U.S.-RUSSIA STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK DISCUSSIONS IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 045414 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC MARR RS SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON MARCH 26-27, 2008 Classified By: Acting U/S John Rood, Reasons: E.O. 12958 b/d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings in Washington, D.C., on March 26-27, 2008, senior-level U.S. and Russian delegations, led by Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John C. Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, respectively, discussed the draft text for a joint U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration which would be issued - but not signed - during President Bush's visit to Sochi, Russia, for meetings with President Putin. On March 26, the two delegations also held a discussion of previously-proposed U.S. transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) to address Russian concerns regarding the proposed U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) assets in Poland and the Czech Republic. By the conclusion of discussions on March 27, both delegations had agreed to most of the text for the joint declaration, but language on MD and Iran remained bracketed for continued discussion and resolution by Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Lavrov. -------------- MARCH 26 THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK DECLARATION -------------- ¶2. (C) Acting U/S Rood opened the discussions by noting that the Strategic Framework Declaration was a way for Presidents Bush and Putin to provide a real legacy in the realm of U.S.-Russian cooperation for their successors. DFM Kislyak said that while there were parts of the draft with which Russia was comfortable, elements of U.S.-Russia disagreement on such issues as CFE, NATO expansion, and military use of outer space needed to be added. If the purpose of the draft framework was to only cite areas of agreement, missile defense and post-START would also need to be eliminated from the text. ¶3. (C) The discussion turned to what type of document the Declaration should be. Acting U/S Rood said that the U.S. goal was a document that described where we can cooperate constructively on large strategic issues. DFM Kislyak replied that the Russian side also wanted the document to reflect a number of disagreements. The two delegations proceeded through a section-by-section review of the draft and agreed that they would work on developing mutually agreeable language for a limited number of areas of disagreement. Acting U/S Rood noted Secretary Rice wanted to 
propose text on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), given this is an area where the United States and Russia are cooperating. Kislyak said in Russia's view PSI was not a U.S.-Russia initiative like others discussed; he did not believe it warranted mention in the Presidential declaration. With respect to the section on MD, DFM Kislyak indicated that the Russians would not agree to language that U.S. TCBMs associated with U.S. MD deployments in central Europe had "allayed" Russian concerns. He said this might eventually be the consequence of the TCBMs but making such a statement at this time would be premature. Kislyak said it would take weeks to resolve the issue of how TCBMs could be useful. He said his only purpose for discussing TCBMs was to clarify the U.S. proposals. Acting U/S Rood replied that Secretary Rice was clear that the U.S. wants an acknowledgment that its forward-leaning TCBM proposals allay Russian concerns. DFM Kislyak responded that the proper formulation was the U.S. proposals are potentially important and useful. -------------- --- MD TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES -------------- --- ¶4. (C) The afternoon session on March 26 was dedicated to discussing U.S. TCBM proposals whose purpose is to reassure Russia regarding proposed U.S. MD deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. The latest formulation of the U.S. proposals was contained in a U.S. non-paper on U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation which was given to the Russians on March 19, just after the conclusion of the 2-plus-2 STATE 00045414 002 OF 006 foreign and defense ministers meeting in Moscow. The discussion was organized around DFM Kislyak's questions regarding the March 19 U.S. non-paper. Kislyak reported that he had some six pages of questions regarding TCBM proposals. He repeatedly reiterated that his questions were an effort to seek clarification and not meant as criticism. U/S Rood welcomed the opportunity to clarify our TCBM proposals. The U.S. delegation responded to each question. ¶5. (S) Acting U/S Rood noted that the radar based in the Czech Republic would be turned off (i.e., not radiating) when not in use following a detected missile launch and that the Russians could be notified before testing and calibration of the radar was performed. With respect to the interceptors in Poland, Mr. Rood said that the U.S. would be willing to pursue two possible options: (a) emplacement of interrupter devices that would prevent the interceptors from being launched; and (b) storage of some number of the interceptors on their base in Poland but not in their silo-launchers. He also noted that some TCBMs would last until an Iranian ballistic missile threat was demonstrated but that others could be continued beyond this point. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy U/SD(P) Eric Edelman added that while some of the TCBMs would end once Iran demonstrated a long-range ballistic missile capability, this would not relieve the United States of the need to maintain measures that Russia would need to feel reassured. It did not mean, for example, that measures such as data-sharing and the presence of liaison officers would not continue. Acting U/S of State for Political Affairs Dan Fried noted that TCBMs might mature into a deeper reality if Russia and the U.S. engaged in MD cooperation over the longer-term. DFM Kislyak said it was Russia's understanding, based on the U.S. assessment of Iranian missile developments, that Iran had already almost met the U.S. criteria for "operationalizing" the MD sites. He said the U.S. criteria included the flight-test or acquisition of a 2500 kilometer missile or the flight-test of a space launch vehicle. Therefore, Russia was concerned the U.S. would build the MD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic and then declare Iran had met the U.S. criteria and terminate the TCBMs. ¶6. (C) DFM Kislyak asked what impact a change in U.S. administration would have on any measures that were agreed upon. U/SD(P) Edelman replied that if we agreed on TCBMs, there was no doubt that a future U.S. administration would carry them out. Kislyak later returned to this topic and asked what type of document is envisioned by the U.S. that would guarantee the TCBMs remained active after this administration left office. Acting U/S Rood said there was no guarantee, but the partnerships being developed between Russia and the United States, as mentioned in the Strategic Framework Declaration, would make it very likely that the TCBMs would remain in place. DFM Kislyak said the U.S. had caused uncertainties in the past and would likely do so in the future. He said the agreement on TCBMs was much too important to the future to not be done properly (i.e., ensure their implementation in the future.) ¶7. (S) DFM Kislyak noted that the March 19 U.S. non-paper had a number of assurances and that one of them is a limit of 10 interceptors with the caveat that the United States would "discuss" with Russia before adding to this number. He asked what this meant. Did it mean that the U.S. would talk to Russia after a decision had been made? What was the Pentagon's current thinking on numbers of interceptors? Was the United States thinking of other interceptor sites? He also noted that there is a difference between informing and consulting. U/SD(P) Edelman responded that U.S. defense planning is transparent; it is done through a five-year defense plan and currently nothing planned goes beyond the ten interceptors to be based in Poland. He added if the U.S. did not succeed in its basing negotiations with the Poles and Czechs it might need to look elsewhere. DFM Kislyak said Russia was concerned about the U.S. building a fourth or fifth site. Russia had heard the U.S. had held talks with the United Kingdom about deploying a MD site there. U/SD(P) Edelman said, that while Prime Minister Tony Blair was in office, the UK had indicated some interest in participating in the program beyond the existing role in hosting Fylingdales. Whether that interest might extend to hosting our interceptor site was never really determined because that STATE 00045414 003 OF 006 interest had waned with Blair's departure from the Prime Minister's office. U/SD(P) Edelman also noted that the reason the U.S. could not be categorical about interceptor totals was because of the possibility of further development of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities in terms of penetration aids, although this was something that was far out into the future, likely beyond 2020. U/SD(P) Edelman then said while the U.S. position of staying at 10 interceptors with no major modifications (such as moving from unitary to multiple warheads) and with no additional interceptor deployments -- without prior discussion with Russia -- was a qualified commitment, the U.S. commitment not to modify its MD sites for offensive purposes was categorical. ¶8. (C) Acting U/S Rood added the U.S. wants MD to defend against ballistic missiles regardless of payload. He also noted missiles have a utility apart from their actual use. The U.S. would want MD to remove ballistic missiles as possible tools of coercion by Iran; the problem is that we do not know what is on the missile. U/SD(P) Edelman added that the risk was too great; we would not know until afterwards what was on the warhead. DFM Kislyak stated his understanding that the U.S. criteria for judging an Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat was the missile's range combined with the ability to carry a militarily useful payload. Acting U/S Rood replied that the U.S. would not make its European MD sites operational prior to a demonstrated Iranian capability to strike NATO countries with longer-range ballistic missiles. DFM Kislyak asked what it meant for a payload to be militarily useful. Acting U/S Rood replied a small biological weapon payload would meet the threshold but final judgment would be based on a range of factors. Kislyak then asked how Russia would be able to determine if the MD missiles had not been modified into offensive missiles. Acting U/S Rood replied that Russia would be able to verify the missiles unchanged nature both before and after the missiles were loaded into the silos. ¶9. (C) Discussion then turned to the use of continuous monitoring of the interceptor site by cameras for assuring the interrupter devices were still in place if the missiles were in the silos or that no interceptors had been placed in their silos. DFM Kislyak asked how long it would take to replace the interrupters. Senior MDA Engineer Englander said it would take one day to replace the interrupters. Monitoring the radar site was the next topic covered. DFM Kislyak noted that Secretary of Defense Gates had suggested that such monitoring could verify not only that Russia was not being observed but could also indicate what the U.S. radar was looking at. Acting U/S Rood replied that personnel at the radar site as well as technical monitoring could address this concern. ¶10. (C) DFM Kislyak then raised the issue of MOLINK (Hotline) notifications of U.S. interceptor launches and how much time would be required to send a message. DASD Brian Green replied that a pre-formatted message could be sent almost simultaneously with the launch of a missile interceptor. Acting U/S Rood added that Russia's own systems could detect a third party's hostile missile launch and that with a functioning Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),Russia would also be getting the launch data. DFM Kislyak asked what the exchange of radar data in "near real-time" meant. Acting U/S Rood replied that the JDEC agreement envisioned that near real-time was as close to real-time as possible and that a very brief delay of seconds - not minutes - was contemplated. Keith Englander, Chief Engineer of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency added this meant less than a ten second delay. ¶11. (C) DFM Kislyak said Defense Secretary Gates had told them in October in Moscow that if the Iranian threat ended, the U.S. would remove its missile defense sites from Poland and the Czech Republic. He wanted to know if this was still the U.S. view. Acting U/S Rood said if something like regime change were to occur in Iran that eliminated the Iranian threat both the executive and Congress would probably move to remove the sites. Acting U/S Rood noted, however, that if a threat from another country in the area appeared, that would justify keeping the sites operational. ¶12. (C) DFM Kislyak asked what the timelines for reaching STATE 00045414 004 OF 006 agreement on TCBMs would be if Russia agreed to pursue this course. Acting U/S Rood said major elements could be established at the level of the delegations then meeting but technical experts would need to work out the details. He added if the Russian side wanted to move quickly this could be done rapidly, in weeks rather than months. DFM Kislyak replied this was too optimistic, as there was too much detail to be done that quickly. ¶13. (C) Attention then turned to the question of reciprocity of access with respect to the Russians granting access to their MD facilities to U.S., Czech, and Polish personnel in exchange for Russian personnel having access to the U.S. sites in central Europe. DFM Kislyak said Russia thought assigning experts to the Russian Embassies in Prague and Warsaw was a great idea and was appreciated. Acting U/S Rood said the U.S. was prepared to work through specifics and wanted to hear from the Russians their ideas on facilities in Russia that would come under reciprocal arrangements. DFM Kislyak replied there was no reasonable explanation for giving access to the Czechs and Poles to Russian MD sites since Russian sites represented no threat to their countries. He indicated that if such reciprocity were to be offered simply to provide diplomatic cover for the presence of Russians at the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, then that was different. Acting U/S Rood responded that perhaps having a reciprocal arrangement with NATO would be more helpful -- since Russian MD did not historically have a completely U.S. focus -- and that since the Czechs and Poles came under NATO this could be a solution. He added that he did not understand the sensitivity of allowing the Czechs and Poles access to Russian facilities and asked how it would harm Russian security to show that Russian MD assets were targeted at U.S. and NATO strategic capabilities. DFM Kislyak replied that reciprocity was the issue and it was not clear why Russia should even open up its Moscow MD site to the U.S. U/SD(P) Edelman responded by stating reciprocity would never be completely symmetrical since U.S. MD deployments would not be directed at Russia while Russian MD, as DFM admitted, was directed at the United States. -------------- MARCH 27: THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK DECLARATION -------------- ¶14. (C) The two delegations returned to working on the draft text of the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration and were able to resolve all editorial and substantive differences except for Iran and missile defense. ¶15. (C) On the Post-START section, DFM Kislyak asserted that the U.S. was trying to walk away from language that had been agreed upon by Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Lavrov at the July 2007 meeting of Presidents Bush and Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine, that indicated the post-START agreement would be based on the START Treaty. The U.S. side, likewise, was concerned that the Russians were distancing themselves from the language of the May 24, 2002, Moscow Summit Joint Statement and that the Russians were unwilling to cite the value of the 2002 Moscow Treaty for strategic offensive arms reductions -- signed at that summit. Kislyak said Russia's positive comments about the value of the Moscow Treaty to the reductions of offensive arms was always in the context of the existence of the START Treaty. Language was finally agreed that discussed the value of the START Treaty to strategic offense reductions, the Moscow Treaty as an important additional step, and the U.S.-Russian desire to continue to develop a legally-binding post-START arrangement. ¶16. (C) Agreement was also reached on language stating the two sides would work to address their differences in areas where their policies do not coincide such as NATO expansion, CFE, and certain military activities in space. ¶17. (C) After a lengthy discussion on the Iran section, the two delegations developed agreed upon language for all but a portion of the text indicating that all states should meet their requirements under United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1737, 1747, and 1803. This text remained bracketed. DFM Kislyak said Russia's goal was to have balanced language that reflected the use of incentives as well as restrictive measures for dealing with Iran's STATE 00045414 005 OF 006 nuclear program. He said this was the basis for Russia's objection to the proposed U.S. language stating a mutual desire to ensure Iran did not develop or acquire nuclear weapons and reaffirmed a commitment to prevent the transfer of dual use and other items useful in developing WMD to Iran. He added although Russia was committed to the UNSCRs, it did not want to be seen as a leader in using sanctions and did not agree with a sanctions approach generally. Michael Allen, NSC Special Assistant and Senior Director Counterproliferation Strategy, noted that the annex to UNSCR 1747 details an incentives package thus a commitment to implement the UNSCRs would be consistent with the GOR's stated aim of a balanced approach. Acting U/S Fried said the right balance must be struck reflecting the dual track approach of the UNSCRs, but the U.S. could be flexible on how to do this. DFM Kislyak responded that the Iran text on states meeting their requirements under these resolutions must remain bracketed for higher level resolution. ¶18. (C) Acting U/S Rood introduced language for a PSI section and indicated that although the U.S. was not attached to its PSI language it would like to see PSI mentioned. Kislyak said Russia did not feel they had ownership of the PSI program, was not satisfied on how it had changed since it was initiated, and was unhappy PSI had been used against a Russian firm (UAE case). Kislyak also used this opportunity to raise Australia Group membership and problems with Russian attendance at the last PSI meeting in the UK. He questioned continued calls for cooperation on PSI on a host of WMD-related threats including chemical/biological weapons, while Russia was still refused Australia Group membership. He then complained that Russian reps were unable to receive a British visa for the last PSI meeting in London. Given lack of Russian participation, Russia could not sign onto principles which would be agreed to/discussed during the PSI Anniversary meeting in Washington. Regarding the inclusion of PSI, Kislyak at first pushed back, saying the topic was not worthy of being included in a Presidential declaration, but after Acting U/S Rood discussed the value of PSI to counter-proliferation efforts, Kislyak admitted PSI had at least a deterrent value. Agreed PSI language was then developed based on the G-8 St. Petersburg Nonproliferation Statement. ¶19. (C) After extended discussion, language was developed that indicated U.S. support for Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and stated the commitment of the U.S. Administration to work with the U.S. Congress to achieve legislation this year on Jackson-Vanik and Permanent Normal Trade Relations. ¶20. (C) As the final item for discussion, Acting U/S Rood returned to the missile defense section and made another effort to obtain Russian agreement to narrow the bracketed language within the section. DFM Kislyak responded as long as the U.S. was insisting on including the sentence "These measures allay Russia's concerns" he could not agree to the missile defense text. He also made clear that his instructions were that nothing in the MD section could be agreed to until everything is agreed. -------------- PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶21. (SBU) U.S.: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood (Head of delegation),Acting Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Daniel Fried, Acting ISN Assistant Secretary, Patricia McNerney, VCI PDAS Stephen Elliott, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric Edelman, DASD Brian Green, DASD Daniel Fata, NSC Special Assistant and Senior Director Counterproliferation Strategy, Michael Allen, NSC Senior Director for Russia, Mary Warlick, State/T Senior Advisor James Timbie, State/T Chief of Staff Hugh Amundson, ISN/MDSP Director David Hoppler, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, OSD Eurasia Policy Director Colonel Jon Chicky, DOD Regional Expert Richard Trout, JCS J5 Scott Roenicke, MDA Keith Englander, Delegation Executive Secretary, ISN/MDSP Deputy Director William Shobert, Interpreters Yuri Shkeyrov and Peter Afanasenko. STATE 00045414 006 OF 006 ¶22. (SBU) Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak (Head of delegation),MoD Chief of Directorate General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MFA Deputy Head of North America Department Oleg Burmistrov, MFA Deputy Head of Security and Disarmament Department Sergey Koshelev, MFA Division Head Vladimir Yermakov, MoD International and Legal Department Division Head Colonel Evgeniy Ilyin, Alexander Trofimov, Second Secretary, MFA Security and Disarmament Department, Alexander Kozlov, Assistant to the Deputy Foreign Minister, Vassily Boriak, Russian Federation Embassy, and Alexander Agapov, Russian Federation Embassy. RICE