SATTERFIELD AND DAVUTOGLU ON BASRAH, NORTHERN

S E C R E T STATE 034305 SIPDIS VILNIUS FOR MINSK THE FOLLOWING ISTANBUL 000156 DTD 02APR08 SENT ACTION STATE INFO EUROPEAB POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IRAQ COLLECTIVE MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD NSC ODC ANKAR TU SECDEF JONIT STAFF JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK HQ USEUCOM VIAHINGEN GE HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL DIA CAI 425ABS IZMIR TU 39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU REPEATED FOR YOUR INFOR 03APR08 QUOTE: S E C R E T ISTANBUL 000156 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2028 TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL MOPS TU IZ IR SUBJECT: SATTERFIELD AND DAVUTOGLU ON BASRAH, NORTHERN IRAQ, AND TRILATERAL DIALOGUE REF: BAGHDAD 983 Classified By: Acting Consul General Sandra Oudkirk; reason 1.5 (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: In an April 1 meeting with Turkish Prime Ministerial advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, S/I David Satterfield reviewed the state of play in Basrah and urged Turkey to give full support to Maliki and the GOI. Davutoglu said GOI stability was in Turkey's strong interest, and also agreed to press VP Hashimi to support Maliki or risk playing into Iran's hands. Davutoglu said Turkey remained willing to meet with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani "anywhere but in northern Iraq" and asked the USG to inform the GOT if Nechirvan goes to Baghdad. He took onboard Satterfield's ideas for confidence-building steps at Makhmour but said the KRG must do more against PKK terrorists or the GOT would be forced to consider launching another operation. Davutoglu said Turkey is looking at options for strategic dialogue with the GOI and KRG, preferably through Talabani, but had concerns about resuming a trilateral dialogue on the PKK. Davutoglu agreed to convey a message to Kuwait to have a diplomatic presence in Baghdad. End summary. A critical period for Maliki and the GOI -------------- ¶2. (S) In an April 1 meeting at Istanbul airport with Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's foreign policy advisor, Satterfield reviewed his Iraq discussions in Ankara and Baghdad earlier in the week and expressed concerns over the difficult situation now facing PM Maliki and the GOI regarding Basrah. Satterfield noted that the situation was taking the GOI's and Maliki's full attention, precluding progress for the moment on other critical issues. Davutoglu said the GOT was surprised by the timing of Maliki's decision to initiate an offensive against JAM elements in Basrah. Satterfield agreed, noting the USG had received little prior notice. He warned that the crisis risked enhancing al-Sadr's status, allowing Iran further scope for destabilizing intervention in southern Iraq, and was prompting political maneuvering within Iraq to take advantage of Maliki's perceived weakness, as seen by the recent Iraqi, Iranian, and Kurdish talks in Sulaymaniyah. ¶3. (S) The USG's message to Iraqi political leaders in response to events in Basrah has been to give full support to Maliki and the GOI during this delicate period, and to urge them not to allow domestic political maneuvering to weaken the GOI. Satterfield conveyed Secretary Rice's request that Turkey reinforce that message to Iraqi interlocutors, and to approach its own Iraq policy challenges with extra caution. Satterfield noted that Basrah in the past two days seems calmer, but we remain concerned about how this incident will impact Maliki's position after he returns to Baghdad. Davutoglu said he had received the same message from Ambassador Wilson and discussed it with PM Erdogan, who believes it is in Turkey's interest to support the stability of Maliki's government. Maliki and PM Erdogan have a direct channel of communication, and spoke to each other several times a day in February at the height of the Turkish operation against the PKK in northern Iraq. Davutoglu said he also communicates directly with Maliki's spokesman, Ali Dabbagh. Davutoglu said the GOT agrees Maliki's situation is very fragile, with the risk that Sunni and Kurdish groups will use the opportunity to cause further problems for him. ¶4. (S) Satterfield noted that the USG did not question Maliki's motives in launching an offensive in Basrah. Iran's influence there is prevalent and destabilizing; criminal gangs were also operating. But Iraq was facing a dangerous situation. This also posed real challenges for Turkey, Satterfield offered, given Turkey's interest in opening a consulate in Basrah. Davutoglu agreed, adding that the timing was also bad because Turkey had just pressed the visiting Emir of Kuwait on the need to open the main Kuwaiti border gate with Iraq, which he believed was now open and functioning despite the violence. The challenge now, Satterfield reviewed, is to make the best of this situation and take steps to bolster Maliki. No MNF-I regular ground forces are involved, but the USG is supporting the ISF in other ways. Once Maliki returns to Baghdad, we will need to take stock and assess the consequences to the GOI and to Maliki himself. ¶5. (S) Hashimi's position: According to Davutoglu, Iraqi VP al-Hashimi has asked to visit Turkey en route to Washington; PM Erdogan assented. When he comes, Davutoglu said the GOT will urge him not to make the situation worse for Maliki. "He knows the main threat comes from Jaysh al-Mahdi and Iran." Indeed, added Davutoglu, those Iraqi leaders and forces who are against Iran's influence must now get behind Maliki. Turkey sees no viable alternative. "That will be Turkey's message to Hashimi.". Satterfield agreed that Hashimi must now look beyond his complaints about Maliki and recognize the importance of working together to make the GOI work. "Hashimi feels in a good position: he is in the government, but gets to have it both ways by also supporting Tawafuq's boycott of the National Reconciliation Conference." Satterfield noted that the USG still wants Tawafuq back in the government. Next steps on northern Iraq: Meeting Nechirvan Barzani -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Satterfield asked about the prospects for dialogue with the GOI and KRG following President Talabani's visit to Ankara, noting the plans for KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani to travel to Baghdad and urging Davutoglu to meet him there. Davutoglu said the GOT has not yet decided. The MFA's Iraq Coordinator, Murat Ozcelik, was just in Iraq (ref A) and wanted to meet Barzani, but the KRG stalled and postponed the meeting. Davutoglu said the GOT offered to host him in Istanbul, openly, even as the KRG was accusing Turkey of wantonly destroying civilian bridges in northern Iraq. "We offered to meet him anytime, on any agenda topics; at one point they said yes, but only after Talabani's visit to Ankara. After Talabani's visit, they declined to meet in Istanbul. We proposed Erbil, then Baghdad, then a third country, but no meeting. Ozcelik went to Baghdad, still no meeting." Nevertheless, Davutoglu was hopeful that in the next week to ten days the KRG might agree to a meeting. Turkey is willing to meet Barzani anywhere but northern Iraq. Davutoglu pledged to raise the issue later in the day with PM Erdogan, en route to Sweden, and to get an update from Ozcelik on prospects for a meeting with Barzani. ¶7. (S) The USG would like to see Nechirvan Barzani go to Baghdad as soon as possible, and has made that clear to the KRG. Satterfield expressed the hope that Turkish interlocutors would be willing to meet with him there. Asked abut the Baghdad security situation, Satterfield predicted that after the Basrah operation finishes, Baghdad's security will improve. As soon as Maliki returns to Baghdad, which could be within days, Barzani may be ready to go; we hope Turkey will be ready to see him. Davutoglu explained that he will return with PM Erdogan from Sweden and then the NATO Summit in Bucharest on Friday, April 4. He asked that the USG inform Turkey when Nechirvan Barzani's travel to Baghdad is confirmed. Turkey also remains willing to meet with him in Qatar, Amman, or elsewhere. Domestic politics limiting GOT's room for maneuver? -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) Davutoglu cautioned that Ozcelik's recent meeting with Iraqi Kurdish authorities and KDP officials in Dohuk, northern Iraq, and the resulting press attention in Turkey, had complicated things. Following so soon after Vice President Cheney's visit, some in the press were claiming the USG had forced Turkey to hold that meeting, he added, cautioning that some domestic opponents of the current Turkish government are using such meetings to accuse the GOT of being too pro-U.S. and pro-EU. "Better to have such meetings with full support from both sides." Satterfield offered support for GOT efforts and noted that Washington understood Turkey's position. Davutoglu said the GOT needs to act with extra care, given the "ultra-nationalist" conspiracies against it. In the end, Davutoglu agreed, "we will have to meet the northern side." Makhmour: possible next steps -------------- ¶9. (S) Satterfield briefed Davutoglu on his meeting the previous day with Turkish DCHOD Saygun, noting that he had raised with Saygun the need for not just military action but also social and economic steps, as well as for progress on the Makhmour refugee camp. The USG believes gradual progress is possible, if the GOT can work with UNHCR and/or ICRC on an initial set of confidence-building steps, such as screening children and the elderly at the camp. Satterfield asked Davutoglu to explore this possibility. MNFI and General Petraeus are prepared to help. Progress on Makhmour is very important to the USG. But progress will likely require a regularized military channel, at the CHOD or DCHOD level, not just ad hoc communications. ¶10. (S) Davutoglu replied that Saygun and the MOD are ready to work on military cooperation with the GOI. Iraqi National Security Advisor Rubaie told Davutoglu that Iraq would be grateful for any training Turkey could offer. Such a channel is on track. Regarding the USG's ideas for progress at Makhmour, "if Turkey's concerns are met, we can proceed." Satterfield urged Davutoglu to pursue the idea, and to let the USG help address Turkey's concerns. Davutoglu countered that it was the KRG's responsibility, not the USG's, to address Turkey's concerns on Makhmour. The camp cannot be allowed to serve as a safe-haven for terrorists. The eastern Zap region is seeing more terrorism. The GOT does not want to launch another operation there, but needs to see that the KRG is doing more to stop it. "Turkey hears the USG's request to do more to support Maliki in the delicate days ahead, but we need to see the KRG do more to control the situation there." Satterfield replied that Turkey's concerns underscored the need for an urgent meeting with Nechirvan Barzani, adding that DCHOD Saygun had also previewed to him the possibility of another military operation once the snows melt, to address this concern. Strategic and Trilateral Dialogues -------------- ¶11. (S) Turning to the issue of formalized dialogue with the GOI and KRG, Satterfield asked for Turkey's view on the proposed Deputy Prime Minister-level Strategic Committee. Davutoglu said there had been no reaction yet from Nechirvan or the KRG. Turkey's understanding is that President Talabani wants a Minister-level committee. PM Erdogan had suggested a committee of select DPMs and Foreign Ministers. Davutoglu pointed out that Turkey has three DPMs, covering key economic portfolios, while Iraq has DPMs representing each ethnic group. Turkey's understanding is that such a committee would meet in Baghdad or Turkey. Asked about next steps, Davutoglu said both Talabani and the GOT were consulting with respective advisors; the GOT "will see where we are in a week or ten days", and will likely raise the issue with Talabani and Maliki in Baghdad, then raise with Nechirvan Barzani. Davutoglu pledged to brief PM Erdogan later in the day on the USG's continuing interest in this issue. ¶12. (S) Satterfield than described Washington's interest in discussing with the GOT the possibility of renewing a US-Turkey-Iraq consultative process, one that would include a clear agenda and goals. Satterfield underscored that Washington understood the need to proceed carefully, offering that if the GOT agreed with the concept, we could raise it together with the GOI. Davutoglu said that Turkey supports a GOT-USG-GOI dialogue, but has a different view on the merits of any dialogue about the PKK involving the KRG. Turkey has no confidence in the KRG. "To share confidence, Turkey and the KRG would need to share the view that the PKK is a common enemy. The U.S. and Iraq have said so, but the KRG has not." Davutoglu said Turkey has no confidence that Turkish information or intelligence shared with the KRG would not end up in the PKK's hands. Davutoglu suggested GOT-GOI-KRG communications could be handled through President Talabani instead, but Satterfield countered that using Talabani as a conduit was not a substitute for direct contacts, starting with Nechirvan Barzani. Kuwait -------------- ¶13. (S) Noting that the Emir of Kuwait was currently visiting Turkey, Satterfield asked if Turkey would reinforce to him and to Iraq's other Sunni neighbors the same message that Vice President Cheney had conveyed in Kuwait and the President had made in January: That the GOK should send diplomatic representatives to and maintain a presence in Baghdad. Davutoglu agreed to convey the message. WIENER UNQUOTE: RICE