LIBYA: DEMARCHE ON LIFTING HOLD ON PROPOSED UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 019145 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 TAGS: EFIN KTFN PREL PTER UNSC LY SUBJECT: LIBYA: DEMARCHE ON LIFTING HOLD ON PROPOSED UNSC 1267 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE LISTINGS REF: A. STATE 14920 NOTAL ¶B. TRIPOLI 101 ¶C. STATE 8902 NOTAL Classified By: NEA DAS Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph three. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 13, USUN proposed listing four Syrian based AQI affiliated members pursuant to UNSC 1267 (al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions). Libya placed a hold on the request. The Libyan Permanent Representative told USUN originally that the Libyan mission had not received instructions from Tripoli, so the Libyan mission placed a hold as "a precautionary measure." Subsequently, a member of the Libyan mission to the UN informed USUN that this case is a "sensitive matter" and that the Libyans would as a matter of course place holds on listing requests for any individual or entity with an Arab name. Department of Treasury officials also raised this issue with the Libyan Ambassador to Washington, who was (not surprisingly) uninformed about the case, but who complained that insufficient pre-notification was putting his government in a difficult position with Arab neighbors on sensitive matters. -------------- ACTION REQUEST AND OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶3. (C/REL LIBYA) Department requests Embassy Tripoli approach Libyan interlocutors at the highest appropriate level to request that Libya lift its hold on our February 13 request to list under UNSCR 1267 Syria-based Badran Turki Hishan al Mazidih and three members of his network. (The Statement of Case for this submission, provided previously in ref C, is copied below in paragraph four.) Embassy Tripoli should pursue the following objectives: -- Remind the Libyans that we pre-notified them six days in advance (ref B) of our submission. -- Convey that the Libyan UN Mission's subsequent explanation to USUN that proposed designations involving Arabs would be placed on hold "as a matter of course" is unacceptable. The nature of the al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime makes the submission of Arab names a fairly common occurrence. Any policy to block such submissions without any substantive justification would undermine the internationally agreed-upon objectives of this sanctions regime. -- Reiterate our request that Libya support the aforementioned listings and refrain from arbitrary holds in the future. -------------- UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT OF CASE SIPDIS -------------- ¶4. (U) Syria-based Badran Turki Hishan Al Mazidih, also known as Abu Ghadiyah, runs an al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) facilitation network and controls the flow of money, weapons, fighters, and other resources through Syria. The network is very family-centric, with four of its key members living in the same house in Syria. As of September 2006, Badran's facilitation network was critical to AQI's ability to sustain itself in Iraq. (1) BADRAN TURKI HISHAN AL MAZIDIH Ind. 1: Al Mazidih, BADRAN Turki Hishan AKA: Al-Mazidih, Badran Turki al-Hishan AKA: Abu Ghadiyah AKA: Al Mezidi, Badran Turki Hishan AKA: Hishan, Badran Turki AKA: Hisham, Badran al-Turki AKA: Al- Turki, Badran AKA: Al-Sha,bani, Badran Turki Hisham al-Mazidih AKA: Abu, Abdallah AKA: Abu Abdullah AKA: Shalash, Badran Turki Hayshan STATE 00019145 002 OF 003 AKA: Abu, Azzam DOB: 1977 Alt. DOB: 1978 or 1979 POB: Mosul, Iraq Location: Zabadani, Syria In 2004, former AQI leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi appointed Badran as AQI's Syrian commander for logistics. After Zarqawi's death, Badran began working for the new AQI leader, Abu Ayyub Al- Masri. As of late-September 2006, Badran took orders directly from Masri, or through a deputy. Badran, who had been chosen by AQI for his ability to obtain false passports for foreign terrorists, provided passports, weapons, guides, safe houses, and allowances to foreign terrorists in Syria and those preparing to cross the border into Iraq as of March 2006. In one instance, Badran received several hundred thousand dollars from his cousin Saddah - whose name we also intend to submit to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee - and used these funds to support anti-U.S. military elements and the travel of AQI foreign fighters. Badran also provided money to other AQI commanders. As of the spring of 2007, Badran facilitated the movement of AQI operatives into Iraq via the Syrian border. Badran also directed another Syria-based AQI facilitator to provide safe haven and supplies to foreign fighters. This AQI facilitator, working directly for Badran, facilitated the movement of foreign fighters primarily from Gulf countries, through Syria into Iraq. (2) GHAZY FEZZA HISHAN AL MAZIDIH Ind. 2: Al Mazidih, GHAZY Fezza Hishan AKA: Hishan, Ghazy Fezzaa AKA: Abu Faysal AKA: Shlash, Mushari Abd Aziz Saleh AKA: Abu Ghazzy DOB: 1974 or 1975 Residence: Zabadani, Syria Ghazy Fezza Hishan Al Mazidih is Badran's cousin and a member of his AQI facilitation network. As of March 2006, Ghazy was Badran's "right-hand man". As second-in-command of Badran's AQI network, Ghazy worked directly with Badran, managed network operations, and acted as the commander for Badran's AQI network when Badran traveled. As of late-September 2006, Ghazy and Badran were planning to facilitate an AQI attack against Coalition forces and Iraqi police in Qusaybah, Iraq. Ghazy and Badran planned to use rockets to attack multiple Coalition forces outposts and Iraqi police stations, in an attempt to facilitate an AQI takeover of Qusaybah. (3) AKRAM TURKI HISHAN AL MAZIDIH Ind. 3: Al Mazidih, AKRAM Turki Hishan AKA: Al-Mazidih, Akram Turki Hishan AKA: Abu Jarrah AKA: Abu Akram AKA: Al-Hishan, Akram Turki Residence: Zabadani, Syria DOB: 1974 or 1975 Alt. DOB: 1979 Akram Turki Hishan Al Mazidih is Badran's brother and a member of his AQI facilitation network. As of early-2006, AQI leaders Akram and Badran directed AQI operations near Al Qa'im, Iraq. In one instance in late-November 2006, Akram, identified as Badran's media facilitator, rented a pickup truck to smuggle weapons from Syria for use in Iraq. As of late-September 2005, Akram acted on behalf of AQI by using his position as head of a shari'a court to issue fatwas and order the execution of AQI's enemies. Akram issued at least one fatwa ordering the execution of all persons found to be working with the Iraqi Government or U.S. Forces, and at least one of Akram's fatwas resulted in the execution of two Iraqis in Al Qa'im, Iraq. (4) SADDAH JAYLUT AL-MARSUMI Ind. 4: Al-Marsumi, SADDAH Jaylut AKA: Al-Marsumi, Sa,da Jalut Hassam AKA: Jalout, Saddaa AKA: Jaloud, Sa,daa DOB: 1955 or 1956 Citizenship: Syrian Residence: Al Shajlah Village, Syria Alt. Residence: As Susah Village, Syria Alt. Residence: Baghuz, Syria STATE 00019145 003 OF 003 As of the spring of 2006, Saddah Jaylut Al-Marsumi, Badran's cousin, was an AQI financier who worked with Badran and other AQI facilitators to transport several unidentified Syrian suicide bombers into Iraq on behalf of AQI. Saddah also facilitated the financing and smuggling of AQI foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq. In one instance, Saddah transferred several hundred thousand dollars to a hawala in Iraq, where Badran received the funds and used them to support anti-U.S. military elements and the travel of AQI foreign fighters. End Statement of Case. -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶5. (U) Post should report the result of efforts by cable by February 27, 2008. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶6. (U) Questions may be directed to NEA/MAG (Amanda Johnson, 202-647-4674) and IO/PSC (Erin Crowe, 202-736-7847). ¶7. (U) Department appreciates the Embassy's assistance with this matter. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. RICE