US-CHINA DISCUSSIONS ON COOPERATION IN ASIAN REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 054231 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 TAGS: PREL CH ASEAN ARF APEC XB SUBJECT: US-CHINA DISCUSSIONS ON COOPERATION IN ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS REF: A. STATE 34771 B. BEIJING 900 CLASSIFIED BY EAP/RSP BLAIR HALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B)&(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 1 in Washington, China MFA Asia Department Deputy Director-General (DDG) Yang Yanyi participated in broad-ranging discussions with U.S. officials on U.S.-China cooperation in Asian regional organizations. China sees the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as useful, particularly in the area of non-traditional security cooperation. While needed, efforts to strengthen ARF must occur under ASEAN's continued, albeit "distracted" leadership. Following a briefing by the U.S., DDG Yang provided few details on China's comprehensive program of cooperation with ASEAN. The U.S. and China hold differing approaches to rationalizing security cooperation in APEC and ARF in light of Taiwan's membership in APEC. The U.S. prefers a more case-by-case approach based on the suitability of each institution rather than the more comprehensive Chinese approach to moving some security issues wholesale from APEC to ARF. On broader regional architecture issues, DDG Yang described East Asia Community-building and the priority China places on regional integration under ASEAN Plus 3. China sees a growing need for new arrangements perhaps more reflective of existing regional power arrangements, including recent notions of an Asian G-8. Overall, U.S. and Chinese views on regional organizations were somewhat similar, but core disagreements toward Taiwan and the role of ASEAN limited further agreement. END SUMMARY. -------------- -- STRENGTHENING ARF, BUT UNDER ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP -------------- -- ¶2. (C) EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall and DDG Yang discussed ARF's strengths, its weaknesses, and the merits of ASEAN leadership. Both sides see ARF as useful, particularly in the area of non-traditional security cooperation. China sees non-traditional security as a potential substitute for preventive diplomacy (ARF's original mandate). For Yang, Asia's focus on the strict avoidance of intervention in another country's internal affairs makes traditional preventive diplomacy efforts in ARF difficult. On the other hand, both sides stated that ARF needs to improve its institutional procedures and produce a clear track record of concrete cooperation. For Yang, institutional reform should reflect ASEAN norms and practices like consensus and gradualism. While also critical of ASEAN's leadership role, China resolutely supports continuing ASEAN's institutional status in ARF. According to DDG Yang, "internal distractions reduce ASEAN's capacity to lead ARF." Despite this, ASEAN "for certain should remain in the driver's seat and the only acceptable leader of ARF is ASEAN." ¶3. (C) Giving specifics on Chinese views on ARF's agenda, Yang referenced China's openness to increasing the roles of defense officials in ARF, including an eventual ARF Defense Ministers' Meeting. South China Sea developments should not be on ARF's agenda. China increasingly supports the role of Track Two organizations such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and other international organizations in ARF's processes. -------------- -------------- CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS: MUCH HAPPENING, BUT FEW DETAILS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Hall briefed Yang at length on U.S. efforts to further integrate ASEAN under the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership. This includes facilitating ASEAN economic integration, political and security cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation such as disaster management, public health, and human resources development. However, DDG Yang provided few details on China's programs of cooperation with ASEAN. On the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, chapters on goods and services have been concluded and China plans to conclude a chapter on investment in August. China has opened an ASEAN Center in Beijing to coordinate its relations with ASEAN. Notable is China's offer of 8,000 professional training slots over the next five years and a draft MOU being developed on media cooperation. -------------- - APPROACHES TO SECURITY IN ARF AND APEC AT ODDS -------------- - ¶5. (C) The U.S. and China hold differing approaches to rationalizing the overlap of security cooperation in APEC and ARF in light of Taiwan's membership in APEC. The U.S. prefers a more case-by-case approach based on the suitability of each institution rather than the more comprehensive Chinese approach to moving certain security issues wholesale from APEC to ARF. U.S. APEC Senior Official Ambassador Patricia Haslach pointed out APEC's structural advantages, such as STATE 00054231 002 OF 002 its multi-sectoral focus and strong relationship with the region's private sector, when developing approaches to trade-related security threats. On the other hand, ARF may be better suited than APEC for some initiatives such as military matters. China concurred that APEC will always play some role in some security issues, citing such activities such as aviation security, food defense, and energy security. However, Huang Yiyang, Department of International Organizations APEC Office Deputy Director, stated that security or political issues deemed to be the "rightful authority of sovereign states" should not be discussed in APEC due to Taiwan's membership. China began to list certain agenda items such as nonproliferation that they deemed "not suitable" for APEC. Following that, the U.S. side cautioned against assigning general labels to any specific issue as "appropriate" or "not appropriate" for either ARF or APEC. Rather a case-by-case examination of proposals should be sought based on the institutional structures of each institution. Both sides agreed to continue the dialogue on future counter terrorism cooperation in APEC. ¶6. (C) Huang also referenced past dialogue between the U.S. and China on a non-paper that outlined several models to allow for work on security issues in APEC while taking into account China's concerns regarding Taiwan. He noted with disappointment that the last round of comments from the U.S. had deleted all mention of these models. (Note: China has agreed to political commitments on certain topics in the past, but has subsequently resisted or watered down all attempts to develop concrete, capacity building activities. There have been no recent discussions on the non-paper.) -------------- -------------- REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE: INTEGRATION AND NEW DIRECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Joined by EAP DAS Scot Marciel and NSC and S/P officials for lunch, U.S. officials probed DDG Yang on China's views on regional integration and new regional arrangements, particularly among major powers. Yang described "East Asia Community-building as progressing along four wheels:" EAS, ASEAN Plus 3, ASEAN's Plus One relationships, and various trilateral groupings. China sees ASEAN Plus 3 as the main vehicle for regional integration. However, ASEAN remains preoccupied with its own internal integration, sometimes to the distraction of broader, pan-Asian efforts. Speaking personally, Yang did not observe great value in EAS. EAS shares no agenda or common objectives among its members. Trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and the ROK has increased as Sino-Japanese ties have warmed. Yang also sought U.S. views on a proposed a U.S.-China-Japan trilateral forum. Yang said China senses the need for a platform for major power cooperation such as recent notions of an Asian G-8 among the major Asia-Pacific powers (ref B). USG interlocutors observed that Asian regional architecture will continue to evolve, and that China and the United States do have many similar strategic interests. They agreed to continue discussions about cooperation in regional institutions. ¶8. COMMENT: The U.S. and Chinese sides seemed to agree far more than they disagreed on substantive views towards these regional organizations. However, core Chinese interests such as isolating Taiwan internationally and maintaining strong China-ASEAN ties still provide a ceiling to the level of synergy between U.S. and Chinese views toward existing institutions. Similar views on new arrangements among major powers could provide opportunities for greater collaboration. These discussions are part of recent efforts to increase U.S.-China coordination within Asian regional organizations. ¶9. (U) Chinese Participants (all MFA): --Asia Department DDG Yang Yanyi --International Organizations APEC Office Deputy Director Huang Yiyang --Asia Department Office of Policy Planning Deputy Director Zheng Zhenhua --Asia Department Office of Regional Security Third Secretary Yang Shichao --Chinese Embassy Staff PolMinCouns Cai Run, Pol/C Hu Zhaoming, Third Secretary Zheng Tao U.S. Participants: --EAP DAS Scot Marciel --EAP Ambassador-for-APEC Pat Haslach --EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall --EAP/CM Director John Norris --S/P James Green --NSC/Asia Kurt Tong --EAP/EP Amit Mathur --EAP/RSP Kevin Sheives --EAP/RSP Jack Andre --ISN/RA Charles Mahaffey --OES/IHA Natalia Commella RICE