C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 020329

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: ECON ENIV ENRG KGHG PREL PGOV EAID XB XC XD XE XH JA
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS'S MEETING WITH JAPANESE
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SASAE, JANUARY 28, 2008

Classified By: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

R. Nicholas Burns, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: U/S Burns met for two hours on January 29
with his new Japanese counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister
Kenichiro Sasae, to discuss G8, UNSC reform, Iraq, Iran,
Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Burma. Sasae
described Japan's priorities for the G8, which include
climate change/energy security, development in Africa and
more "traditional issues" such as non-proliferation,
counterterrorism and peace building. U/S Burns assured Sasae
that the U.S. continued to support Japan for a permanent UN
Security Council seat while emphasizing the importance of UN
reform. U/S Burns briefed on the situation in Iraq; Sasae
stressed Japan continued to support U.S. efforts there. U/S
Burns asked for Japan's political support in New York for a
third UN Security Council resolution on Iran and pressed
Sasae for GOJ sanctions in line with those the EU is expected
to implement. Sasae and U/S Burns agreed on the increasingly
intertwined importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan. U/S
Burns briefed on U.S. policy toward India; Sasae described
growing Japanese government and business interests there.
Sasae described Japan's interest in supporting Gambari's
Burma mission and said that Japan would like to address Burma
through the G8; he also said he wanted to visit Burma
himself, which U/S Burns supported. End Summary.

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Japan's G8 Priorities
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2. (C) Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae told
U/S Burns January 29 that Japan's priori

ties for the G8 would
include: climate change; development in Africa; and more
"traditional issues" such as non-proliferation,
counterterrorism and peace building. Japan planned that the
Leaders' Statement would address all of these. Sasae said
European counterparts had proposed institutionalizing the G8
plus 5 during his just-concluded consultations. Sasae noted
that, in accordance with the G8's agreement in Heiligendamm
to engage in continuous dialogue with the five largest
emerging economies (China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South
Africa), Japan would agree to such a dialogue, but not an
institutionalization of this outreach. Japan also did not
want to enlarge the G8; G8 enlargement should also not be
linked to UNSC reform. Sasae also said that in addition to
the plus 5, Japan would invite three Asian countries
(Indonesia, Australia and the Republic of Korea) to attend,

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given the regional importance of environmental issues.

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Kosovo
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3. (C) Sasae expressed some concern that Kosovo could emerge
as an additional political issue in play; U/S Burns suggested
Kosovo should no longer be an issue by the time of the July
G8 Summit. U/S Burns asked that Japan quickly recognize the
newly independent Kosovo as the United States and many
Europeans would do; Sasae made no comment. U/S Burns said
Russia could be expected to protest Kosovo's independence and
could block its membership in the UN, but further UNSC action
was not required for an independence declaration; having
withdrawn troops and aid programs, Russia had lost its claim
to have a voice on the issue and could not stop Kosovo's
independence.

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Russia
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4. (C) Sasae noted the increased difficulty of dealing with
Russia; UK counterpart Mark Lyall Grant had frankly described
Britain's bilateral problems with Russia and floated G7
discussion of Russia. U/S Burns said the Administration
favored G7 discussions only within an economic framework, not
political; we had made a decision in 1994 to bring them into
the framework, making a dis-invitation difficult. Informal
discussions about Russia were acceptable, but should not be
not institutionalized; Sasae agreed. U/S Burns described the
significant differences between today's Russia and the former
Soviet regime and noted the areas in which we cooperated
strategically (e.g., non-proliferation and counterterrorism).
Putin's Russia had centralized power, but society was much
more open, and we were convinced economic integration with
the West was in Russia's self-interest. However, we must be
prepared to oppose Russia's behavior in the ex-Soviet space
that runs counter to our interests, e.g. in the Caucuses,
central Europe and in Central Asia. The centralization of
power in the Kremlin, restrictions on the press and efforts
to minimize domestic political competition were of concern.
The U.S. saw a balance of interests and did not view Russia
as a new enemy. Sasae agreed, but noted Russia's protests
regarding U.S.-Japan ballistic missile defense, and said that
relations with Russia required "delicate balance."

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UN Reform
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5. (C) U/S Burns noted that he and others in the State

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Department had had many conversations with Japan on UNSC
reform. The President had supported expansion of the UNSC in
his September 2007 UNGA speech. There was great interest in
talking to Japan, India, Brazil and African countries. The
U.S. would respond to proposals. U/S Burns noted that
different views existed within the USG. It did not make
sense to undertake UNSC reform without coupling it with other
reform measures, including managerial, budget, and ethical
reforms. A "winning package" of UNSC expansion and reforms
was necessary.


6. (C) Sasae thanked U/S Burns for the encouragement and
indicated Japan would try again this year to develop a
proposal, consulting closely with the U.S. U/S Burns said it
was important to continue to consult, and reminded Sasae that
Japan was the only nation the U.S. supported publicly for a
permanent UNSC seat. He suggested Africa would be the most
difficult challenge, not China, which Sasae said now
"understands Japan's interest in a greater role"; its
neutrality to Japan's UNSC membership would be sufficient.

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Iraq
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7. (C) U/S Burns briefed on progress in Iraq, which he
described as in better shape than a year ago: the surge had
positive effects, though political developments remained a
concern; it was imperative for social stability that Kurds,
Shia and Sunni cooperated; the U.S. would begin negotiations
with Iraq on a long-term SOFA-like agreement; the U.S.
remained interested in outside political and economic support
for the Iraqi government. Sasae agreed that the situation
seemed to have improved and that the U.S. deserved greater
credit for its "tremendous results." Sasae asked if the
localized dialogue with Iran had helped; U/S Burns said the
channel, under Ambassador Crocker's direction, was not very
active, but the U.S. hoped it would because of Iran's support
to the Shia, which it equipped with IEDs.

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Iran ) diplomacy and domestic politics
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8. (C) Sasae asked whether Japan could help with Iran. U/S
Burns said that Iran needed to be a major issue for the G8
agenda; he also asked that Japan give political support at
the UN for a third UNSCR. U/S Burns noted that once the
UNSCR passes, the EU would pass much stronger EU sanctions
toward Iran; Japan, the ROK and other major trading partners
should consider similar sanctions to make diplomacy
effective. Sasae responded that Japan would follow the UNSCR
and consider additional measures; while Japan did not order

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its banks to take actions, it made suggestions, which led
them to reduce exposure on their own. U/S Burns said that he
believed that if not handled correctly, Iranian sanctions
could become an issue in U.S.-Japan relations; the U.S.
looked to Japan to do much more. Sasae said he would see
what he could do, adding that China's actions were important.
China as expanding its activities with Iran as others
reduced them, and Japan did not want China to take advantage
of this situation. U/S Burns cautioned that it would be a
mistake for Japan to measure its actions based on China's;
China would do little and would be the "weak link." Sasae
said Japan was not linking its action to that of China, but
that we collectively needed to work on China. U/S Burns
stressed the importance that sanctions succeed to make
diplomacy work.


9. (C) Sasae suggested that a third UNSCR could help Iran's
domestic political situation. U/S Burns agreed, noting that
we did not want to do anything to help Ahmadinejad in the
run-up to the March 14 Majlis elections. Sasae observed that
a serious political struggle was occurring within Iran;
society was divided; the fight was not just over power but
the "pulse" of the country; and that we needed to consider
how best to support moderates. U/S Burns noted criticism of
the perceived U.S. unwillingness to talk with Iran was wrong;
we were on the record since June 2006 offering talks, and
Secretary Rice had repeated this offer at Davos. Iran,

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however, rejected the offer, perhaps because of the lack of
political unity within Iran; this became clear after Putin's
visit. Sasae suggested that Iran could be waiting for a new
U.S. Administration, which U/S Burns said would be a mistake,
given strong bipartisan agreement in Washington on the need
to address the threat posed by Iran. Sasae suggested
continuing bilateral expert discussions on Iran, to which U/S
Burns agreed.

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Afghanistan and Pakistan
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10. (C) Sasae stated that Afghanistan and Pakistan needed
greater attention, that our activities in the two should be
linked, and that Japan planned to propose this for the G8.
U/S Burns agreed that Afghanistan and Pakistan were
increasingly important, that the Taliban would not be a
strategic threat to the Afghan government as long as NATO
troops were in-country, and that the military effort was
going well, though additional troops and helicopters were
necessary. The U.S. was more worried by the civilian effort,
which needed a strong person with a strong mandate; the UN
was unfocused, and it was regrettable that Afghan President
Karzai had reversed himself on Paddy Ashdown serving as UN
Special Representative.

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11. (C) Sasae noted that although France had proposed a
donors conference for Afghanistan, an overall strategy was
necessary first. Japan, as G8 Chair, would work to develop a
strategy. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
(JCMB), which Japan will host in Tokyo February 5-6, will
provide an opportunity to discuss problems. U/S Burns said
that Afghanistan needed to be a subject for Leaders and
Foreign Ministers in the G8, to which Sasae agreed.


12. (C) On Pakistan, U/S Burns described the need for
Pakistan to more aggressively pursue Taliban and extremists
in the tribal areas of the country. The U.S. had opposed
imposition of martial law and the postponement of elections;
the assassination of Benizir Bhutto had been a tragedy, since
Pakistan needed a stronger political center. Sasae said that
Japan would increase its assistance to Pakistan.

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India
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13. (C) U/S Burns described the President's interest in
pursuing a strategic relationship with India, of which the
civilian nuclear accord was a major component. India needed
to conclude negotiations with IAEA chief El Baradei before
going to the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group. Sasae said Japan knew the U.S. position;
Japan had to work through its domestic political process but
ultimately would not oppose the deal. U/S Burns said that
the United States and India were increasing military
cooperation, both exercises and sales. This was important
because the Soviet Union/Russia had been India's main
supplier for 60 years. He noted that 75,000 Indians attended
U.S. universities; the economic relationship was exploding.
Sasae said that Japan also moving toward increased
engagement, including investment, with India. Investment in
China had a downside; Japan was shifting more investment to
countries like India and Vietnam. Japan and India have a
security dialogue and an increasing number of exchanges.
India realized it needed to improve its relations with other
countries in the region, in part to balance relations with
China but also on its own merits. Japan wanted to see India
more in Asia Pacific. U/S Burns said the United States did
not see India as a counter to China.

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Burma
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14. (C) Sasae, calling Burma a "headache," said he was "at
wits end." He stressed Japan's desire to help Gambari "do
his best." U/S Burns described the interest of the President

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and First Lady on this issue. The United States also
supported Gambari but if there were no action and the UN
process weakened further, the U.S. would consider more
vigorous efforts at the UN. U/S Burns agreed with Sasae's
proposal to consider issuing a G8 statement before Gambari
visited Burma. U/S Burns noted that the channel between Aung
San Suu Kyi and the Minister of Labor that the junta had
established was not genuine. Sasae expressed interest in
traveling to Burma, though he needed to discuss the idea with
his superiors; U/S Burns was supportive.

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Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD)
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15. (C) Sasae invited U/S Burns to Japan for a final TSD
Senior Officials Meeting; U/S Burns urged Sasae to hold a
meeting after U/S-designate Bill Burns had assumed his
responsibilities. Sasae also solicited U.S. views about
initiating a Japan-China-U.S. trilateral dialogue, a Chinese
idea, and resuming a Japan-U.S.-ROK dialogue on global issues
not connected to the Korean peninsula or the Six Party
process; he indicated ROK counterpart DFM Shim had responded
positively. U/S Burns indicated we would consider the ideas.


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IAEA Secretary General
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16. (C) Sasae told U/S Burns that Japan would put forth the
candidacy of Ambassador Amano as Secretary General of the
IAEA to replace the Algerian Secretary General El Baradei in

2009. U/S Burns said we would consider the matter.


17. (U) January 28, 2008; 12:15 PM ) 2:00 PM; Washington,
D.C.


18. (U) Participants:

United States
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Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns
EAP/J Director James Zumwalt
EAP/J Deputy Director Raymond Richhart
P Special Assistant George Kent

Japan
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Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA)
Political Minister Masafumi Ishii, Embassy of Japan
Principal Senior Policy Coordinator Takehiro Funakoshi, MOFA
Policy Coordination Deputy Director Kengo Otsuka, MOFA
RICE