U.S.-QATAR GULF SECURITY DIALOGE (GSD) DECEMBER

S E C R E T STATE 002004 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2018 TAGS: ASEC EPET KNNP MARR IR MASS PREL QA IZ LE SUBJECT: U.S.-QATAR GULF SECURITY DIALOGE (GSD) DECEMBER 18, 2007 REPORTING CABLE REF: 07 DOHA 581 Classified By: NEA Deputy Assistant Secratary Gordon Gray for reasons E.O. 12958 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The third round of the U.S.-Qatar Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) took place in Washington on December 18, with Qatari officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior representing the Government of Qatar. The meeting reinforced our mutual commitment to the overall strategic relationship, but also highlighted significant policy differences on Iran. Qatar acknowledged a significant threat from Iran, and emphasized the importance of strong bilateral and regional military cooperation to balance it. The Qataris also cautioned about varying perceptions in the Gulf regarding the severity of the Iranian threat. Qatar urged the USG to engage in clear dialogue with the Iranian regime on the nuclear issue, possibly brokered by a third party (such as Qatar). On Iraq, Qatar criticized PM Maliki for being too sectarian and emphasized that he must exert greater control over Iraqi security forces in order to gain the confidence and support of leaders in the Gulf. The Qataris expressed their intention to purchase two or more C-17 aircraft and to establish a Shared Early Warning system. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) PM Acting Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull and OSD Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Coulter co-chaired the third round of the U.S. -Qatar Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) in Washington, DC on December ¶18. NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray, ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dell Dailey (S/CT),Deputy Coordinator Gerald Feierstein (S/CT), Maj. Gen. Vern Findley (CENTCOM, J5),Bruce Hardcastle (DIA), Col. Ralph Baker (Joint Staff),and other USG officials also participated. The Qatari Delegation was led by MFA Assistant Minister for Follow-Up Affairs Mohammed Al-Rumaihi and included MOD General Coordinator of Qatar Armed Forces Brig. Gen. Abdullah Al-Hamad, MOI State Security Coordinator Lt. Col. Ahmmed Al-Mohanadi, Assistant to the Director of European and American Affairs Abdullah Al-Jaber, Acting Charge d'Affaires at Qatar Embassy Washington Mr. Fahad Kafoud, and other MFA and Embassy officials. -------------- Plenary -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Acting Assistant Secretary Mull opened the meeting by underlining that the USG values its strategic relationship with Qatar and remains committed to maintaining peace and security in the Gulf. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to shared objectives discussed at the May 2007 GSD, and thanked Qatar for continuing to host a critical and robust U.S. military presence at the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. ¶4. (C) MFA Assistant Minister for Follow-Up Affairs al-Rumaihi asserted that the U.S.-Qatar relationship was important to Qatar and noted that the political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of the bilateral relationship would develop to eventually match the robust cooperation evident in the bilateral military relationship. He also stressed the need for increased bilateral meetings and visits at the highest levels. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶5. (C) Bruce Hardcastle, DIA Senior Intelligence Analyst, provided a detailed strategic update on Iran, including a discussion of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and an assessment of Iran's nuclear intentions and capabilities. Hardcastle noted that the conclusions of the NIE had been misrepresented in press coverage and stressed that Iran was keeping its options open concerning its nuclear program. ¶6. (S/NF) Qatar noted that it was important to contain Iran and to create a strategic balance in the region through military cooperation with the U.S. Rumaihi acknowledged that Iran directly affects Qatar's security, but asserted Iran has not caused "a full conflict situation" nor stood as a significant source of regional instability. Rumaihi cautioned about varying perceptions of the severity of the Iranian threat among Gulf States. Iran's attendance at the recent GCC Summit in Doha, the Qataris believe, demonstrated Iran's belated recognition of the sovereignty of Qatar and the other GCC states -- recognition that in the past, Iran had only begrudgingly acknowledged. ¶7. (C) Qatar proposed that the U.S. pursue a direct dialogue with Iran. The Qataris maintained that direct communications and negotiations would mitigate potential misunderstandings between the two sides. Qatari Armed Forces General Coordinator Brig. Gen. Hamad expressed his view that Iran "will not come to you" and suggested that the USG initiate talks, possibly using a neutral third party like Qatar to get the dialogue started. ¶8. (C) Brig. Gen. Hamad asked what the U.S. would do if Iran blocked the Straits of Hormuz. He expressed concern that continued threats of a U.S. military strike on Iran could provoke Iranian expatriates in the Gulf or other elements to retaliate against Qatar. ¶9. (C) In response, NEA DAS Gray explained that Secretary Rice had agreed to sit down with Iran with her P5 1 counterparts to discuss outstanding issues if Iran suspended its enrichment activities. Gray characterized Iran as an expansionist power which continues to occupy three Emirati islands and poses a major threat to the security of the Gulf. He also underscored the U.S. commitment to free passage in the Straits of Hormuz. -------------- Iraq -------------- ¶10. (C) Rumaihi noted the need to strengthen Iraq so that it could serve as a counterbalance to Iran, as it did before ¶1991. He indicated that in order to obtain Qatar's support, the Iraqi government had to better control its security forces. Characterizing the Iraqi government as sectarian in nature and responsible for marginalizing Sunni political power, he mentioned that Qatar remained concerned about the strong Shia influence in Iraq. Rumaihi said the Government of Qatar (GOQ) remains hesitant about opening an embassy in Iraq, given what he termed the dangerous security situation in the country. ¶11. (C) AA/S Mull agreed that the Maliki government was far from perfect and that Maliki's political approach originated in a sectarian tradition, but emphasized that Gulf support would help the Maliki government gain necessary strategic depth and strengthen its non-sectarian tendancies. If Gulf States did not reach out to the Iraqi government, Mull noted, this would create an opportunity for Iran to exploit. In this context APDASD Coulter described USG efforts to build and strengthen the capacity of Iraqi security forces, noting that these forces were becoming more competent and less sectarian with time. Coulter expressed willingness to work cooperatively with Qatar to address security issues regarding its embassy in Iraq, including undertaking security evaluation trips to Iraq with Qatari officials. ¶12. (C) Rumaihi stated that Qatar had offered to train Iraqi police in Qatar and had set aside funding to build a training school, but had received no response from Iraq. He also said that Qatar was willing to send financial assistance to train Iraqi police in Iraq, but added that it would be difficult to send Qatari trainers and equipment into Iraq given the security situation. ¶13. (C) On debt relief to Iraq, Rumaihi stated that at present Qatar was not asking Iraq to make immediate payments, nor was it collecting interest on its debt. However, publicly announcing debt forgiveness at this time would be politically untenable in Qatar. -------------- Annapolis -------------- ¶14. (C) Qatar expressed concern that the Annapolis Summit was not robust enough to yield results and suggested that future negotiations be held under the auspices of the UN Security Council. Rumaihi voiced concern that the Government of Syria was disappointed that the issue of the Golan Heights was not given more formal consideration at Annapolis. ¶15. (C) DAS Gray described Annapolis as an important step forward and thanked Qatar for its participation. He also responded that the Golan Heights issue was not the primary focus of the conference but that follow-up meetings, like the one in Moscow, could provide the Syrians with a further opportunity to raise the issue. -------------- -- Enhanced Defensive Capabilities and Cooperation -------------- -- ¶16. (C) Qatar characterized bilateral military relations as "excellent" and commented that the Chief of Staff of the Qatari Armed Forces Major General Hamad Al-Attiyah has a strong relationship with CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon. ¶17. (C) APDASD Coulter agreed with this assessment, and expressed the Pentagon's desire to make the relationship more robust. He reported that Secretary of Defense Gates had a positive discussion with Major General Hamad Al-Attiyah at NAVCENT Headquarters prior to the Manama Dialogue, during which they discussed Qatar's support of establishing a Shared Early Warning system. Coulter expressed appreciation for Qatar's intent to purchase two or more C-17 aircraft. He also noted with appreciation opportunities for cooperation in the field of maritime security. ¶18. (C) APDASD Coulter made clear that in order to establish Shared Early Warning, a communications security (COMSEC) agreement had to be in place. Brig. Gen. Hamad indicated Qatar is "open to discussing these issues any time" and recommended follow-up at the upcoming Military Consultative Commission (MCC); Coulter agreed to add it to the agenda. ¶19. (C) Qatar expressed frustration that officers seeking training in the U.S. encountered problems getting visas and suggested that the U.S. make the process easier by taking into account the GOQ "Guarantee Letter" provided to personnel selected for USG training. Coulter pointed to U.S. visa law and regulations as an unavoidable reality that had to be factored into any discussions of this issue, but committed to seeking ways to expedite the process within those given parameters. -------------- Counterproliferation -------------- ¶20. (C) Qatar expressed readiness to engage with the U.S. on counterproliferation efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),but indicated it would be wary of anything provocative towards Iran. Rumaihi asserted that the GOQ had not officially "signed" the PSI, but endorsed it in principle, and that it participates in related exercises. Hamad indicated that questions still exist regarding PSI requirements, noting that they may in some instances conflict with international law. ¶21. (C) ISN Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary McNerney clarified that PSI requires countries to stop and search ships only when they have the authority to do so, and consequently does not conflict with the requirements of international law. PDAS McNerney also raised the possibility of signing a bilateral shipboarding agreement with Qatar. Such an agreement would expedite the consent process for the two signatories should the need arise to board the other's flagged ships. Rumaihi expressed willingness to look into the possibility of a bilateral shipboarding agreement and to re-examine the possibility of Qatar formally signing the PSI. He cautioned, however, that either of these steps would require high-level political decisions. -------------- Counterterrorism -------------- ¶22. (C) S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey thanked the GOQ for its cooperation in support of counterterrorism and its legislative efforts to address counterterrorism financing, but expressed concern at what appeared to be a decline in intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism coordination. He raised, in particular, U.S. disappointment over the lack of Qatari cooperation on designations during its tenure on the UN Security Council. ¶23. (C) Qatar responded that there was no policy decision to decrease counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S., and it was not Qatar's intention to communicate such a desire. Hamad suggested meeting on the subject with the appropriate players on both sides to determine why there had been a decrease in the volume of shared cases. ¶24. (S) Hamad raised the issue of two terrorism suspects being held by the USG -- specifically, a Qatari citizen, Ali Al-Marri being held in South Carolina, and a Sudanese citizen (and Qatari resident),Sami Al-Hajj being held at Guantanamo. (Note: A second Qatari national, Jarallah Al-Marri, the brother of Ali, is also being held at Guantanamo with Al-Hajj.) The delegation hoped to receive an update on their status, as per previous inquiries. AA/S Mull indicated he would follow-up on Qatar's request for an update. -------------- Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection -------------- ¶25. (C) S/CT Deputy Coordinator Gerald Feierstein expressed concern that the GOQ had not advanced efforts to cooperate on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) since a small USG team visited Qatar in June 2007. Rumaihi responded that the Qataris remain interested in formalizing cooperation, but recounted several internal obstacles that had slowed progress. He asked that the U.S. provide him again with a draft of the proposed MOU on cooperation. Upon learning that the U.S. would like to follow-up on the June visit with a bigger team before making recommendations on CEIP, Rumaihi suggested that Qataris join the team and that the embassy coordinate with the MFA for an appropriate time. Feierstein assured Rumaihi that such participation would be welcome. -------------- Follow-Up -------------- ¶26. (C) Mull and Rumaihi agreed that they would like to follow up on all significant issues discussed in advance of the next GSD. RICE