IRAN'S UAV PROGRAM SEEKING GERMAN-ORIGIN ENGINES

S E C R E T STATE 134297

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA IR FR GM
SUBJECT: IRAN'S UAV PROGRAM SEEKING GERMAN-ORIGIN ENGINES
VIA FRENCH INTERMEDIARY (S)

REF: A. 06 STATE 19038

B. 06 STATE 78595

C. 06 STATE 190812

D. 06 BERLIN 3380

E. 07 STATE 21966

F. 07 BERLIN 1312

G. STATE 50301

H. BERLIN 631

I. STATE 118936

J. BERLIN 1535

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see
paragraph 5.


2. (S) We want to inform French authorities that as of
mid-November 2008, a procurement official affiliated
with Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program was
seeking German-origin engines via the French
intermediary Technical Assistance and Financial
Services SA (TAFS SA). We understand that a TAFS SA
representative named Tofighi was involved in these
negotiations. While the particular engines being
sought are not controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR),they have been used in other
countries' UAV systems (e.g., South Africa's Seeker and
Israel's Searcher). We have discussed the Iranian UAV
program previously with France and our other MTCR
Partners (Refs A & B),noting that it uses several
names, including Fan Pardazan and Ghoods Aviation (or
Aeronautics) Industries (an entity designated United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1747). We cannot
exclude the possibility that it might be using
additional aliases in order to disguise its identity
from export officials in potential supplier countries,
including France.


3. (S) Additional background for post only: We have
held previous discussions with German officials related
to efforts by Iran's UAV program to acquire Limbach
L550E engines via middlemen in the Netherlands, Taiwan
and the United Arab Emirates (Refs C & J) and we will
discuss this latest information with Germany as well.


4. (S) Objectives: We want to share this information
with French officials and urge them to investigate and
take all appropriate measures to ensure that TAFS SA is
not engaging in the export of sensitive materials to
entities of proliferation concern in Iran.


5. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy
Paris approach appropriate host government officials to
deliver talking points in paragraph 6. Talking points
can be left as a non-paper.


6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL FRANCE)

-- The United States greatly appreciates France's
leadership of and support for international efforts to
advance nonproliferation.

-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation partnership,
we would like to raise with you a matter of
proliferation concern and request your government's
assistance in investigating this activity.

-- We understand that in mid-November 2008, a foreign
commercial manager for Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) program expressed interest in acquiring German-
origin Limbach L550E engines from the French firm
Technical Assistance and Financial Services SA (TAFS
SA).

-- The foreign commercial manager may have been dealing
with a TAFS SA employee named Tofighi.

-- Although the Limbach L550E engine is not controlled
by the MTCR, it is suitable for use in UAVs (and is
used by South Africa's Seeker and Israel's Searcher
UAVs, for example).

-- As we have discussed with you and the other MTCR
Partners, the Iranian UAV program is known by several
names, including Ghoods Aviation (or Aeronautics)
Industries and Fan Pardazan.

-- Ghoods is designated under UN Security Council
Resolution 1747 for its affiliation with the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

-- However, we cannot exclude the possibility that
additional alternate names could be used by Iran's UAV
program to acquire these engines through TAFS SA.

-- As you are aware, Iran's UAV program employs these
various names in its procurement efforts in order to
disguise its identity from export officials in
potential supplier countries.

-- We encourage you to investigate this information and
to take all appropriate measures to ensure that French-
based firms are not acting as suppliers of sensitive
items to Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

-- We know France shares a similar strong commitment to
nonproliferation and will take the necessary steps to
prevent exports that could contribute to missile
proliferation.

-- We also plan to bring this activity to the attention
of German officials.


7. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann
with any questions or follow-up related to this case
(202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or
herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this
issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, and EUR/PRA.


8. (U) A Word version file of this document will be
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE