(S) FOLLOWING UP WITH THE GOT ON FILAMENT WINDING

S E C R E T STATE 039672 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2033 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA TU PK SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOWING UP WITH THE GOT ON FILAMENT WINDING MACHINE CASE REF: A. STATE 024222 ¶B. ANKARA 000467 ¶C. STATE 024896 ¶D. HARDIMAN - HERRMANN E-MAIL - MARCH 12 2008 ¶E. HARDIMAN - PALMIERO E-MAIL - MARCH 18 2008 ¶F. ANKARA 000614 ¶G. ANKARA 000692 Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D),and (H). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (S) On March 10, we provided Turkey information indicating that the Turkish company Tet Makina Metal Sanayi Ve Ticaret was working to supply four- and six- axis filament winding machines to Pakistan. We expressed our concerns that these machines, which are controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),and Wassenaar Arrangement, could be diverted to missile-or nuclear- related end-users in Pakistan (Refs A & B). In response, the GOT pledged to investigate the matter on an urgent basis, and to immediately inform all relevant agencies (Ref B). Turkish authorities subsequently advised us that no export license application regarding the equipment in question had been made, that it appeared that the equipment had not yet arrived in Turkey, and that they were closely monitoring Tet Makina and its personnel to prevent any such shipment from reaching Pakistan (Refs D & E). ¶3. (S) We subsequently shared with the GOT additional information identifying the intended end-user as Kahuta Research Laboratory (KRL - formerly Khan Research Laboratories) - an entity involved in Pakistan's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs (Refs F & G). During this meeting, Turkish MFA officials advised us that their intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been closely monitoring Tet Makina's activities "for some time," and that Turkish Customs recently added Tet Makina to its watch list - meaning that if the firm were to apply for an export license for any product, the application would be automatically flagged for review. Moreover, the Turkish MFA has indicated that, given the scrutiny of Tet Makina, it would be very difficult for the firm to export anything without GOT knowledge (Ref G). ¶4. (S//REL TURKEY) Objectives/Action Request: Department requests that Embassy Ankara approach appropriate host government officials to pursue the following objectives, as appropriate: -- acknowledge the positive nature of nonproliferation cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey as detailed in Ref H; -- thank Turkish officials for their efforts thus far to ensure that the filament winding machine transfer has not gone forward, and reinforce the importance of remaining vigilant against Tet Makina's efforts to procure these machines for Pakistani entities of proliferation concern; -- note that we have been asked to brief Members of Congress on the 123 Agreement with Turkey and in particular on this case, and would be interested in any new information on the status of Turkey's investigation of this case; -- reiterate the point made in Ref A that the entities involved in this transaction may be taking measures to circumvent Turkish export control laws to facilitate this transaction, and raise the possibility that Tet Makina may not submit an export license application; -- advise the GOT that we are very interested in learning of any new information on the status of Turkey's investigation of this case, and any specific steps Turkey is taking to prevent the transfer of this equipment to Pakistan; ¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone: 202-647-1430). Please slug reporting on this or other missile nonproliferation issues for ISN/MTR and EUR/PRA. RICE NNNN End Cable Text