DEMARCHE REQUEST TO EU MEMBER STATES ON BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 030007 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018 TAGS: BO EU PHUM PREL SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST TO EU MEMBER STATES ON BELARUS REF: A. MINSK 199 ¶B. STATE 28931 Classified By: Acting EUR A/S Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Department requests addressees to seek support at the highest appropriate level from all EU member states as the Government of Belarus attempts to reduce the U.S. diplomatic presence in Minsk. Your conversations should promote continued U.S.-EU unity in our policy toward Belarus. You should encourage the EU to make it clear to Belarus that its efforts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and EU will not be successful, nor will they deter us from insisting on the release of all political prisoners and restoration of fundamental freedoms in Belarus. -------------- Objectives -------------- ¶2. (C) Action addressees should pursue the following objectives in conversations with appropriate host government officials: -- Reinforce the importance of U.S.-EU unity in the face of Belarusian attempts to drive a wedge between us. While specific tactics may differ, we need to stay in the same place on the fundamentals. Concrete actions, such as public statements and demarches, are an important demonstration of solidarity with the U.S. and highlight the unacceptability of Belarus, actions. -- Stress our view that the recent release of some political prisoners has come about primarily because of this unity of purpose and from international pressure. Note Treasury,s clarification of existing sanctions on March 6, 2008, happened only after the GoB reneged on its promise to release political prisoner Alyaksandr Kazulin. We had made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to open a dialogue after Kazulin,s release, but the GoB failed to follow through. -- Emphasize that the current diplomatic problems are solely the responsibility of Minsk. The Belarusians effectively forced out our Ambassador in Minsk and are now demanding we reduce the size of our embassy in Minsk to the size of their mission to the United States (essentially halving our embassy) or face a corresponding PNGing of our staff. They have demanded that the remaining staff clear their in-country travel with the MFA, as well as all contacts with government institutions, organizations, and state enterprises. These actions are unwarranted and, if applied only against the United States, potentially discriminatory. They should be of concern to all nations with a stake in the effective functioning of the international system. -- Encourage the EU to work together with us to secure the release of Kazulin and restore fundamental freedoms in Belarus. It is imperative that the GoB understand that releasing only some of the prisoners will earn them nothing. The deal they made was for all the prisoners. -- Stress that the Government of Belarus has a simple choice to make: release Kazulin unconditionally and see an improvement in relations with the West, or keep him in jail at the expense of better relations. -- Draw the connection between the GoB,s behavior and its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. Although we prefer to keep politics out of the WTO, the actions of the GoB are not those of a country willing to adopt the fundamental principles of the WTO, including the rule of law and transparency, and hence we see no reason to move forward with this accession at this time. -- Convey our appreciation for the Commission's consideration of postponing the opening of its new Delegation Office in Minsk. We would regard this, as well as any other public signs of support, as an important signal to the regime of US-EU policy coordination and unity. STATE 00030007 002 OF 003 -------------- Background -------------- 3.(C, Rel. EU member states) Following U.S. Treasury Department action in November 2007 to freeze the assets of the Lukashenka-controlled state enterprise Belneftekhim, we began to see signs that U.S. and EU pressure on the Belarus leader might be bearing fruit. Belarus approached the U.S. in January 2008 with a question about what sort of moves the U.S. would take if Belarus released all political prisoners, including former presidential candidate Alyaksandr Kazulin. Our response, delivered after consulting with Brussels, was that we would not offer concessions for the release of prisoners per se, but that we were prepared to interpret the release of all political prisoners as a sign that the GoB is serious about improving relations with the West and we would begin a dialogue on other measures to improve relations. Among the actions the U.S. took was the immediate suspension of further action on financial sanctions pending the release of prisoners and the beginning of other institutional reforms. ¶4. (C, rel EU member states) Based on our initial response, Belarus gave the U.S. assurances that all political prisoners, including Kazulin, would be released by the middle of February. When Kazulin was not released by late February, the U.S. urged Belarus to follow through on its pledge by releasing Kazulin as a humanitarian gesture after the death of his wife, Iryna Kazulyna. We repeatedly warned Belarus that if it failed to release Alyaksandr Kazulin permanently and unconditionally, the GoB would squander the opportunity for improving relations and be subjected to the continuation of U.S. sanctions. Kazulin was released for three days for the funeral of his wife, but returned to prison, where he remains. We have thoroughly briefed EU officials on our interactions with the GoB related to the release of political prisoners. The EU also issued a statement at the time of Iryna Kazulyna,s death tying improved relations to the permanent and unconditional release of all political prisoners. ¶5. (C, rel EU member states) On March 6, 2008, Treasury,s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released a clarification of an existing sanction against state-owned enterprise Belneftekhim concerning the applicability of the sanctions on certain Belneftekhim subsidiaries. Prior to OFAC releasing the clarification, we told the GoB that the USG would continue to strengthen sanctions as long as Kazulin was in prison. In a gross overreaction, the GoB recalled its Ambassador to Washington and insisted that U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart leave Minsk or be declared persona non grata. Shortly after her departure for consultations, the Belarus MFA informed us she would not be welcome back until the Belarus Ambassador returned (and that he had no plans to return). In Minsk the MFA then demanded that we reduce our embassy staffing to the number of Belarusian diplomats in its bilateral missions in the United States. On March 17, the MFA informed us that if we did not voluntarily reduce our American diplomatic staff to 17 persons by March 27, (the number of Belarusian staff now in the U.S.),that Belarus would selectively declare U.S. diplomats persona non grata to reduce our number to 17. The GoB also insisted that our diplomats coordinate all in-country travel with the MFA, and that our meetings with state institutions, enterprises, and organizations must have prior MFA approval. Other GoB actions toward our Embassy and diplomats also indicate a pattern of harassment and obstructionism. ¶6. (C, Rel EU Member States) We have stressed to the Belarus MFA our conclusion that its request to reduce U.S. staff based upon the size of Belarus' embassy in the U.S. is completely unwarranted and delivered the following points. --The GOB demand that the U.S. reduce the number of people at its mission to the same number that Belarus has in the United States is not based on or consistent with the standard in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). --In fact, the demand that the U.S. reduce the number of people at its mission is highly unusual and inconsistent with normal diplomatic practice; USG missions overseas, including our mission in Minsk, are staffed at the level required to carry out their work. It is immaterial that it is larger than Belarus, mission in the United States. STATE 00030007 003 OF 003 --It is also not reasonable to demand that the respective missions be the same size, since the United States Embassy has programs that the Belarusian Embassy in Washington does not, for instance, foreign assistance programs. Our security requirements also differ. --The number of people working at the embassy is the number needed to provide adequate and appropriate representation and security. --We also question the intention in demanding such a reduction. The MFA has publicly acknowledged that the actions against the U.S. embassy are due to the sanctions against Belarus state enterprise Belneftekhim and subsidiaries and not driven by concerns related to the operation of the U.S. embassy. -- Furthermore, if Belarus has not demanded that other sending States hold their missions to sizes comparable to the size of Belarusian missions in their States, this would call into question Belarus,s adherence to the requirement under the VCDR that in applying the Convention Belarus not discriminate among States. --Belarusian President Lukashenka assured the President of the United States on 20 November 1998, that Belarus would adhere unconditionally to both the letter and the spirit of the VCDR and other legal instruments which regulate the functioning of diplomatic missions. ¶7. (C) The U.S. and EU have jointly blocked restarting Belarus WTO accession talks for the last three years. With the release of some political prisoners, some states may think it is time to restart those talks. The U.S. WTO working party in Geneva has asked that in our discussions on Belarus, we request that EU capitals demonstrate U.S.- EU unity by continuing to block Belarus WTO accession talks in Geneva. ¶8. (U) Please address questions to Matthew Flannigan, 202- 647-6733 FlanniganMJ@state.sgov.gov or Stephen Gee, 202- 736-4443, GeeSJ@state.sgov.gov. in the Office of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus Affairs. RICE