Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE3208
2008-01-10 23:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

APPROACHING THE EU IN SUPPORT OF ESDP DEPLOYMENT

Tags:  EUN PREL PGOV CD 
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OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #3208/01 0102340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 102338Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5029
INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 3018
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 2446
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0217
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 7796
XMT AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 003208 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV CD
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN SUPPORT OF ESDP DEPLOYMENT
TO CHAD AND C.A.R.

Classified By: Kurt Volker, Acting A/S,EUR. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 003208 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018 TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV CD SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN SUPPORT OF ESDP DEPLOYMENT TO CHAD AND C.A.R. Classified By: Kurt Volker, Acting A/S,EUR. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 4. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Original EU plans were to deploy the ESDP PKO Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and have boots on the ground, by October 2007. Limited support from other EU members, resistance to funding certain aspects of the mission on a EU-wide basis, difficulties in rallying resources, and reignited fighting in the east raised EU concerns about the viability of the mission, but the French say they are determined to overcome present obstacles. We want to assure EU members of U.S. support for the ESDP mission in Chad and urge them to consider ways to seek increased NATO support for the mission, or make individual contributions through the EU in the alternative. We also should make clear to EU members that the USG is not planning to contribute to the mission at this time, but that we would want to do so through NATO if that changes. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables. A background section covering some of these issues is provided prior to a section containing talking points. Points are to be delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level to EU members only. Non-EU embassies and Embassy Paris should not/not deliver these points. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Original EU plans were to deploy the ESDP PKO Operation and have boots on the ground, in Chad and C.A.R. by October 2007. However, other EU members have not offered contributions, either in kind or in funding, sufficient to allow deployment as planned. Admittedly, some of this reluctance may stem from European military contributions to critical NATO combat operations in Afghanistan. France has approached other EU members to request 15-20 helicopters and a field hospital. The French have been unsuccessful in obtaining these essentials and have indicated concern about whether the operation will actually deploy as planned, but seem determined to make the operation happen. France has also expressed concern about the lack of support from EU members and the GOC in securing land space to operate a military base separated far enough from the fighting yet close enough to the humanitarian camps. A final force generation
conference will be held Jan. 11 at which time the operation commander will determine whether he has sufficient assets to approve the mission. A cancellation of the deployment would be highly damaging to the steps already taken by the international community to sustain peace in the region. EUROPEAN SECURITY DEFENSE PROGRAM AND MINURCAT DEPLOYMENT -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Embassies in EU member states should deliver the following points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as possible. Non-EU embassies and Embassy Paris should not/not deliver these points. Embassy Paris should inform the MFA that we are making this demarche in other EU capitals in support of the ESDP mission, which we view as a demonstration of increased USG support. BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT: z Sustaining peace in the region is our common goal and the U.S. is committed to obtaining this goal. z We believe that the planned ESDP mission and the follow on UN (MINURCAT) peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Eastern Chad and Northern Central African Republic can make important contributions to peace in the region and support their deployment as soon as possible. z Given the deteriorating situation on the ground, we therefore note with concern that EU members have not yet identified the military personnel, logistical support and financing necessary for the ESDP mission to go forward. z We would hope that all EU members consider the mission STATE 00003208 002 OF 002 a matter of priority and look at making military and/or financial contributions to the ESDP mission, following France,s lead. z We also recognize the UN,s request for UNAMID support for Darfur. We hope that, in the desire to accomplish both goals, EU members do not make an artificial choice between the two missions but instead work together to fulfill the requirements for both missions with equal priority. z We would also encourage the EU to coordinate with NATO on what kinds of NATO support could potentially provide, given certain collective NATO capabilities, as well as the prospect of some Allies who may prefer to contribute through NATO rather than directly to the ESDP operation. z The USG has no current plans to support the EU mission militarily. If the USG were to decide to provide military support, we would plan to do so through NATO. z We believe this EU-UN deployment, in addition to providing protection for Sudanese refugees, Chadian and CAR displaced populations and the humanitarian workers assisting under UNSCR 1778, could strongly reduce tensions in Eastern Chad caused by the presence of Sudanese rebel groups in Chad and Chadian rebel groups on the Sudanese side of the border, and in C.A.R. as well. z We are also concerned about Deby,s continued uncertainty over acceptance of a follow-on UN military force in place of the ESPD military presence, whose mandate will expire in 2008. ESDP deployment will be a clear sign to the GOC that the UN operation is a necessity. END TEXT. ¶5. Tripoli minimize considered. RICE

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