Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE4865
2008-01-16 15:18:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:
SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
how-toVZCZCXRO3899 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHC #4865/01 0161520 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 161518Z JAN 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 8736 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 5771 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 6900 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 8103 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0011 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 8392 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 7870 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 5072 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4419 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 7302 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 9333 RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 9270 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 7784 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5952 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 7574 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 4297 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0280 RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 6596 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 5372 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 6541 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0596 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2345 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 5512 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 9014 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 9791 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 4815 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0042 INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 004865
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2033
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: STATE 150164
Classified By: NEA DAS LAWRENCE BUTLER FOR
REASONS 1.4. (A),(B) AND (D)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 004865
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2033
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: STATE 150164
Classified By: NEA DAS LAWRENCE BUTLER FOR
REASONS 1.4. (A),(B) AND (D)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Para 3.
Please slug responses for PM, NEA and the appropriate
regional bureau; also info NSC WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC, and
JOINT STAFF WASHDC.
2. (C) SUMMARY: As the President and Prime Minister Maliki
agreed in their November 26, 2007 Declaration of Principles,
"the Governments of Iraq and the United States are committed
to developing a long-term relationship as two fully sovereign
and independent states with common interests." UN SECURITY
Council resolution (UNSCR) 1790 takes note of the Iraqi Prime
Minister,s December 7 letter to the SECURITY COUNCIL in
which he stated that the Government of Iraq considers the
letter to be its final request to the SECURITY COUNCIL for
the extension of the mandate of the multinational force. The
United States is beginning a dialogue with Iraq on a
long-term relationship, including defining the conditions for
and status of a military presence in Iraq in 2009 and
thereafter.
--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------
3. (C) Posts are requested to engage host governments in
order to determine whether host governments expect to pursue
continued troop deployments in Iraq in 2009, and what legal
and political conditions the host government believes would
be necessary to facilitate such deployments without the
authority of a Chapter VII UNSCR. Posts should also inquire
as to what conditions would be useful but not absolutely
necessary to facilitate a continued presence. Posts should
note if the foreign policy and defense establishments differ
in their assessment of the legal or political hurdles. Post
should also note the role that the legislature will have and
the anticipated lead time required to take any required
domestic steps (e.g., legislation) to obtain authority to
remain in Iraq post-Chapter VII UNSCR. Finally, post should
explore whether the host government would be interested in
benefiting as a third-party from a U.S.-Iraq Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA),as described below.
--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------
4. (C) The U.S. preferred outcome is that if foreign
governments will be able to deploy to Iraq in 2009 and
beyond, they will be able to benefit from the same status
arrangements and authorizations that U.S. forces will have
under a to-be-negotiated Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).
The mechanism we have in mind currently to provide such
benefits is to include a term in the U.S.-Iraq DCA that
extends to a troop-contributing country, upon such country,s
request, the rights and obligations of specific articles in
the DCA. We do not/not anticipate that this will be a
multi-lateral agreement. We will brief international
partners on our discussions with Iraq on the DCA in the near
future.
STATE 00004865 002 OF 003
5. (U) A Fact Sheet that discusses the role of SECURITY in a
Strategic Framework Agreement is repeated in para. 6 for
posts to draw on in the discussion. Posts should not/not
leave this factsheet as a nonpaper--note that the exact name
of the agreement is still to be determined
6. (SBU)
BEGIN EXCERPTS SPECIFIC TO THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
-- negotiations will begin by addressing issues of SECURITY
and center on the framework for U.S. support to and
cooperation with the Iraqi government.
-- This SECURITY agreement would be very similar in content
to status of forces agreements or defense cooperation
agreements(DCA) that the U.S. negotiates regionally and
globally. The U.S. has concluded similar arrangements with
more than 120 countries around the world, including many
countries in the region. We generally seek to negotiate
these agreements anywhere U.S. forces will be present in a
peacetime environment, and to cover all manner of cooperative
military activities.
-- An agreement with Iraq would include provisions that are
not found in traditional DCAs, such as temporary authorities
for United States forces to continue to conduct operations in
Iraq and to hold SECURITY detainees. Other topics typically
addressed in most DCAs include the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction over U.S. DOD personnel, cooperation in criminal
investigations; entry/exit and tax exemptions, access to host
nation, government-owned facilities, and adjudication of
claims, among others.
-- When concluded, such an agreement with Iraq, as with all
such agreements that the U.S. concludes with its friends and
allies, will respect the sovereignty of our host, preserve
flexibility for U.S. NATIONAL decision makers, and provide
the necessary freedom of action for U.S. forces. This is not
an attempt to lock down future administrations into certain
policies, troop levels, or mission sets, but instead to
negotiate the legal framework for the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
-- We hope troop-contributing countries will continue to
contribute to the common goal of helping Iraq provide for its
security, and as part of our efforts to negotiate this
agreement, we will work to facilitate this. Our relationship
with Iraq is evolving, but Iraq still requires a range of
support and training before it can take full responsibility
for its own security.
-- The Iraqi government has indicated that it does not want
permanent U.S. bases in Iraq, and we are not seeking them.
As is commonplace in bilateral DCAs, the U.S. and Iraq will
negotiate topics such as access to facilitites in order to
promote our mutual goals and interests.
-- The USG has about 120 DCAs or similar agreements with
countries around the world and, with the exception of those
agreements that involve reciprocal obligations or include an
explicit defense commitment (e.g. NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, Mutual Defense Agreements with Japan and Korea),
DCAs are concluded as executive agreements.
END FACT SHEET EXCERPTS
STATE 00004865 003 OF 003
--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------
7. (U) Posts should respond by Wednesday January 24.
--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------
8. (U) Please contact NEA/I-PM's Stephen Epstein: 202-647-
4112; EpsteinSM@state.sgov.gov.
RICE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2033
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: STATE 150164
Classified By: NEA DAS LAWRENCE BUTLER FOR
REASONS 1.4. (A),(B) AND (D)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Para 3.
Please slug responses for PM, NEA and the appropriate
regional bureau; also info NSC WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC, and
JOINT STAFF WASHDC.
2. (C) SUMMARY: As the President and Prime Minister Maliki
agreed in their November 26, 2007 Declaration of Principles,
"the Governments of Iraq and the United States are committed
to developing a long-term relationship as two fully sovereign
and independent states with common interests." UN SECURITY
Council resolution (UNSCR) 1790 takes note of the Iraqi Prime
Minister,s December 7 letter to the SECURITY COUNCIL in
which he stated that the Government of Iraq considers the
letter to be its final request to the SECURITY COUNCIL for
the extension of the mandate of the multinational force. The
United States is beginning a dialogue with Iraq on a
long-term relationship, including defining the conditions for
and status of a military presence in Iraq in 2009 and
thereafter.
--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------
3. (C) Posts are requested to engage host governments in
order to determine whether host governments expect to pursue
continued troop deployments in Iraq in 2009, and what legal
and political conditions the host government believes would
be necessary to facilitate such deployments without the
authority of a Chapter VII UNSCR. Posts should also inquire
as to what conditions would be useful but not absolutely
necessary to facilitate a continued presence. Posts should
note if the foreign policy and defense establishments differ
in their assessment of the legal or political hurdles. Post
should also note the role that the legislature will have and
the anticipated lead time required to take any required
domestic steps (e.g., legislation) to obtain authority to
remain in Iraq post-Chapter VII UNSCR. Finally, post should
explore whether the host government would be interested in
benefiting as a third-party from a U.S.-Iraq Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA),as described below.
--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------
4. (C) The U.S. preferred outcome is that if foreign
governments will be able to deploy to Iraq in 2009 and
beyond, they will be able to benefit from the same status
arrangements and authorizations that U.S. forces will have
under a to-be-negotiated Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).
The mechanism we have in mind currently to provide such
benefits is to include a term in the U.S.-Iraq DCA that
extends to a troop-contributing country, upon such country,s
request, the rights and obligations of specific articles in
the DCA. We do not/not anticipate that this will be a
multi-lateral agreement. We will brief international
partners on our discussions with Iraq on the DCA in the near
future.
STATE 00004865 002 OF 003
5. (U) A Fact Sheet that discusses the role of SECURITY in a
Strategic Framework Agreement is repeated in para. 6 for
posts to draw on in the discussion. Posts should not/not
leave this factsheet as a nonpaper--note that the exact name
of the agreement is still to be determined
6. (SBU)
BEGIN EXCERPTS SPECIFIC TO THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
-- negotiations will begin by addressing issues of SECURITY
and center on the framework for U.S. support to and
cooperation with the Iraqi government.
-- This SECURITY agreement would be very similar in content
to status of forces agreements or defense cooperation
agreements(DCA) that the U.S. negotiates regionally and
globally. The U.S. has concluded similar arrangements with
more than 120 countries around the world, including many
countries in the region. We generally seek to negotiate
these agreements anywhere U.S. forces will be present in a
peacetime environment, and to cover all manner of cooperative
military activities.
-- An agreement with Iraq would include provisions that are
not found in traditional DCAs, such as temporary authorities
for United States forces to continue to conduct operations in
Iraq and to hold SECURITY detainees. Other topics typically
addressed in most DCAs include the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction over U.S. DOD personnel, cooperation in criminal
investigations; entry/exit and tax exemptions, access to host
nation, government-owned facilities, and adjudication of
claims, among others.
-- When concluded, such an agreement with Iraq, as with all
such agreements that the U.S. concludes with its friends and
allies, will respect the sovereignty of our host, preserve
flexibility for U.S. NATIONAL decision makers, and provide
the necessary freedom of action for U.S. forces. This is not
an attempt to lock down future administrations into certain
policies, troop levels, or mission sets, but instead to
negotiate the legal framework for the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
-- We hope troop-contributing countries will continue to
contribute to the common goal of helping Iraq provide for its
security, and as part of our efforts to negotiate this
agreement, we will work to facilitate this. Our relationship
with Iraq is evolving, but Iraq still requires a range of
support and training before it can take full responsibility
for its own security.
-- The Iraqi government has indicated that it does not want
permanent U.S. bases in Iraq, and we are not seeking them.
As is commonplace in bilateral DCAs, the U.S. and Iraq will
negotiate topics such as access to facilitites in order to
promote our mutual goals and interests.
-- The USG has about 120 DCAs or similar agreements with
countries around the world and, with the exception of those
agreements that involve reciprocal obligations or include an
explicit defense commitment (e.g. NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, Mutual Defense Agreements with Japan and Korea),
DCAs are concluded as executive agreements.
END FACT SHEET EXCERPTS
STATE 00004865 003 OF 003
--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------
7. (U) Posts should respond by Wednesday January 24.
--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------
8. (U) Please contact NEA/I-PM's Stephen Epstein: 202-647-
4112; EpsteinSM@state.sgov.gov.
RICE