
the PA, support the legitimate Palestinian Authority,
ensure humanitarian needs are being met in Gaza, work
towards the resumption of normal economic life for the
people of Gaza, and restore conditions that would permit
the implementation of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and

-- The United States will not abandon the people of Gaza.
We continue to provide humanitarian assistance through the
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) and other international organizations.

STATE 00054639 011 OF 012

As the Secretary noted in her remarks with President Abbas
earlier this month, the U.S. is looking to increase our
assistance to humanitarian relief organizations working in
Gaza and we'll be doing that very soon.

-- Continued Israeli settlement construction is a
problem. It is inconsistent with the Roadmap and does not
contribute to creating an environment supportive of
negotiations. The Roadmap calls for a freeze on
settlement activity and we expect Israel to fulfill its
commitments under the Roadmap and to avoid any actions
that could prejudice issues that must be resolved through
negotiations. With respect to outposts, Israel has
committed to removing them and as President Bush has said,
they need to go.


-- The European Commission has expressed support for our
plan to include all pledges made since the 2006 London
Conference in our pledges at the June 12 Afghanistan
support conference in Paris. This allows the Commission
to include its 600 million Euro, four year commitment
(2007-2010) and its 2007 33 million Euro pledge of
humanitarian assistance. This totals roughly $1 billion.
We hope that EU member states will follow this approach in
their bilateral pledges.

-- The European Commission and Kai Eide have expressed
Paris goals that parallel ours. We agree that the Paris
Conference will be a platform to reaffirm our long-term
commitment to Afghanistan, put Kai Eide in the lead, fund
an Afghan-led development strategy, fund elections in
particular, and commit to improve aid effectiveness.

-- We also agree that the Afghans should commit to
improving accountability and fighting corruption. We are
already working with the Afghan Government to take
concrete steps demonstrating this commitment prior to

-- We applaud Afghanistan's efforts to paint a
comprehensive approach to development, but agree that the
five-year plan needs more prioritization among its goals.
We are hopeful that the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund will approve the plan at their Board Reviews
on June 2 and 3 and set a positive tone going into the
June 4 Senior Officials meeting.


-- While we continue to support the ongoing political
dialogue process, we urge the EU and its member states to
provide financial support for the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) as a key element in helping to create the
conditions for lasting peace and stability.

-- The U.S. also remains deeply concerned about the
increasing number of acts of piracy and armed robbery off
the coast of Somalia, and strongly supports regional
efforts to strengthen maritime security.

-- In February, the TFG requested assistance from the UN
Security Council in fighting piracy in waters off the
coast of Somalia. In response, the U.S., U.K., France,
and Panama have co-sponsored a draft resolution that would
authorize states, in cooperation with the TFG, to take
steps in deterring, preventing, and suppressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

-- The purpose of the resolution is to provide a clear
basis for member state involvement in counterpiracy
efforts under the UN Charter and international law.
Although some Security Council members have voiced
concerns about the impact of the resolution on Somalia's
sovereignty, the resolution is fully consistent with

STATE 00054639 012 OF 012


-- We appreciate the visit to Georgia on May 12 by several
EU FMs and their strong statements condemning all
activities increasing tensions in the region and
emphasizing the need for Georgian authorities to provide
for free and fair elections on May 21, stressing the role
of a free and independent media.

-- We must continue to urge Russia to decrease tensions in
Georgia by repealing the Presidential Instructions
authorizing increased government contacts with Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, and by withdrawing the airborne troops
and artillery deployed to its peacekeeping forces in

-- We must call on Russia to actively encourage direct
talks between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz,
talks in which Moscow has discouraged the Abkhaz from
participating in the past. We will continue to press
President Medvedev to work with President Saakashvili to
reduce tensions and to facilitate direct Abkhaz-Georgian
engagement on Tbilisi's peace proposals.

-- We also encourage your support for efforts to re-
energize the peace process, including a meeting of senior
Georgian/Abkhaz officials in Sweden next month; a follow
up meeting in Berlin in July; and convening of a peace
conference (with U.S., EU, Russian, UN and other states)
to offer a new forum for Georgian-Abkhaz talks.

-- We would welcome additional EU steps to strengthen
Georgia's territorial integrity, such as denying EU visa
facilitation to Russian passport holders who reside in
Abkhazia and a call for an end to illegal foreign
investment in Abkhazia.

-- We also need to call on Georgia to continue showing
restraint in response to provocations and call on Tbilisi
to further develop and implement its peace plan in
collaboration with Abkhaz authorities.

-- We warmly welcome the continued efforts of EU Special
Representative Semneby and the European Commission in
implementing confidence-building measures, and we applaud
the Commission's allocation of 2 million Euros to support
preparations for the crucial parliamentary elections.

-- We strongly support a European Instant Assessment
Mechanism to investigate the April 20 shoot-down of a
Georgian UAV. We see this as complementary to the UN's
investigation of the incident, which we understand will be
concluded soon.

- At the U.S.-EU Summit, we believe that we should, in the
communiqu, reiterate our commitment to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Georgia, call on Russia to
reverse its recent provocative actions in Abkhazia, call
on all parties to refrain from further escalating
tensions, welcome the Georgian Government's recent peace
initiatives on Abkhazia, and call on the separatist
authorities in Abkhazia to engage in direct talks with