ANNUAL DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 027211 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2033 TAGS: EC ETTC KSCA MTCRE PARM TSPA AORC SUBJECT: ANNUAL DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION (HCOC) Classified By: IO DAS BRIAN HOOK FOR REASON 1.4 (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2. ¶2. (U) Background/Action Request: Request the Mission deliver the USG interagency-cleared paper in paragraph 3 to Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) Immediate Central Contact (ICC) at earliest opportunity for distribution to all HCOC subscribers. ¶3. (C/REL HCOC) BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: ANNUAL DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION The United States is submitting this declaration pursuant to the following provisions of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC): a) Transparency measures as follows, with an appropriate and sufficient degree of detail to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction: i) With respect to Ballistic Missile programmes to: - make an annual declaration providing an outline of their Ballistic Missile policies. Examples of openness in such declarations might be relevant information on Ballistic Missiles systems and land (test-) launch sites; - provide annual information on the number and generic class of Ballistic Missiles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre- launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in tiret iii); ii) With respect to expendable Space Launch Vehicle programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic confidentiality principles, to: SIPDIS - make an annual declaration providing an outline of their Space Launch Vehicle policies and land (test-) launch sites; - provide annual information on the number and generic class of Space Launch Vehicles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre- launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in tiret iii); - consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the degree of access permitted),inviting international observers to their land (test-) launch sites; Ballistic missiles are the most threatening means of delivery for weapons of mass destruction. It is no accident that the dangerous proliferation of ballistic missiles occurs predominantly in parallel with programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Such ballistic missile programs also often exist in parallel with support for terrorist groups. Viewed in this context, it is clear why the proliferation of ballistic missiles threatens international peace and security on a worldwide basis. The United States regards the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a direct threat to the United States, its deployed forces, its friends and allies, as well as its interests in key regions of the world. The United States views the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation as an important addition to the wide range of tools available to countries to impede and roll back this proliferation threat. One element of our strategy is multilateral efforts against missile proliferation, such as the HCOC and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Another important element is missile defense. We view our missile defense efforts as complementary to, and consistent with the objectives of the HCOC and MTCR. Each seeks in different ways to protect us from the dangers posed by WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. Missile defenses, the MTCR, and the HCOC play important roles in deterring and reducing missile proliferation, and the United States will be ready to work with members of the HCOC and the MTCR to ensure that these complementary efforts are mutually reinforcing. While an important addition to the broad arsenal of nonproliferation measures, it is clear that the HCOC has its limitations. For example, in taking on the political commitment pursuant to the HCOC to "exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction," the United States -- like other countries -- understands this commitment does not limit its right to take steps in these areas necessary to meet national security requirements that include the ability to maintain a deterrent umbrella for friends and allies and the capability to defeat aggression involving WMD attacks. Most HCOC implementation work concerns the requirements for pre-launch notification launches and test flights of the Subscribing States' ballistic missile and space-launch vehicles. Per the U.S. statement at the November 25, 2002, Launching Conference for the International (Hague) Code of Conduct, the United States intends to make pre-launch notifications and annual declarations pursuant to the ICOC (HCOC) based upon current U.S. proposals in its negotiations with the Russian Federation on a Pre- Launch Notification System, including on the question of which launches are to be notified. Once implementation is completed, the notifications and declarations that the United States provides pursuant to the ICOC (HCOC) will be based upon the U.S.-Russian Pre-Launch Notification System to be established in connection with the U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center. Over the longer term, the United States and the Russian Federation previously agreed that the bilateral U.S.-Russian Pre-Launch Notification system should be multilateralized. We hope, in turn, that such a multilateralized system might provide the mechanism by which all ICOC (HCOC) Subscribing States exchange pre-launch notifications. We plan to keep all Subscribing States informed on the progress of implementation of the U.S.-Russia agreement on launch notification, and on the implications and opportunities that a multilateralized U.S.-Russia Pre-Launch Notification System can present for the ICOC (HCOC). Ballistic Missiles An effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD. Meeting the challenges of surprise and uncertainty requires a new approach to deterrence. While nuclear forces made an indispensable contribution to deterring Warsaw Pact aggression during the Cold War, a strategic posture reliant solely on offensive nuclear weapons is inappropriate for deterring potential adversaries across the full spectrum of contingencies the United States will face in this century. Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's commitments to allies and friends. In response, the United States requires a broad range of capabilities to dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten the U.S., allies or friends. As such, U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent across the spectrum of capabilities to potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology, including WMD and the means to deliver them over long distances. In conjunction with defenses (active and passive) including ballistic missile defenses, ballistic missile programs (including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)) provide the United States with these credible deterrent capabilities, as well as providing capabilities that assure our allies and friends and dissuade adversaries. Since 2001, the United States developed a new approach to addressing Strategic Force capabilities. New, non-nuclear capabilities will provide a broader range of strategic strike capabilities, enabling reduced dependence on nuclear deterrence alone. This approach has allowed substantial reductions to deployed nuclear weapons and strategic forces. The reductions codified in the Moscow Treaty began in 2002 and will be complete in 2012. To date, the United States has withdrawn from operational service Peacekeeper ICBMs, removed 4 Trident ballistic missile submarines from strategic service, and reduced the number of warheads on remaining Trident SLBMs and Minuteman III ICBMs. In mid-2007, the United States began reducing the Minuteman III force from 500 to 450, in accordance with a recommendation in the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Removing the 50 Minuteman III missiles is expected to take 24 months to complete. At that time, the United States will have 450 Minuteman III ICBMs and 288 Trident II SLBMs deployed. The United States operates several land (test-) launch sites for ballistic missiles, including Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Cape Canaveral in Florida. The United States is committed to making every effort to prevent states and non-state actors of proliferation concern from acquiring missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The United States opposes missile programs of proliferation concern, and exercises particular restraint in missile- related cooperation. Space Launch Vehicles For nearly five decades, United States space transportation capabilities helped secure peace and protect national security, enabled the United States to lead the exploration of our solar system and beyond, and increased economic prosperity and humanity's knowledge of the Earth and its environment. Today, vital national security, homeland security and economic interests are increasingly dependent on United States Government and commercial space assets. U.S. space transportation capabilities - encompassing access to, transport through, and return from space - are the critical foundation upon which U.S. access to and use of space depends. In accordance with 2004 Space Exploration Policy, the United States is embarking on a robust space exploration program to advance U.S. scientific, security and economic interests. A central component of this program is to extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a return to the Moon in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations. The Space Shuttle will be used to complete assembly of the International Space Station, planned for the end of this decade, and then retired. A new crew exploration vehicle will be developed to provide crew transportation for missions beyond low Earth orbit. Access to space through U.S. space transportation capabilities is essential to: (1) place critical United States Government assets and capabilities into space; (2) augment space-based capabilities in a timely manner in the event of increased operational need or minimize disruptions due to on-orbit satellite failures, launch failures or deliberate actions against U.S. space assets; and (3) support government and commercial human space flight. The United States, therefore, maintains robust, responsive and resilient U.S. space transportation capabilities to ensure access to space. In doing so, the United States will emphasize safety in flight and on the ground. Exploiting space to the fullest extent, however, requires a fundamental transformation in U.S. space transportation capabilities and infrastructure. In this regard, the United States will capitalize on the entrepreneurial spirit of its private sector to develop new approaches and technology innovation in space transportation, options for enhancing space exploration activities, and opportunities to open new commercial markets, including public space travel. The United States operates several space launch vehicle (SLV) systems. These SLV systems include the Atlas, Athena, Conestoga, Delta, Minotaur, Pegasus, Taurus, Falcon-1 and Spaceship One. In addition, there are several SLV land (test-) launch sites in the United States; these include: Vandenberg Air Force Base and California Space Port in Vandenberg, California; White Sands Missile Range in White Sands, New Mexico; Kodiak Launch Complex in Kodiak, Alaska; Cape Canaveral Space Port, Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Cape Canaveral, Florida; Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia; Edwards Air Force Base, California; China Lake, California; Matagorda Island, Texas; Reagan Test Range, Omelek Island, Kwajalein, and Virginia Space Flight Center, Wallops Island, Virginia. No launches were reported pursuant to the pre- launch notification provisions of the HCOC in the period between the previous declaration period, which ended on December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2007. End text of paper. ¶4. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up related to this issue (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov). ¶5. (U) A word version of this cable will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. RICE NNNN End Cable Text