OSCE - DEFENDING THE U.S. KOSOVO POSITION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 014285

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2018
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU OSCE
SUBJECT: OSCE - DEFENDING THE U.S. KOSOVO POSITION IN
VIENNA

REF: USOSCE 31

Classified By: EUR Principal DAS Kurt Volker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This cable is an action request (see para 3) and
responds to USOSCE's reftel request for guidance.


2. (C) BACKGROUND: We understand that Serbia intends to
invoke the Berlin Mechanism immediately after an expected
declaration of independence (DI) from Kosovo. We believe
that Serbia's purpose for calling such a meeting would be to
try to embarrass countries that recognize independence,
declare any such action a violation of the Helsinki Final Act
(HFA) and cast a pall of illegitimacy over our actions. Our
European partners have reported that both Russia and Serbia
have been active lobbying OSCE members to support such a
move. Disturbingly, we have heard that some EU members,
including Spain, are sympathetic to holding such a meeting.


3. (U) The Berlin Mechanism for consultation and cooperation
with regard to emergency situations was adopted by OSCE
participating States at the first meeting of the Ministerial
Council in June 1991. The mechanism was designed to
facilitate the resolution of serious emergency situations
resulting from a violation of one of the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act in one or more of the participating
States. To trigger the mechanism, an OSCE participating
State would circulate a written statement in Vienna. An
initial written response by the states involved is required
within 48 hours of the initial triggering of the mechanism.
Should the request for a meeting garner sufficient support
(12 participating States),the procedures foreseen by the
mechanism mean that approximately five to seven days will
elapse from initial invocation to convocation of the
emergency meeting.


4. (C) Department requests that USOSCE lobby OSCE
participating-State delegations to oppose the invocation of
the Berlin Mechanism in order to prevent Serbia and Russia
from obtaining the support of the twelve OSCE participating
States necessary for the convacation of an emergency session
under the mechanism. We recommend against entering into a
detailed, point-by-point disputation on which principles of
the HFA are applicable. Instead, we should restate our
general points about why Kosovo's independence is necessary
for the preservation of peace and stability in Europe and
explain why the Berlin Mechanism is not the appropriate forum
for a discussion on this issue. We recommend an approach to
other delegations that emphasizes the following themes:

-- The United States and most European Union member states
intend to recognize Kosovo's independence in order to prevent
the deterioration of an unsustainable status quo and stave
off a new crisis in southeastern Europe.

-- No stone was left unturned in the quest for a negotiated
agreement, which has nevertheless proved impossible. Failure
to act would have damaging consequences for the political,
social and economic development of Kosovo and the region of
Southeast Europe and risk unraveling the hard-won
achievements of the OSCE and other international institutions
in Kosovo over the past nine years.

-- Kosovo is clearly a special case, which must be seen as
the final stage of Yugoslavia's non-consensual break-up.
Milosevic,s policies of oppression and ethnic cleansing,
UNSCR 1244 that set up a UN administration, severed Serbia,s
governance over Kosovo and envisioned a political process to
determine Kosovo,s status make Kosovo different from other
conflicts.

-- The OSCE is not the primary venue for this discussion.
The situation in Kosovo is governed by the terms of a
specific resolution of the U.N. Security Council, UNSCR 1244.
It is resolution 1244 against which we should be measuring
the events that are unfolding in Kosovo. That discussion must
take place in New York, not Vienna.

-- Serbia's desire to invoke the Berlin Mechanism after a
Kosovo DI is a political ploy designed to attack countries
that are taking action to resolve a looming crisis. Such a
disingenuous use of the Berlin Mechanism would diminish the

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OSCE. While it is appropriate for participating States to
raise issues of concern in the Permanent Council, invocation
of the Berlin Mechanism implies a much more serious
situation. Participating States should not, by the seemingly
"neutral" act of agreeing to invocation of the Berlin
Mechanism, lend implicit support to the view that Kosovo
independence constitutes a violation of the Helsinki Final
Act principles.

-- We must not forget that the current situation in Kosovo is
the consequence of the violence, ethnic cleansing and gross
violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. After that history, and almost a decade of increasing
and successful self-government, Kosovo,s return to Serbia is
not viable.

(IF RAISED)

-- For the reasons stated above, recognition of Kosovo's
independence is not a violation of the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act (HFA). We are acting to advance the
purposes of the HFA and preserve peace and security in Europe.


5. (SBU) The following talking points may be used to address
arguments that Kosovo's independence reflects an illegal
violation of Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity:

Q: IS RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE GOING TO SET A
PRECEDENT THAT WILL ENCOURAGE SEPARATISM ELSEWHERE?

-- No. The situation in Kosovo is truly sui generis and its
independence should be seen as the very last stage of the
long process of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and in
the context of Yugoslavia's violent collapse.

-- Among the factors that make it appropriate to view Kosovo
as a special case are the violent, non-consensual break-up of
Yugoslavia, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes
against civilians in Kosovo, the extended period of
international administration, and the establishment of a
UN-facilitated process designed to determine final status.

-- Perhaps most important, the situation in Kosovo is
governed by the terms of a specific resolution, UNSCR 1244,
adopted by the UN Security Council. UNSCR 1244 was intended
to help determine Kosovo,s future status through a political
process that contemplated the possibility of independence.

-- It would be irresponsible to disregard the extraordinary
circumstances that have led us to this point and cite Kosovo
as a precedent for other situations arising from very
different facts.

Q: IS RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE A VIOLATION OF UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244, WHICH EXPRESSLY AFFIRMS THE
"SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF SERBIA AND
REFLECTS AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT?

-- No. Language in 1244 on the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia referred only to the interim stage of Kosovo's
political development, and not to its final status.

-- Moreover, the basic language on territorial integrity is
set out in the preamble and not as a decision of the Security
Council that would create obligations under international
law. Nothing in that language bars independence in the
circumstances in which Kosovo now finds itself.

-- While Resolution 1244 aimed for an agreement between the
parties, it did not require one.

-- 1244 envisaged a Final Status process for Kosovo but did
not pre-determine the outcome. As we all know, that process
was taken forward by the UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari,
and culminated in his proposals for Final Status.

-- Every effort has been made to reach a mutually-agreed
solution, most recently in the Troika process. But every
such effort has failed.

-- At this point, prompt resolution of Kosovo,s status is
needed to ensure long-term stability, and to promote
Euro-Atlantic integration for Serbia, Kosovo and the entire
region.

//END POINTS//
RICE