S E C R E T STATE 042958

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC TH KS TC XB XC XE

SUBJECT: (S) M/V ANNE E SHIPMENT OF ANHYDROUS HYDROGEN
FLUORIDE FROM THAILAND TO IRAN

REF: A. A. STATE 3743

B. B. ABU DHABI 52

C. C. ABU DHABI 70

D. D. ABU DHABI 178

E. E. HINES-SIDLER E-MAIL

F. 1 APRIL 2008

Classified By: ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney,
Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY and ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to
approach appropriate Thailand officials to follow up
regarding a shipment of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF)
from Thailand to Iran via Dubai. Post is requested to ask
Thai officials for permission to release information
regarding the South Korean firm to the ROKG. End summary and
action request.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (S) In January 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL)-controlled Liberian-flagged M/V Anne E
on IRISL Persian Container Line (PCL) voyage 8237 loaded a
very large shipment of Chinese-origin anhydrous hydrogen
fluoride (AHF) at Laem Chabang, Thailand for delivery to
Bandar Abbas, Iran. The vessel was scheduled to call at
Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 14 January 2008 for
final delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran on 15 January 2008.


3. (S) AHF is an Australia Group-controlled chemical weapons
precursor and is included in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) gas centrifuge and reprocessing watchlists (for items
that would be subject to "catch-all" controls for nuclear
purposes), that the U.S. has shared with the NSG. AHF is also
used in the uranium conversion process to make uranium
tetrafluoride (UF4) which is a precursor to making uranium
hexafluoride (UF6), the feed stock for a gas centrifuge. It
also has applications in the refining of uranium, the
production of fluorine and aluminum fluoride, and as an
addition in liquid rocket propellants.


4. (S) On 14 January 2008, Emirati officials detained the
cargo, and have been holding it ever since (Refs B, C). The
UAE has expressed a desire to have the shipment recalled.
(Ref D).

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OBJECTIVES
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5. (S) Post should:

-- Request permission to share information regarding the
South Korean firm involved in this transfer, the Foo Sung
Corporation, with Republic of Korea officials

-- Emphasize that United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials are
anxious to have the shipment recalled and disposed of as soon
as possible, and that Thai cooperation in this matter will
facilitate this effort.

-- Note our concern that these items could be used in Iran's
nuclear or chemical weapons programs, and therefore are
proscribed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1737,
1747, and 1803.

-- Express our appreciation for Thai officials' ongoing
cooperation with regard to this shipment.

-- Thank Thai officials for investigating this matter and
sharing the results of their investigation with us.


-- Express US interest in continued close cooperation on
proliferation issues.


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REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND POC
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6. (U) Please report delivery of demarche and any immediate
response by 28 April.


7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information
is Mark Felipe, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.
Please slug all responses for ISN, T, EAP, and NEA.
Washington appreciates Post's assistance.
RICE


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