(S) SHIELD S05-08: IMMINENT TRANSFER OF CW

S E C R E T STATE 035977 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2033 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CH IR SUBJECT: (S) SHIELD S05-08: IMMINENT TRANSFER OF CW PRECURSOR CHEMICAL TO IRAN REF: BEIJING 333 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: ISN/CB Acting Office Director Richard D'Andrea for Reasons 1.4 B, C, D, and H ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (S) Background: The U.S. has information that a shipment of 1000 metric tons of the CW precursor chemical sodium sulfide (also spelled sulphide) from China to Iran is imminent. Specifically, the Chinese company China Northern Chemical and Minerals Company is scheduled to load this CW precursor chemical shipment in Tianjin aboard the Iranian-flagged M/V Iran Teyfouri on Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) Persian-Japanese Line voyage 1854 for delivery to Bandar Abbas. The M/V Iran Teyfouri is scheduled to arrive at Tianjin on April 10, 2008. China Northern Chemical and Minerals Company also sought to transfer 800 metric tons of sodium sulfide to Iran in September 2007. ¶3. (S) Background Cont'd: China and the Australia Group control sodium sulfide, and the Iranian recipient in both cases is a transportation company and therefore not the end-user. We are concerned that this CW precursor chemical could be used for, or diverted to, a CW program, and are interested in learning whether China's export licensing or customs systems vetted these transfers and, if so, the reason for their approval. Moreover, as the M/V Teyfouri's scheduled Tianjin arrival is April 10, the U.S. wants to urge China to take all steps necessary to investigate this case and prevent the scheduled transfer. ¶4. (S) Background Cont'd: The M/V Iran Teyfouri has been involved in previous proliferation activity (reftel). In January 2008, the vessel delivered chemicals to Iran,s solid missile propellant program. In response to U.S. demarches, China claimed that it investigated and found that the chemicals were delivered to a company in Singapore vice Iran. However, open source information proves that the vessel did not stop in Singapore during the period in questions and successfully delivered the chemicals to the intended Iranian missile end-user. Singapore Customs also confirmed that the Teyfouri did not call in Singapore. We believe that Chinese authorities were provided with false information during their investigation. The U.S. has repeatedly proposed sending a State experts team to Beijing to brief MFA experts on the January voyage of the Teyfouri and to discuss improving cooperation on interdiction issues, but this proposal has continually been turned down by Beijing. ¶5. (U) Action Request: Request Post convey the points in paragraph 7 to the appropriate senior host government officials and report response. Points may be left as a non-paper. Washington also will deliver the same points to the Chinese DCM on Tuesday, April 8. ¶6. (S) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S05-08 and slug for ISN and EAP. Please contact ISN/CB Peter Roe at 202-647-1194 or via classified e-mail at roepb@state.sgov.gov for additional information or clarification. Post's assistance is appreciated. ¶7. Begin talking points/non-paper. (Secret//Rel China) -- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we would like to raise an urgent matter of chemical weapons (CW) proliferation concern and request the Chinese government's assistance in preventing this transfer. -- We have information that the Chinese company China Northern Chemical and Minerals Co. is supplying the CW precursor chemical sodium sulfide (also spelled sulphide) to Iran. -- Specifically, China Northern Chemical and Minerals Company is shipping approximately 1000 metric tons of sodium sulfide flakes to Pakrahan Tarbar International Forwarding and Transportation Company aboard the Iranian-flagged M/V Iran Teyfouri. -- The sodium sulfide is scheduled to be loaded in Tianjin aboard the M/V Iran Teyfouri on the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) Persian-Japanese Line (PJL) voyage 1854 for delivery to Bandar Abbas. -- The M/V Iran Teyfouri is scheduled to arrive at Tianjin on April 10, 2008. -- The freight provisional invoice number is 14640/7/31251. -- Previously, in September 2007, China Northern Chemical and Minerals also sought to transfer approximately 800 metric tons of sodium sulfide flakes to the Pakrahan Tarbar International Forwarding and Transportation Company in Iran. -- The Iranian recipient in both cases is a transportation company and therefore can not be the end-user. -- While it has legitimate civilian uses, sodium sulfide/sulphide also can be used as a CW precursor chemical and therefore is controlled by China and the Australia Group. -- In light of its CW and other programs of proliferation concern, its support to terrorist organizations, and its efforts to destabilize other countries in the region, Iran, we believe, is an unreliable destination for dual-use exports, particularly hundreds of tons of CW precursor chemicals. -- Iranian end-user statements or other assurances are neither credible nor trustworthy. -- We therefore are concerned that this CW precursor chemical could be intended for, or diverted to, a CW program. -- In addition, transfers of CW precursor chemical to Iran may result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions against the entities involved. -- We therefore request that the Chinese government take all steps necessary to investigate and stop this transfer in order to prevent Iran from acquiring CW precursor chemicals. -- We also are interested in learning whether China's export licensing or customs systems vetted these transfers and, if so, the reason for their approval. -- We look forward to the Chinese government sharing with us the results of its investigation into this matter as soon as possible. -- In a related matter, we would like to strongly request that China urgently reconsider the U.S. proposal to accept the visit of a Department of State experts team to discuss the January voyage of the M/V Iran Teyfouri. -- Our experts team would like to provide detailed information that is significant to China,s January investigation into the vessel and that we believe will also significantly inform China,s future investigation of related cases. -- Providing our experts the opportunity to meet face-to-face to discuss the technical details of cases such as this one will contribute to our joint efforts to deepen and improve our counterproliferation cooperation. End talking points/non-paper. RICE NNNN End Cable Text