DEMARCHE TO SPECIAL ADVISOR GAMBARI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 036718

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SPECIAL ADVISOR GAMBARI


Classified By: IO A/S Kristen Silverberg, E.O. 12958
Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) ACTION REQUEST: USUN is instructed to seek a meeting
at the earliest possible date with UN Special Advisor for
Burma Ibrahim Gambari to convey the concern of the United
States that Gambari's public statements overestimating
minimal concessions made by the regime in response to the UN
Good Offices mission undermine the ultimate objectives of his
mission by providing the Burmese military regime and its
defenders with arguments that the regime is cooperating
adequately, drawing on para 4 points below. USUN should also
urge that Gambari signal to UNSC members reluctant to endorse
the proposed PRST (China, Russia, Indonesia and Vietnam) his
belief that such a PRST would help facilitate his mission and
progress, and should point out that unduly optimistic
assessments of the progress to date could have the unintended
consequence of persuading those countries that no further UN
action is needed. USUN should request of Gambari that in his
statements, he make the points clearly and openly that the
Burmese regime continues to hold key political prisoners,
including Aung San Suu Kyi, and to arrest still more peaceful
political activists, and has yet to begin a dialogue with
democratic and ethnic minority representatives despite his
requests and the Security Council,s 11 October 2007 PRST.
End Action Request.


2. (SBU) OBJECTIVES:

-- Convey the concern of the United States that Gambari's
public statements overestimating minimal concessions made by
the regime in response to the UN Good Offices mission
undermine the ultimate objectives of his mission by providing
the Burmese military regime and its defenders with arguments
that the regime is cooperating adequately.

-- Request Gambari engage UNSC members currently reluctant to
move forward on the draft PRST under consideration -- China,
Russia, Indonesia, and Vietnam -- to support the PRST. Note
that Gambari told us over recent months that a PRST, and even
a UNSCR draft text threatening an arms embargo, would be
useful leverage for his mission. Impress upon Gambari that
the reluctant countries are unlikely to endorse a PRST if
they believe significant progress is already being made.


3. (SBU) SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:

-- The United States has supported your "good offices"
mission to Burma as a means for achieving democratic change
and national reconciliation in Burma.

-- The U.S. is evaluating the success of the Good Offices
mission based on one criterion: whether it unequivocally
presses the Burmese regime for change, or whether the mission
gives the regime international cover to continue its policy
of non-fulfillment of the UN's stated requirements.

-- We should not characterize concessions on process as
substantive progress. While the regime released many of
those detained during the August/September 2007 crackdown,
most detained activists remain in custody. The regime
continues to arrest more activists every week. Many who have
not yet been arrested have been attacked and beaten with
sticks by regime-backed thugs.

-- The number of political prisoners held by the regime has
not decreased. In fact, there have been recent new arrests,
even while you were in the country, and the estimated number
of political prisoners and detainees has almost doubled since
your mission began.

-- There has been a total failure on the regime's part to
begin the inclusive time-bound dialogue for which both you
and the Security Council called and which is the crux of your
mission. The meetings the regime's appointed liaison Aung
Kyi has had with ASSK have been devoted to browbeating her
and lecturing her about her failure to consent without
reservations to the regime's flawed "roadmap."

-- We have seen no evidence that violence against ethnic
minority groups has decreased. As Special Rapporteur
Pinheiro commented in his last report, the regime's flat
refusal to let any neutral observer, including yourself and
Mr. Pinheiro, visit ethnic minority areas suggests that the
situation there is getting worse rather than better.

-- There has been no improvement in humanitarian access. UN

STATE 00036718 002 OF 003


agencies and NGOs continue to be tightly controlled and
heavily monitored. The ICRC has been unable to re-establish
any of its protocols.

-- At the same time, we are concerned about some recent
statements attributed to you that seem to exaggerate actions
the regime has taken. These statements can and will be used
by the regime and its defenders to argue that if things are
going well, there is no reason for the regime to change what
it is doing and no further purpose for UN involvement in
Burma. They play into the regime,s efforts to marginalize
the UN,s involvement in Burma and your mission specifically.


-- We are afraid that such public statements can undermine
the basis for your good offices mission by giving the
military regime the impression that if it pushes back, the UN
will always redefine its definition of progress to allow it
to get away with a complete failure to live up to prior
commitments.

-- More seriously, such optimism allows the regime and its
defenders to argue that if things are going so well, there is
no reason for the regime to change its behavior or to begin a
genuine dialogue and no justification for further UN
involvement in Burma.

-- During your most recent visit, according to your own
report the generals gave you no tangible results at all in
the direction of modifying their rules for the upcoming
referendum to make it more fair, transparent and democratic.
The regime has not even met the commitments it made to you
during your visit to Burma last September-October, much less
met the conditions laid down in the Council's PRST of 11
October 2007.

-- You have indicated to us that a PRST would be helpful in
advancing your mission. Yet several countries have suggested
that now might not be the right time for a PRST. This could
be in part because of an erroneous belief on their part that
adequate progress is already being made. We hope you will
engage UNSC members currently reluctant to move forward on
the draft PRST under consideration -- China, Russia,
Indonesia and Vietnam -- to support the PRST.

-- We and other supporters of democratic change in Burma are
not going to judge your mission harshly if it does not
single-handedly succeed in changing the situation in Burma.
On the contrary, your mission will be judged by how
consistently you pushed for change and how honestly and
realistically you assessed its efforts and results.

-- Public statements you make are followed carefully around
the world, both by the Burmese people and their friends, who
seek any reasonable grounds for hope that the situation will
improve, and by the regime and its defenders, who seek any
grounds for avoiding reform and maintaining their iron grip
over the Burmese people.

-- We want to urge you not to give them such grounds. You
should make it clear in your public statements that the
Burmese regime must do much more in the direction of reform;
release of political prisoners and detainees; meaningful
time-bound dialogue with ASSK, the democratic opposition and
ethnic minorities; and national reconciliation, before the
international community will have any reason to be optimistic
that the situation in Burma is beginning to improve.


4. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT: USUN should report the results of
its meeting with Gambari as soon as possible to IO/UNP (Paul
Wickberg) and EAP/MLS (Aaron Cope).


5. (C) BACKGROUND: In recent public statements, Gambari has
indicated that although he achieved no meaningful progress
during his last visit to Burma, he is optimistic about the
ultimate success of his mission. He has cited as reasons for
his optimism the facts that the regime allowed him to visit
in March rather than April (after weeks of international
pressure, including by Burma's main defender China, and
despite having promised an even earlier visit date) and that
they allowed him to stay an extra day beyond the two
originally allotted (when Gambari had told us before the
visit that it would be a minimum of three days with a likely
extension). He also glosses over the actual treatment he
received from the regime during his last visit (the Kyaw Hsan
harangue and no meeting with Than Shwe),as well as the
continuing deterioration in the human rights situation on the
ground. The Department sees no reason for optimism. We are
concerned that such statements undermine the basis of
Gambari's mission, both by allowing the generals to believe
that the UN and the international community will tolerate

STATE 00036718 003 OF 003


such treatment of Gambari's mission, and by providing Burma's
defenders with the argument that if Gambari says that things
are going well, there is no reason for the regime to reform
or make the changes stipulated by the PRST of 11 October 2007
and no justification for further Security Council
involvement. We want to caution him that his statements are
being followed carefully. If they seem unrealistic or
apologetic they will undermine his mission. If the regime
continues to be uncooperative, stronger action by the Council
will be both justified and imperative.
RICE