Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08STATE15648 | 2008-02-14 23:23:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 015648 |
1. (U) Classified by William Lucas, Office Director, EUR/ERA. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). 2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 13. 3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their next General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting in Brussels on February 18-19. We expect the agenda to include: Western Balkans (Kosovo), Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Iran, Chad, and Burma. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables. A background section covering some of these issues is provided prior to a section containing talking points. Points are to be delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level to EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver these points. BACKGROUND -------------------------- ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS 4. (SBU) Our focus is on sustaining the momentum generated at the November 27 Annapolis Conference, and the December 17 Paris Donors' Conference. We continue to encourage expanded budgetary support for the PA, especially by Arab states. The next AHLC meeting on May 2 in the United Kingdom will provide a good opportunity to push donors to meet and expand their budgetary support to the PA. Secretary Rice has made clear, both privately and publicly, that we must ensure continuous progress in Israeli-Palestinians political negotiations on core issues even in the face of unhelpful developments (e.g., Dimona terrorist bombing, Gaza-Egypt border situation) and that we cannot let this distract from progress in talks between the parties. Our goals remain Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap implementation, Palestinian capacity building (the mission of Quartet Representative Blair and LTG Keith Dayton's Security Sector Reform), regional cooperation with Israel and Arab support for this process, and progress on political talks between Abbas and Olmert and their negotiating teams. IRAN 5. (C) Iran's continued failure to suspend its proliferations sensitive activities and to provide complete and verifiable disclosure of its nuclear activities through the IAEA Work Plan, as well as its continued ballistic missile development, support for terrorism, and willful violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, underscores the need for increased international pressure, both through the UNSC and by urging states to implement additional sanctions measures. The EU remains divided on adopting additional sanctions on Iran. A significant number of EU Member States prefer to wait for a third UNSC sanctions resolution before adopting new EU sanctions, and it appears possible that the EU will not adopt new sanctions without a new UNSCR. However, as the UNSC track moves forward, the French, British, and Germans assure us that the EU will take autonomous steps. 6. (C) EU non-proliferation and regional experts met in Brussels February 6 to discuss a new round of autonomous EU designations of Iranian officials and entities suspected of engaging in proliferation-related activities. They considered new candidates for designation under the EU's Common Policy on Restrictive Measures Against Iran, the mechanism used to designate entities from the annexes of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. STATE 00015648 002 OF 007 These new designations under existing mechanisms could be approved by the EU-27 foreign ministers at the February 18 GAERC, but the EU appears likely to wait until after a third UNSCR has been approved. Also at the February GAERC, the foreign ministers are expected to receive briefings from High Representative Solana on the nuclear dossier. 7. (C) The EU will resume internal deliberations of new sanctions against Iran (other than designations) immediately after a third UNSCR is tabled in New York, with a view toward approval of new measures at the March GAERC. We want to encourage the EU to implement new UN sanctions, once adopted, as expeditiously as possible. We want the EU to go beyond the specific lists of individuals and entities designated in the new resolution, as well as to make mandatory and expand the scope of any provisions that are left as voluntary in the resolution, as the EU has done in the past (e.g., with respect to outright bans on arms sales and the transfer of items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to Iran). CHAD 8. (C) The EU has temporarily suspended its military deployment to Chad because of recent intense fighting in Ndjamena. EU officials believe Sudan is heavily supporting the Chadian rebels and that the timing of the fighting was calculated to overthrow the Deby regime prior to the deployment of EU forces. The EU has stated repeatedly that it remains committed to deploying the EUFOR peacekeeping mission to the Chad/Sudan border as quickly as possible. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 9. (U) The WTO waiver for the trade provisions of the EU's Cotonou Agreement expired on December 31, 2007. In order to replace the previous one-way preferences and to ensure compliance with the WTO rules, the EU has been trying for 5 years to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 77 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), split into six regional groups (West, South, Central and East Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific). 10. (U) EPAs are to be structured as comprehensive and regional free trade agreements, covering trade liberalization in goods, services, and investments, enforcement of intellectual property rights, and also an "aid for trade" assistance package. However, only one region out of six, the Caribbean, signed an EPA before December 31, 2007. Therefore, the European Commission has initialed non-comprehensive "interim agreements", covering only goods, with most of the ACP countries. 11. (U) The interim agreements, as well as the ultimate EPAs themselves, will have implications for many different aspects of US trade and development policy and therefore raise a number of questions for different agencies within the USG. We also recognize that, given the many sensitive issues raised, any public USG response will need to be carefully considered. Until the USG has been able to assess those agreements, USTR requests that agencies avoid commenting specifically on the agreements. The only concern we can express so far is that several "interim agreements" do not respect regional institutional cohesion (for example, interim agreements initialed bilaterally with Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, instead of ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States.) BURMA 12. (SBU) The Burmese regime has made no progress toward a dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority representatives, as Aung San Suu Kyi's January 30 STATE 00015648 003 OF 007 statement acknowledged. It continues to delay the return of UN Special Adviser Ibrahim Gambari and to arrest and prosecute peaceful political activists. It has not fulfilled the UNSC's call to stop harassing, arresting and detaining members of the opposition and to release all political prisoners. The junta announced that it will hold a referendum on a new, junta-drafted constitution in May, demonstrating its lack of seriousness about an open and fair process for the restoration of democracy. The drafting process for the constitution has not incorporated the views of opposition parties or all ethnic groups, nor does the timeframe allow for adequate debate on the merits of the constitution especially when large segments of the opposition are imprisoned or in hiding. Given the lack of progress, the EU should join the U.S. in increasing the pressure on the regime by further tightening targeted financial sanctions on the regime. The United States does not see sanctions as an end, but as a means to prompt the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and begin a genuine dialogue. Tighter sanctions complement our efforts to promote a dialogue on a transition to democracy, support the goals and objectives of the UN good offices mission and the UN Security Council's focus on Burma, engages key stakeholders in the region, and supports the Burmese democracy movement. 13. (SBU) Please deliver the following points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as possible (in advance of January 28-29 GAERC). BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT WESTERN EUROPE -- We congratulate President Tadic and his party on their February 3 reelection victory. Following a vigorous campaign, the second round of voting took place in an orderly manner, and the extraordinarily high voter turnout was remarkable. -- President Tadic promised voters a European future for Serbia. We will work with President Tadic and Serbia to see that promise fulfilled, and we look forward to continuing our efforts to build a productive relationship on matters of common interest. -- Of course, we also welcome the EU's efforts to deepen its relationship with Serbia and accelerate its progress towards the EU, and we encourage your efforts to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Belgrade. -- However, our policy on Kosovo has not changed. The time for decision on Kosovo is upon us, and we must all be ready to act. -- We need as many EU Member States as possible to recognize Kosovo within a day or two following a declaration of independence. Any gap between the declaration and recognitions will complicate UNSYG Ban's effort to smooth the transition of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). -- We do not have the luxury to be flexible with timing. The Kosovars have been patient, but there is anticipation building for a declaration of independence. Further delay of Kosovo's independence or delay of recognition would create space for extremists on the ground in Kosovo and the region to stir up trouble. -- We welcome the adoption of the procedures authorizing the ESDP Rule of Law mission ("EULEX Kosovo") earlier this month, and we look forward to the formal launch of the mission very soon. The United States is eager to join with the EU in this very important effort, and our experts are coordinating on the details of U.S. STATE 00015648 004 OF 007 participation. ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS -- Appreciate the EU's support for the Annapolis process and the strong EU financial assistance for the Palestinians announced at the Paris Donors' Conference ($650 million for 2008). -- We welcome the EU's transition from the Temporary International Mechanism to PEGASE, a mechanism to provide direct European assistance to the Palestinian Authority, and to focus assistance on development and reform priorities identified by PM Fayyad ahead of the Paris Conference. We also look forward to the next Ad- Hoc Liaison Committee in May in the United Kingdom. -- We must sustain the momentum generated at Annapolis and Paris. President Bush's travel to the region aimed to do just that, and reflects his personal commitment to achieve real progress towards a two state solution. The President has said that he will return to the region, possibly as soon as May. -- We believe it is particularly important at this time to achieve meaningful progress on the ground to build confidence between the parties. Tony Blair's team has identified a number of excellent projects. We need to identify and address any obstacles to get these projects moving forward. -- As agreed with the parties at Annapolis, the U.S. will take on the role of monitoring and judging Roadmap implementation. LTG William Fraser will head this effort. He traveled to the region at the end of January and will return on a regular basis for discussions with the parties. -- It is our hope that by providing a mechanism to deal with Roadmap issues, we can also help protect the negotiations from being distracted or derailed by any unhelpful developments on the ground. -- As you know, Secretary Rice has appointed retired General Jim Jones, former Marine Corps Commandant and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, to serve as her Special Envoy for Middle East Security. -- General Jones will be advising the Secretary on security needs for a two-state solution, both in terms of the parties' needs, international engagement, and the regional dynamic. -- On Gaza, we were deeply concerned by the events of January 23, when Hamas breached the border with Egypt and Gazans flooded into the Sinai. Egypt has gradually restored order and we have encouraged Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians to work together to find a solution for the Gaza-Egypt border. -- We have also stressed the importance of continued humanitarian aid to Gaza. We must work with the parties to find a solution for Gaza that maintains pressure on Hamas, but ensures the needs of innocent Gazans are being met. -- We are also deeply concerned by the daily rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel, injuring and killing numerous Israeli civilians. This is unacceptable and must be stopped, and we continue to call on all parties to do their part to put an end to these terrorist attacks. -- In that same vein, we condemned the terrorist attack in Dimona on February 4 and have urged the PA, which also condemned the attack, to do everything within its power to dismantle the infrastructure of terror and prevent such attacks in the future. STATE 00015648 005 OF 007 -- We will continue to consult closely with our European partners and with the Quartet over the coming months. IRAN -- Iran has failed to meet even the limited obligations it agreed to under the August 2007 IAEA Work Plan and is continuing its enrichment activities in direct violation of its legally binding UNSC suspension obligation. -- Iran failed to meet the December 2007 deadline set by IAEA DG ElBaradei for Work Plan completion, and continues to block the IAEA by extending the deadline. -- New information revealing Iran's past attempts to create a weapon combined with their ongoing enrichment of uranium make it imperative that Iran fully disclose its past activities and provide the IAEA verification that these activities have stopped. -- DG ElBaradei has repeatedly requested a full "confession" of Iran's past and present activities. The international community can have no confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's current nuclear activities until Iran admits to its past weapons-related activities and complies with its international nuclear obligations. -- As the NIE notes, Iran's decision to suspend weapons related work in 2003 was in response to international pressure. We should redouble our efforts to pressure Iran and insist it come completely clean with its nuclear program. -- Iran also continues to provide lethal support to terrorists throughout the Middle East in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions. EU troop-contributing nations in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq should be especially concerned with Iran's lethal support to terrorists in these countries. -- We urge EU members to publicly call for quick adoption of a third UNSC sanctions resolution. When it adopts new UN sanctions, we encourage the EU to go beyond the specific lists of individuals and entities designated in the resolution, as well as to make mandatory and expand the scope of any provisions that are left as voluntary in the resolution, as the EU has done in the past. -- We also encourage the EU to adopt additional autonomous sanctions. We support additional EU designations under existing mechanisms being finalized as soon as possible, and new sanctions being finalized quickly once the third UNSCR is adopted. -- For example, we urge the EU designation of Bank Melli and Bank Saderat using the authorities provided in UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. There is hard evidence linking these banks to Iran's proliferation activities and support for terrorism, respectively. LEBANON -- February 14 marks the third anniversary of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was murdered alongside 21 other Lebanese. The UN Special Tribunal, which will help the Lebanese to hold the perpetrators of this and a number of other acts of political violence accountable, is not yet fully funded. We urge the EU to recognize appropriately the anniversary of Prime Minister Hariri's assassination and to provide funding to the Special Tribunal. -- We are also concerned about Lebanon's continuing political impasse. The opposition, backed by Syria and Iran, continue to obstruct the election of a President. STATE 00015648 006 OF 007 Political intimidation and interference in Lebanon's sovereign political process cannot be tolerated. We urge the EU to speak out against Syrian and Iranian interference and intimidation in Lebanon. -- Along these lines, we urge the EU to stop engaging Syria. The repeated visits of Western diplomats to Damascus have only served to embolden the Asad regime. Since Syria's participation in Annapolis, it has received multiple European ministers in Damascus, and Syrian officials have been received in Europe. And yet, Syrian interference in Lebanon and support for Hizballah continues apace, while repression of Syrian democracy activists at home has increased. CHAD -- We have demarched Khartoum and other regional governments to put pressure on Sudan to cease their support for Chadian rebel groups. -- We support the deployment of the EUFOR peacekeeping mission as soon as possible. It is now all the more critical in order to help stabilize the humanitarian and security situation. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) -- The United States has not yet assessed the EPA agreements recently signed by a number of ACP countries. We understand that except for the Caribbean, these are non-comprehensive "interim agreements", some of which are still being finalized. -- We support EPA's objective to foster regional integration and strengthen regional organizations. We hope that the signing of the "interim agreements" will not hamper regional integration efforts, especially in Africa. BURMA -- Highlight our concern that the regime has made absolutely no progress on its obligations to the UNSC. The regime continues to harass and imprison the opposition; it has not released all political prisoners as requested; it still has not made any progress toward a dialogue on a transition to democracy; and it continues to delay the visit of UN Special Adviser Gambari. -- This lack of progress coupled with the announcement of a referendum in May 2008 on a new, junta-drafted constitution, the regime has demonstrated its lack of seriousness about an open and fair process for the restoration of democracy. -- Emphasize the need to press the regime not to begin a genuine dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority groups. This entails releasing political prisoners and easing restrictions on ASSK and other key interlocutors. Another step is full cooperation with and access for the good offices mission of U.N. Special Adviser Gambari. -- Urge the host government to advocate adopting EU sanctions on Burma's three foreign trade banks as a means to increase the pressure on the regime. -- Note that tougher sanctions by like-minded countries will focus international attention and pressure on China, as the regime's key enabler, to positively influence the regime. -- Stress that sanctions on Burmese banks can be tailored to allow personal remittances and transfers to STATE 00015648 007 OF 007 NGOs to ensure that sanctions target the regime and not the Burmese people. -- Underscore that the regime has only responded to pressure and that sanctions are having an impact - Singaporean banks have canceled some Burmese accounts, gem auction revenues are down, and the Burmese officials and regime cronies have complained to us and Gambari about sanctions, indicating that they feel the pinch. -- Any offer of incentives for Burma including humanitarian assistance before the regime has made significant progress toward a transition would be premature at best, and is likely to prolong the lifespan of the regime and thus undercut the calls of the international community and the UNSC for democratic transition. 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