BELARUS:DEMARCHE REQUEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 028931 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM AMGT ODIP OFDP BO SUBJECT: BELARUS:DEMARCHE REQUEST REF: A. MINSK 163 ¶B. MINSK 168 ¶C. MINSK 191 ¶D. MINSK 33 Classified By: Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer E.O.12958 Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. Embassy Minsk has requested Department guidance on the demand outlined in Refs A through C that the U.S. reduce the number of U.S. diplomatic staff at Embassy Minsk to 17 or face expulsion of embassy staff. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has given a deadline of March 24 to provide the list of 17 U.S. diplomatic staff who will remain accredited to Belarus. The Department, in consultation with other USG agencies and Embassy Minsk, is preparing a list of 17 staff members who would stay at post in the event of a U.S. decision to comply with Belarus' demand. We have not/not taken a final decision to provide such a list; additional guidance will be provided prior to the March 24 deadline. The focus of this approach should be to push back on the unwarranted Belarusian request and to point out the potential consequences of continued Belarusian recalcitrance regarding political prisoners, and urge Belarus to pursue a different path. Please deliver on March 20 at the appropriate level of the MFA. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. -------------- Objectives -------------- ¶2. (C) Embassy Minsk is requested to pursue the following objectives. -- Inform the MFA that the U.S. is considering its response to the request to reduce staff. -- Challenge the request to reduce U.S. citizen staff at Embassy Minsk, noting that it is highly unusual, unwarranted, potentially discriminatory, and appears to be retaliation for U.S. sanctions policy rather than based on concerns regarding what is a reasonable or normal size for the mission to conduct its normal business. (See paragraph 4 for additional background on this objective.) -- Urge Belarus to honor commitments to release all political prisoners, including Alyaksandr Kazulin, as had been promised in earlier conversations (Ref D). Relations cannot be improved without this essential step. Should the Belarus Government release Kazulin immediately, we would be prepared to begin a dialogue aimed at additional steps to improve relations. -- Emphasize that sanctions against Belneftekhim will not be reversed until Belarus takes positive steps, including the release of Alyaksandr Kazulin and the beginning of democratic reforms as agreed upon in dialogue with the U.S. If all prisoners are not released, additional economic sanctions, including additional designations, and additional clarifications of existing sanctions will continue to be pursued. It remains in the interest of Belarus to avoid additional economic sanctions before they are imposed-- since they are not easily removed under U.S. law. (See paragraph 5 for additional background on this objective.) -- Emphasize that absent positive movement on the political prisoners, the U.S. will continue to block Belarus' stalled WTO aspirations, and will consider other measures. -- Confirm that if any of our diplomats are expelled, the U.S. is prepared to take responsive actions which may include reduction in the number of Belarus diplomats accredited to the U.S. -------------- Background -------------- ¶3. (C) Per Ref C, the Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) informed Embassy Minsk on March 17 that if the U.S. does not reduce the number of U.S. diplomatic staff to 17 persons by March 24, the Ministry would bring the U.S. presence down to that size by declaring U.S. diplomats persona non grata. The Department recognizes Belarus will STATE 00028931 002 OF 003 likely follow through on this threat. The Department agrees it is preferable for the U.S. to determine which staff remain in Belarus in order to best advance U.S. interests. Keeping in mind the deadlines set by the MFA (Ref C),we are engaged in an interagency effort to make such a determination, but there has been no final decision to provide such a list. -------------- Background on Vienna Convention -------------- ¶4. (U) We should reiterate our conclusion that the request by Belarus to reduce U.S. staff based upon the size of Belarus' embassy in the U.S. is completely unwarranted, drawing from the points below. --To demand that the U.S. reduce the number of people at its mission to the same number that Belarus has in the United States is not based on or consistent with the standard in the Vienna Convention. --In fact, the demand that the U.S. reduce the number of people at its mission is highly unusual and inconsistent with normal diplomatic practice; USG missions overseas, including our mission in Minsk, are staffed at the level required to carry out their work. It is immaterial that it is larger than Belarus, mission in the United States. --It is also not reasonable to demand that the respective missions be the same size, since the United States Embassy has programs that the Belarusian Embassy here does not, for instance, foreign assistance programs. Our security requirements also differ. --We reiterate that the number of people working at the embassy is the number needed to provide adequate and appropriate representation and security. --We also question the intention in demanding such a reduction. The MFA has publicly acknowledged that the actions against the U.S. embassy are due to the sanctions against Belarus state enterprise Belneftekhim and subsidiaries ) and not driven by concerns related to the operation of the U.S. embassy. -- Furthermore, if Belarus has not demanded that other sending States hold their missions to sizes comparable to the size of Belarusian missions in their States, this would call into question Belarus,s adherence to the requirement under the VCDR that in applying the Convention Belarus not discriminate among States. -- Finally, we would like to remind you about the assurances given by President Lukashenka to the President of the United States on 20 November 1998, that Belarus would adhere unconditionally to both the letter and the spirit of the Vienna Convention and other legal instruments which regulate the functioning of diplomatic missions. -------------- Background on Additional Sanctions -------------- ¶5. (C) In the meantime, we will emphasize with Belarus that actions against the United States embassy do not come without a price. We will continue to pursue visa restrictions and economic sanctions against persons responsible for human rights abuses, for impeding Belarus' transition to democracy and for public corruption. These sanctions may be directed against new types of targets as well as continue to target state owned enterprises that are owned or controlled by persons who are designated. ¶6. (C) It is in the interest of Belarus to avoid new sanctions. Recent guidance issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) clarified which Belneftekhim subsidiaries are subject to U.S. sanctions by operation of law. OFAC is prepared to issue additional clarifications that will substantially exacerbate the effect of existing sanctions. OFAC is legally required to issue such guidance, so the implementation of such guidance should not be offered as a carrot or a stick. However, it is important to emphasize that OFAC is working on additional designations under Executive Order 13405, and it is in Belarus' interest to avoid additional sanctions. ¶7. (U) The United States would also continue to block Belarus' aspirations to restart WTO talks unless all political prisoners are freed. STATE 00028931 003 OF 003 ¶8. (U) If United States staff in Minsk are declared persona non grata, the United States is prepared to take responsive action which may include action against Belarusian diplomats in the United States. ¶9. (U) If, however, Belarus releases political prisoner Alyaksandr Kazulin, the USG would interpret his release as a meaningful step toward improving relations. The Government of Belarus (GoB) would need to take additional actions, mainly the restoration of fundamental freedoms, before relations could fully improve, but we are prepared to engage in a dialogue with the GoB about what needs to happen after the release of political prisoners. 10.(U) Embassy Minsk's efforts and assistance are greatly appreciated during this difficult time. Point of Contact in the Department for questions and follow-up is Stephen Gee, Desk Officer for Belarus in the Office of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus Affairs, 202-736-4443, or geesj@state.sgov.gov. RICE