SUGGESTED POINTS FOR USUN FOR MAY 5 FORMAL

UNCLAS STATE 047440 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN KTFN PREL PTER SUBJECT: SUGGESTED POINTS FOR USUN FOR MAY 5 FORMAL BRIEFING TO THE 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN SANCTIONS) COMMITTEE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DENMARK, LIECHTENSTEIN, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND ¶1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. On Monday, 5 May, representatives from Denmark, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland will meet with the 1267 (al-Qaeda/Taliban) Sanctions Committee with a view to having an in-depth discussion on issues relevant to the work of the Committee and in particular related to the implementation of sanctions measures set out in UNSCR 1267 and other relevant resolutions. The aforementioned countries are among the harshest critics of the 1267 sanctions regime, and at the forefront of a proposal to create an independent review mechanism to provide non-binding recommendations with respect to the merits of listing and de-listing decisions of the Security Council and its sanctions committees. All four countries favor and have proposed establishing a panel comprised of three independent legal experts to review de/listings. While we welcome the chance to engage with these countries on their ideas to improve the 1267 sanctions regime, we do not think their proposed solution would work, nor be acceptable to several Security Council Members. A more constructive proposal for improving the 1267 sanctions regime would be to improve Member State implementation of existing commitments, including: providing clear identifiers for proposed listings; providing public statements of case for proposed listings, which clearly indicate the basis of the designation in accordance with the criteria established under the 1267 sanctions regime; exercising reasonable efforts to serve notice to designated parties once they are designated, as well as to inform the designated parties of their right to seek licensing (exemptions) and de-listing from the 1267 Sanctions Committee. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶3. Department requests the following points guide the message USUN delivers, as appropriate, in response to the committee's interaction with Denmark, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland, particularly regarding the establishment of an independent review mechanism for the 1267 sanctions regime: - Thank the representatives of Denmark, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland for their desire to engage in this important dialogue directly with the 1267 Committee. - Agree that the Security Council needs to do what it can to avoid sanctioning the wrong people, and remind representatives of Denmark, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland that protections in the 1267 regime have been greatly expanded through successor resolutions, such as 1452 (2003) (licensing exemptions); 1617 (2005) (providing notice and a statement of case); 1730 (2006) (establishment of the UN focal point and de-listing procedures); and 1735 (2006) (listings, de-listings, and exemptions procedures; and establishment of a universal cover sheet for de-listings). - Stress that the Committee will strive, as it has done in previous successor resolutions, to strengthen efforts to outline fair and clear procedures when negotiating the next resolution (in June) to extend the committee's mandate. - Welcome the chance to engage further on these issues, but remind them that criticism of the regime and suggested fixes should be constructive and realistic, and that we all must recognize that targeted sanctions are a critical tool for the UNSC -- usually a better alternative to blunter tools like non-targeted sanctions (that is, sanctions against and entire country's economy) or even the use of force. - Explain that the clear USG position is that it is not appropriate to subject the decisions of the Security Council or its sanctions committees to review by a group of individuals, operating either outside the Council or in and advisory capacity to the Council. The UN focal point (under which member states retain all responsibility for making decisions on designations) was carefully crafted to preserve the authority of the Council. - A critical factor in assessing the merits of a review mechanism is the extent to which reviewers would have access to non-public information. It is very unlikely that many Member States (including the U.S.) would agree to share relevant non-public information with an independent review body, and access limited to public information would arguably preclude meaningful review. Conversely, even if a review panel were given access to non-public information, the review panel would not be able to reveal the information publicly -- making it unlikely that the panel would satisfy criticisms over the lack of transparency in the current system. - The current proposals for independent review which call for non-binding recommendations from the review panel would invite further criticism as either an empty review process that either "rubber stamps" Committee decisions or is ignored by the Committee. - Despite the potential limitations on the scope of a panel's review, there would likely be pressure for the Council to follow recommendations. Public rebuttal would be limited due to an inability to share non-public information. - The make-up of a review mechanism would likely be problematic. A panel of experts (such as the 1267 Monitoring Team) selected by the Security Council could be criticized as lacking true independence, but any other selection process (eg., one proposal calls for a panel consisting of the non-permanent members who have recently rotated from the Council) would raise other obvious concerns. - Underscore that the Committee,s end goal must be preserving its authority and defending the decisions of the Council, as set out in its resolutions. ¶4. Department appreciates Mission's assistance. RICE