DEMARCHE REQUEST: URGING WESTERN FRIENDS'

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 046991

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2018
TAGS: UNGA GE PREL
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: URGING WESTERN FRIENDS'
SUPPORT FOR GEORGIAN IDP AND REFUGEE RESOLUTION

Classified By: IO PDAS James B. Warlick, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. This is an action request. Department requests that
Embassies London, Paris, and Berlin urge host governments
to vote in support of the Georgian UN General Assembly (UNGA)
resolution on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
refugees currently scheduled for consideration around May 9.
Post should pursue the objectives in para 2 below with MFA IO
Assistant Secretary equivalents. The German, British, and
French Friends of Georgia have previously indicated support
for this resolution; therefore, delivery to EUR Directors is
at Posts' discretion. Post may draw from the background
material in para 4 - 8 below when delivering this demarche.
End action request.


2. (U) Department requests posts pursue the following
objectives:

-- Urge support for the Georgian IDP UNGA resolution,
drawing on the background in para 4-8 below.

-- For IO-equivalent interlocutors: Underscore agreement
with concerns about eroding the division of competencies
between the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council,
but explain this is not the time to stand on principle. We
are willing to work with the Georgians on the text of the
resolution so that it will not contain &recommendations."

-- For EUR-equivalent interlocutors: Note that we have long
hoped to see an IDP and refugee resolution from Georgia
because IDP and refugee return is a core issue of the
Abkhazia conflict. Failure to address this issue is a
primary reason why the UN settlement talks are frozen and the
Georgian government is losing faith in the Friends' process
at a time when it needs Western support.


3. (U) Point of Contact/Reporting Deadline: Posts should
report the results of this demarche to Anneliese Reinemeyer
in IO/UNP (202 647-0046 or in the GAL) by Wednesday, May 7.
Please send an info copy of the response to USUN.

--------------
Background
--------------


4. (SBU) Georgia plans to table its IDP and refugee
resolution in the UNGA on/around Friday, May 9. The Georgian
Mission is reluctant to delay the vote for fear that it will
not be able to secure another discussion before Georgia's May
21 election. The Mission noted that it had pulled the
resolution previously at our request (in the fall of 2007)
but would lose credibility if it did so again. Therefore, we
do not anticipate that Georgia will delay consideration
of its resolution.


5. (C) While the western Friends (UK, France, Germany, and
the U.S.) originally planned to support the resolution, the
UK, France, and Germany are now opposed for reasons of
principle and refuse to even discuss the content of the
resolution with the Georgians. The issue of principle
concerns the divide in competencies between the UN Security
Council and the UN General Assembly. Article 12 of the UN
Charter provides that the UNGA shall not make any
recommendations with regard to a dispute or situation while
the Security Council is exercising its Charter functions in
respect of the dispute or situation. The UK, France and
Germany have thus taken the position that the UNGA should not
adopt this resolution because the UNSC is already "seized"
with the situation in Georgia, therefore, the UNGA should not
deal with this issue. At the same time, the UK Mission in NY
reports that Georgia cannot make any changes to the
resolution that will make it acceptable to the UK -- ever.
As a result, the UK will likely abstain while making a strong
statement in support of Georgian territorial integrity. The
French Mission told USUN "the timing and idea of this
initiative are appalling . . . It will harm relations between
the UNGA and UNSC and make it more difficult for the UNSC to
defend its competency." The French Mission has indicated
that, in the best case scenario, France will abstain. Based
on reporting from the UK Mission, Germany also plans to
abstain.


6. (SBU) The Department did consider the Article 12 issue
and also had concerns. In principle, we agree that Article
12 should play an important role in delineating the
respective roles of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, and that we and the international community have a
strong interest in rolling back erosion that has occurred
over time. That said, the General Assembly has in fact
adopted resolutions that would appear to encroach on the
principles that we believe should apply under Article 12 on
numerous occasions. Article 12 does not prevent the UNGA
from adopting resolutions on issues covered by the UNSC as
long as they do not contain recommendations.


7. (SBU) We would like to refocus the UK, France, and
Germany on how this resolution fits into our larger policy on
Georgia. W e fear that the UK, France, and Germany would be
sending a very negative signal of their lack of support to
the Georgians by abstaining, especially in light of Russia's
recent actions including:

-- withdrawal from CIS sanctions on Abkhazia on March 6,
-- Putin,s instructions to Russian ministries to establish
relations with their counterparts in Abkhazia on April 16,
-- the downing of a Georgian UAV apparently by a Russian
fighter on April 20, and
-- the Russian decision to increase peacekeepers in Abkhazia
without advance notification on April 29.

Georgian buy-in to the UN-chaired Friends of the Secretary
General (FOSG) peace process is at an all-time low due to a
complete standstill in the negotiations. The current
bottom-up approach on developing CBMs is not working. We
believe that the FOSG need to refocus on the core issues of a
political settlement of Abkhazia's status and IDP and refugee
returns, and this resolution helps to do this.


8. (SBU) At the same time, we would like to do everything
possible to maintain Friends, unity, in order to ensure that
a Georgian victory in the UN does not turn into a devastating
embarrassment for Georgia. It is possible
that Georgia may be able to secure enough votes to approve
the resolution, but if the western Friends oppose the
resolution, the abstentions may far outnumber the votes to
approve. Russia could exploit the result as a lack of
support for Georgia, and the Friends process would be further
weakened. While we fully understand the concerns about
maintaining a divide between the mandated functions of the
UNSC and the UNGA, we do not feel that we should make that
issue the focus here, or that this resolution threatens or
undermines the efforts of the UNSC in Georgia in any tangible
way. Rather, in our view, the resolution would further the
Friends' overall goals for moving the Georgian peace process
forward.
RICE