M/V IRAN TEYFOURI: FOLLOWING UP ON SHIPMENTS OF

S E C R E T STATE 037260

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2033
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC CH IR

SUBJECT: M/V IRAN TEYFOURI: FOLLOWING UP ON SHIPMENTS OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN (S)

REF: A. A. STATE 8178

B. B. BEIJING 333

C. C. PAN-FELIPE ET AL E-MAIL

D. 8 APRIL 2008

E. D. STATE 35977

F. E. BEIJING 1309

Classified By: ISN/CPI DIRECTOR PHILIP A. FOLEY
FOR REASONS 1.4 B, C, AND D


1. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to follow-up on an
April 8 National Security Council meeting with Chinese DCM
Xie Feng to provide additional information on the January
voyage of the M/V Iran Teyfouri, press China to reconsider
its decision on the proposed visit of a State experts team to
brief Beijing in detail on the information, and provide
response to China's request for additional details on the
currently scheduled shipment of sodium sulfide on board the
M/V Iran Teyfouri. (REFS C, D, E).

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OBJECTIVES
--------------


2. (S/REL China) Post should:

-- Respond to Chinese requests for additional information on
the current shipment of sodium sulfide to Iran on board the
M/V Iran Teyfouri; convey that the U.S. has made an effort to
find as much of the data that China requested, but not all of
the requested information is available.

-- Press Chinese officials to prevent the transfer,
particularly as the Iranian vessel in question is scheduled
to arrive in Tianjin on April 10, 2008.

-- Thank China for investigating and responding promptly in
January to our information on the M/V Iran Teyfouri.

-- Convey that our investigation of China's findings
conflicts with the results provided by China, and that we
believe Chinese authorities were misled during their
investigation.

-- Present non-paper in paragraph four, which summarizes U.S.
findings.

-- Press Chinese officials to accept a visit of U.S. experts
to present detailed information on the U.S. findings;
emphasize that our information includes highly technical
information that is best discussed by experts from
Washington, and that this consultation would enhance our
counterproliferation cooperation.

-- Inform China that this case highlights the deceptive
methods that entities employ when they seek to mask their
proliferation activities in response to scrutiny from
authorities.

-- Strongly urge Chinese officials to re-investigate the
details of this case, based on initial information provided
in the non-paper.

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BACKGROUND
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3. (S/REL China) On April 8, 2008, Post and Washington (NSC
Senior Directors to Chinese DCM Xie Feng) provided Ref B
non-paper on the imminent shipment to Iran of 1000 metric
tons of the CW precursor sodium sulfide by China Northern
Chemical and Minerals Company. The shipment is scheduled to
be loaded in Tianjin aboard the Iranian-flagged M/V Iran
Teyfouri, which is expected to arrive in Tianjin on April 10.
China Northern Chemical and Minerals Company also sought to
transfer 800 metric tons of sodium sulfide to Iran in
September 2007. China requested additional information,
including the address and telephone number of the Chinese
company (REF E).


4. (S/REL China) In January 2008, the Chinese firm Dalian
Zhongbang Chemical Industries Company delivered chemicals
used in producing solid-rocket propellant to Iran aboard the
M/V Iran Teyfouri. The chemicals were destined for Iran's
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG),an entity designated
under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 for its involvement
in Iran's ballistic missile program. Chinese officials
claimed that the shipment was delivered not to Iran, but to a
firm in Singapore REF B). However, a review of publicly
available information refutes Chinese claims that the cargo
was delivered to Singapore. A summary of this information
(para 4 non-paper) was presented to Chinese DCM Xie Feng on
April 8 by the National Security Council. Several requests
have been made in Beijing and Washington for China to accept
the visit of an experts team to Beijing to present and
discuss this information in detail; however, Chinese
officials have repeatedly denied these requests.


--------------
NON-PAPER
--------------


5. (S/REL China) Begin non-paper:

-- We have additional information regarding the shipment of
the CW precursor chemical sodium sulfide/sulphide by China
Northern Chemical and Minerals Company that is scheduled to
be loaded in Tianjin on the M/V Iran Teyfouri for shipment to
Iran.

-- The address of China Northern Chemical and Minerals
Company appears to be Room 5C-805, Houxiandicheng, Baiziwan
Road No. 16, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100022, telephone
86-10-87765122.

-- This is the same address and telephone number as the
headquarters for Sinorth Minerals Group Ltd.
(www.sinorth.com),whose product list includes sodium
sulphide. Additional telephone numbers for Sinorth are
86-10-87766719, fax 86-10-87765119.

-- As the M/V Iran Teyfouri is scheduled to arrive in Tianjin
on April 10, 2008, we urge Chinese authorities to investigate
and prevent this imminent shipment to Iran.

-- In response to our January 18 demarche relating to a
previous shipment on the same vessel, China indicated that
the M/V Iran Teyfouri delivered chemicals from Dalian
Zhongbang Chemical Industries Company to an enterprise in
Singapore.

-- However, publicly available shipping information shows
that the Iran Teyfouri did not stop in Singapore and that the
chemicals have been delivered to Iran and the end users
listed in the January 18 demarche.

-- Ship positioning data shows that the Iran Teyfouri did not
call in the Port of Singapore.

-- Information from the Bandar Abbas port website indicates
the Iran Teyfouri was in port on January 29, where it
unloaded all of the 21 containers from Dalian Zhongbang
Chemical Industries Company.

-- Between February 5 and 16, according to publicly available
information, the containers were delivered to their
consignees, which are listed as Mehr Engineering and
Industrial Group and OMID Research Industrial Group.

-- Both Mehr Engineering and Industrial Group and OMID
Research Industrial Group are cover names for Iran's
solid-propellant missile program entity Shahid Bakeri
Industrial Group (SBIG) ) an entity designated under UNSCR

1737.

-- In light of this latest information about the Iran
Teyfouri, we request that China re-investigate the details
surrounding the earlier shipment to determine whether the
Chinese Government's investigating agencies were misled and
take action to prevent or scrutinize any future contact
between Dalian Zhongbang Chemical Industries Company and any
of its affiliates with any of its alleged Singaporean
customers.

-- We also urge China to give its most serious attention and
consideration to the pending shipment in order to meet our
shared UNSC commitments and nonproliferation objectives.

-- We are prepared to send an experts team from the
Department of State to Beijing to provide a detailed briefing
to relevant Chinese experts. We believe such a briefing and
discussion will be valuable in increasing our cooperation on
such matters.


6. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are Mark
Felipe, 202-647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov, and Matthew
Zartman, 202-647-7588, zartmanml@state.sgov.gov. On the
sodium sulfide shipment SHIELD case # S05-08, POC is ISN/CB
Peter Roe at 202-647-1194 or via classified e-mail at
roepb@state.sgov.gov for additional information or
clarification.



7. (U) Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and EAP.
Washington appreciates Post's assistance.
RICE


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