Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE15220
2008-02-14 14:33:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

(S) FURTHER SCHEMING BY GERMAN FIRM TO EXPORT TEST CHAMBER TO IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM

Tags:  ETTC GM IR KSCA MTCRE PARM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 141433Z FEB 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 015220 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2033
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, MTCRE, KSCA, GM, IR

SUBJECT: (S) FURTHER SCHEMING BY GERMAN FIRM TO EXPORT
TEST CHAMBER TO IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM

REF: A. 05 STATE 201650

B. 05 BERLIN 3726
C. 05 STATE 211408
D. 05 BERLIN 3954
E. 06 STATE 36325
F. 06 BERLIN 674
G. 06 STATE 62278
H. 06 BERLIN 1123
I. 06 STATE 70328
J. 06 BERLIN 1229
K. 06 BERLIN 1550
L. MTCR POC 201/2006 - MAY 16 2006
M. 07 STATE 75839
N. 07 BERLIN 1137
O. 07 STATE 108420
P. 07 BERLIN 002163
Q. 07 STATE 166482
R. 07 BERLIN 2216

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).

S E C R E T STATE 015220



SIPDIS





E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2033

TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, MTCRE, KSCA, GM, IR



SUBJECT: (S) FURTHER SCHEMING BY GERMAN FIRM TO EXPORT

TEST CHAMBER TO IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM



REF: A. 05 STATE 201650



B. 05 BERLIN 3726

C. 05 STATE 211408

D. 05 BERLIN 3954

E. 06 STATE 36325

F. 06 BERLIN 674

G. 06 STATE 62278

H. 06 BERLIN 1123

I. 06 STATE 70328

J. 06 BERLIN 1229

K. 06 BERLIN 1550

L. MTCR POC 201/2006 - MAY 16 2006

M. 07 STATE 75839

N. 07 BERLIN 1137

O. 07 STATE 108420

P. 07 BERLIN 002163

Q. 07 STATE 166482

R. 07 BERLIN 2216



Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM

FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).



1. (U) This is an action request. Please see

Paragraph 7.



2. (S) Background/Objective: Since November 2005, we have

discussed with German officials efforts by Iran's solid

propellant missile developer - the Shahid Bakeri Industrial

Group (SBIG) - to procure environmental test chambers from

the German firm ICS Schneider Messtechnik (Schneider) (Refs).

SBIG has conducted its dealings with Schneider through the

Iranian intermediary Rakin Ltd. and the missile-related front

companies Aban Commercial and Industrial Group (Aban),Saba

Machinery Supply Company (Saba),and Pooya Commercial and

Engineering (Pooya).



3. (S) In April 2006, Germany denied a request by Schneider

to export environmental chambers to Saba (Ref K). This

denial came shortly after having been alerted by the USG to

SBIG's use of Saba as a front company (Refs E & G). Germany

has also sensitized Voetsch Industrietechnik GmbH - the

manufacturer of the test chamber - to its concerns about this

case (Ref P).



4. (S) In June 2007, we alerted the FRG that Schneider - in

a further attempt to evade German export controls - in

mid-March 2007 suggested to Rakin that a thermal shock

chamber be shipped to Iran using Croatian, Romanian or

Russian intermediaries (Ref M). We subsequently advised

German officials that in late May 2007, the Croatian firm

Belmet 97 made an offer to Rakin - on behalf of Schneider -

for the sale of a shock chamber (Ref O).


<
br />5. (S) We now have information indicating that as of

mid-December 2007, Schneider and Rakin's Abdolmajid Naji had

discussed routing the shock chamber through Edib Oil General

Trading (LLC) in the United Arab Emirates. Schneider and

Naji apparently agreed to falsely list an entity in

Tajikistan as the end-user, but Edib Oil would actually

forward the chamber directly from the UAE to Iran. Naji also

requested an inspection and training course in Germany for

two or three engineers prior to the machine's shipment to

Iran.



6. (S) Objective: We want to share this most recent

information with FRG officials, and encourage them to

continue their work to prevent Schneider from supplying

Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program with shock

chambers.



7. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy

Berlin approach appropriate host government officials

to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 8 and report

response. Talking points may be left as a non-paper.



8. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:



(SECRET//REL GERMANY)



-- Since November 2005, we have been discussing with you

efforts by Iran's Rakin Ltd. to procure environmental test

chambers from the German firm ICS Schneider Messtechnik on

behalf of Iran's missile program.



-- In early June 2007, we shared information with you

indicating that in mid-March 2007, ICS Schneider was working

with Rakin to provide a 2-zone thermal shock chamber type VT

7030 S2 to Iran's Pooya Commercial and Engineering, an entity

associated with the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG),

Iran's primary developer of solid-fueled ballistic missiles.



-- As we advised you in June, ICS Schneider representatives

Andreas Schneider and Kerstin Schaeffer had suggested to

Rakin that the shipment be routed through Croatia, Romania,

or Russia in order to disguise the fact that the actual

end-user is in Iran.



-- You will also recall from our subsequent discussions in

August that Croatia's Belmet 97 D.O.O. had made a late-May

offer to Rakin - on behalf of ICS Schneider - for the sale of

the shock chamber, and that ICS Schneider had developed plans

to ship the chamber to Croatia, where Belmet would act as an

intermediary and forward the equipment to Iran.



-- We now have information indicating that as of December

2007, ICS Schneider and Abdolmajid Naji of Rakin Ltd.

continued their discussions related to the purchase by Rakin

of a thermal shock chamber on behalf of Iran's solid-fueled

ballistic missile program.



-- Specifically, we understand that ICS Schneider and Naji

have discussed shipping the test chamber to Edib Oil General

Trading (LLC) in the United Arab Emirates.



-- Schneider and Naji appear to have agreed to falsely list

an entity in Tajikistan as the end-user, but Edib Oil would

actually forward the chamber directly from the UAE to Iran.



-- The test chamber is to be shipped within two to three

months after an advance payment has been made. We do not

know if any such payment has yet occurred.



-- We also understand that Naji requested an inspection and

training course in Germany for two or three engineers prior

to the machine's shipment to Iran.



-- We are grateful for your continued cooperation on this

case, and for measures you have taken in the past to prevent

the shipment of this equipment to Iran.



-- We will continue to provide you with relevant information

on this issue as it becomes available, and look forward to

hearing of any actions your government takes in response to

this information.



End talking points/non-paper.



9. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any

questions or follow-up related to this case (202-647-1430 -

herrmannjp2@state.gov or herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug

reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/AGS and EUR/PRA.



10. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at

www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.

RICE





NNNN

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