S E C R E T STATE 031941

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL ETTC IR NL

SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOWING-UP WITH THE NETHERLANDS ON A DUTCH
FIRM'S EFFORTS TO ASSIST IRANIAN UAV DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION

REF: A. 05 STATE 145292

B. 05 STATE 164496

C. 05 THE HAGUE 002478

D. 05 STATE 172807

E. 05 THE HAGUE 002555

F. 05 THE HAGUE 003283

G. 05 STATE 229063

H. 05 THE HAGUE 003397

I. 06 STATE 159373

J. 06 THE HAGUE 2139

K. 07 THE HAGUE 000037

L. STATE 015228

M. THE HAGUE 000174

N. THE HAGUE 000225

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAMELA K. DURHAM;
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B), (C) AND (D).


1. This is an action request. Embassy The Hague, please see
paragraph 4.


2. (S) Background and Objective: In February 2008, the U.S.
alerted the government of the Netherlands (GON) to efforts by
the Dutch firm Inter Connection Technologies (InCo Tech) to
supply high-density military-grade connectors used in
aviation applications to Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
program (Ref L). GON officials responded by confirming that
InCo Tech had consulted with the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs about this export in December 2007. However, the GON
had concluded that the export of these connectors to Iran did
not pose a proliferation risk and informed InCo Tech that it
had no objection to this transaction going forward (Ref N).
Despite this decision, the GON indicated to Post (Ref N) that
it would be willing to reconsider the matter if the U.S.
could demonstrate that this shipment to Iran was of
proliferation concern. Dutch officials also noted that,
because exports generally occur several months after an
official approval is received, it is possible that these
connectors may
not yet have been transferred to Iran.


3. (S) We want to follow-up with Dutch officials to urge
them to re-examine this case and take measures, if possible,
to prevent these items from being exported to Iran. In
particular, we want to emphasize that because these dual-use
connectors are likely intended to support Iran's UAV
development efforts, there appears to be a clear basis for
the application of the Netherland's catch-all contr

ol
authorities. We also want to note that the deal was referred
to InCo Tech by the Dutch firm Aviation Services
International (ASI), whose extensive dealings with Iran's UAV
program prompted the GON to issue a catch-all control
licensing requirement in 2007 to suspend further exports by
ASI to Iran (Refs A-K).


4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy The Hague approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 and report response. Talking
points also may be provided as a non-paper.


5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET REL NETHERLANDS)

-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation partnership, we
would like to follow-up with you on a recent case involving
activity of potential proliferation concern.

-- In February 2008, the U.S. alerted you to information
concerning efforts by the Dutch firm Inter Connection
Technologies (InCo Tech) to supply military-grade connectors
to Iran.

-- We understood that these connectors would be used to
support Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development
efforts.

-- During our initial discussions of this case, we noted that
this order was referred to InCo Tech by the Netherlands-based
company Aviation Services International (ASI), which has
worked to supply Iran's Ghoods Aviation Center with turbojet
engines and components suitable for UAV applications.

-- As you are aware from our past discussions of ASI's
business dealings in Iran, Ghoods Aviation Center is
responsible for overseeing Iran's UAV program.

-- This cooperation between ASI and Ghoods Aviation Center
led your government in early 2007 to issue a catch-all
licensing requirement aimed at suspending exports from ASI to
Iran.

-- However, in this recent case involving InCo Tech, you
responded that your government determined that these
connectors did not pose a proliferation risk and therefore
did not object to their export to Iran.

-- Although not controlled by the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), we understand that the connectors being
offered to Iran are high-density military grade connectors
suitable for UAV applications.

-- Because our information also indicated that these dual-use
connectors are likely intended to support Iran's UAV
development efforts, we believe there is a clear basis for
the application of your catch-all controls, particularly
given that InCo Tech became involved in this deal based on a
referral from an entity that has an extensive history of
supplying Iran's UAV program.

-- Such exports also exemplify why the MTCR Partners agreed
in 2003 to include national catch-all requirements in the
Guidelines of the Regime: catch-all controls provide a legal
basis to control the export of items destined for use by
programs of concern.

-- We therefore hope you will re-examine this case and, if
possible, use your catch-all control authorities to prevent
this export by InCo Tech to Iran.

-- We look forward to continued cooperation on
nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your
government takes in response to this information at the
earliest possible time.

End talking points/nonpaper.


6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, and EUR/PRA.


7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche in the "MTAG - EUR"
folder.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text