U.S. RESPONSE TO FRENCH GLOBAL INF PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134228 GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 TAGS: PARM KACT JCIC START INF RS US FR SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE TO FRENCH GLOBAL INF PROPOSAL REF: A. P3 CONSULTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT IN PARIS (PARIS 002134) ¶B. RUSSIA PREVIEWS PROPOSED GLOBAL INF TREATY (STATE 012526) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an Action Cable for Embassy Paris, see paragraph 5. ¶2. (C) Background: During a P-3 meeting in Paris on November 7, 2008 (Ref A),the French provided Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, John Rood, a draft French proposal to globalize the INF Treaty entitled "Basic Elements of a Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate Range Ground-to-Ground Missiles" (Unofficial translation in paragraph 7). The INF Treaty, formally known as the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, entered into force on June 1, 1988, and is of indefinite duration. The INF Treaty obligates the United States and the USSR successor states to eliminate all their ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and not to produce, flight test or launch such missiles. ¶3. (C) On February 12, 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov presented a similar proposal to Globalize the INF Treaty to the Conference on Disarmament during a speech to the CD in Geneva (Ref B). The French proposal has two options for expanding the scope of INF prohibited missiles to include those with a range in excess of 150 km or 300 km (as opposed to INF minimum range of 500 km). While the U.S. supported in principle the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles of INF ranges, the U.S. was not convinced that a global treaty was the best way to address the issue. The points in paragraph 5, below, provide the U.S. analysis of the French INF proposal and are consistent with the U.S. response to the Russian proposal. The points also note U.S. objections to the French proposal to include missiles with a range between 150/300-500 km. ¶4. (U) On December 5, 2008, French President Sarkozy, in his role as the President of the European Union (EU), provided to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, a memorandum on the EU's views on disarmament. Sarkozy's memo contained, inter alia, a recommendation to "start ... consultations on a treaty banning short and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles." The memo did not provide any clarifying detail on the proposal. ¶5. (U) Action Request: Embassy Paris should provide the points in paragraph 6 below, to an appropriate host government official. Embassy is requested to confirm delivery of the points, the name and office of the official to whom they were delivered, the date of delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that time. ¶6. (C/REL FRANCE) Begin points: - The United States has reviewed the French proposal to globalize the INF Treaty, entitled "Basic Elements of a Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate Range Ground-to-Ground Missiles" provided on November 7, 2008, in Paris. - The United States recognizes that France has made a serious proposal and is willing to meet bilaterally to discuss the proposal. We note that your proposal expands upon a similar proposal made by the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on February 12, 2008, in that it would lead to the eventual elimination of entire classes of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles under the range of 5500 km. - The United States agrees that the growing proliferation of these missiles is a concern that should be recognized and dealt with by the international community and we welcome the fact that other countries share this concern. However, we have serious reservations about this, and similar proposals, well-intentioned though they may be, to negotiate a multilateral arms control treaty under the auspices of the CD. - We do not believe that a one-size-fits-all treaty is a practical response to this issue. INF-range missiles are inextricably interwoven into complex regional situations. To successfully eliminate these missiles, the specifics of these regional dynamics must be understood and addressed within the context of those specific situations. - We are concerned that such a proposed treaty would inevitably become mired in CD politics, and thus risk replacing concerted and directed international non-proliferation efforts with political inaction and gridlock. - This has been the lesson of three United Nations missile panels, each of which has underscored the inability of the international community to reach consensus on developing a universal approach to the missile issue. Moreover, we believe the three UN missile panels have shown that such approaches would divert attention and resources from successful and ongoing efforts to address missile proliferation that have yielded successes and produced results. - The United States is also concerned that France intends to lower the range of missiles subject to elimination to those with a range below 500 km. The United States and many of its allies have missile systems of those ranges and their prohibition could raise U.S. national security concerns and those of our allies. - The United States recognizes the significant dangers posed to regional stability and international peace and security through missile proliferation and supports, in principle, the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles of INF ranges, i.e., with ranges between 500 and 5500 km; however, the United States is not convinced that a global treaty is the best way to address the issue. We welcome the opportunity in that context to continue our work with the French Republic to address the threat posed by the proliferation of ground-launched missiles of INF-range. ¶7. (C) Begin text of the French proposal to globalize the INF Treaty, as received in English only. Basic Elements of a Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate Range Ground-to-Ground Missiles I - RATIONALE - The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles with increasing range constitutes a growing threat to global and regional security. Increasing missile tests over the last few years in the Middle East and Asia, together with missile development programs within a growing number of countries, point to the need for accelerated non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in this area, in the interests of promoting regional and international stability and reducing the availability of delivery systems capable of delivering WMD. - The aggravation of missile proliferation, in particular with short- and intermediate-range, requires from the international community to come up with a collective and normative response. - There is however a lack of a multilateral legally-binding regime to back up non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the missile field. -- The MTCR acts as a consultative and coordinating mechanism on export control policies and mechanisms; -- The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC),which promotes restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles (including, where possible, reduction of national holdings) and introduces annual declarations and pre-launch notifications, serves essentially as a transparency- and confidence-building measure. -- A few bilateral agreements do exist (the INF, START Treaties between the United States and Russia),but they do not provide an appropriate basis for multilateral action. - Therefore, we propose that a multilateral treaty on elimination of short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles be elaborated and concluded, with the double objective of strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, by addressing missile proliferation, and contributing to efforts in the field of disarmament. This Treaty would contribute to eliminating existing lacunas in international non-proliferation and disarmament regime regarding missiles, complementing efforts within existing international instruments in that field (HCOC, MTCR),and strengthening general and regional security. In particular, elimination of short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles would represent a net increase in security at the regional level, as most of the missiles that the Treaty would address (in particular if it covers missiles with a range capability in excess of 150 km) are essentially regional in application. II - SCOPE OF THE TREATY - General obligations Such an international Treaty could comprise the following basic elements: -- the obligation for the Parties, upon entry into force of the Treaty, not to manufacture, develop and deploy short- and intermediate-range missiles or their stages and launchers; -- the obligation for the Parties to eliminate, under a phased time frame, all their short- and intermediate-range missiles, launchers thereof and associated supporting facilities and equipment. - Definitions of types of short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles 1) General definition -- The Treaty would cover ballistic and cruise ground-to-ground (i.e. sea-launched missiles should be excluded) missiles, with any kind of payload. For purposes of the Treaty, the terms "ballistic missile", " cruise missile" and "ground-to-ground" missiles should be defined. -- Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should be excluded from the scope of the Treaty; -- Range capability: --- For the long range: 5500 km would be coherent with NATO classification. No strategic or technical reason justifying a different range has yet been identified. --- For the short range, two options would be possible: -------------- 150 Km, consistent with NATO SRBM definition; it would allow to address missiles which are used in regional conflicts but not controlled under MTCR; -------------- 300 Km, consistent with MTCR definition. 2) Declaration mechanism To guaranty a certain flexibility of application, these general definitions could be associated with a declaration mechanism: -- Each Party would, by ratifying the Treaty, designate its existing national types of short- and intermediate-range missiles covered by the Treaty. -- An actualized declaration could then be submitted annually by each Party. - Elimination procedures A phased approach could apply to elimination procedures: each State Party to the Treaty should eliminate all its short- and intermediate-range missiles, launchers thereof and associated supporting facilities and equipment, in a specified time-period depending from the range, for ex: -- IRBMs (3000 - 5500 Km) would be immediately eliminated; -- MRBMs (1000 - 3000 Km) would be eliminated within a mid-term period (for ex 10 years); -- SRBMs (150/300 - 1000 Km) would be eliminated within a specific time frame, defined by each State Party but not beyond an agreed deadline. - Compliance and exchange of information related to the obligations The Treaty would rely on a voluntary information and transparency basis (initial and annual declarations). - Other provisions -- A permanent body could be established (an informal conference-based structure without fixed secretariat - as currently used by the NPT - a formal treaty-based international institution). -- Duration of the Treaty and withdrawal: The Treaty would be of unlimited duration. It could introduce provisions regarding withdrawal. -- Entry into force: it would require the ratification of a determined number of countries most active in the field (all states which have claimed to have performed nuclear tests / only the P5 / other) III - METHOD - Consultations -- circulation of the proposed Treaty for study by UK and then in P3; -- consultations with the other members of the P5; -- circulation within EU, in view of its possible endorsement; -- presentation to the Member States of the Conference on Disarmament (possibly by the EU); -- The EU could propose a resolution to the UNGA, in order to call for the launching of negotiations on the Treaty. - Fora to be negotiated The CD would be the most logical negotiating body, as it is the single multilateral forum the international community has at its disposal for global negotiations in the field of disarmament. There are UN bodies dealing with outer space but their mandates are not entirely pertinent. The UN First Committee could be a useful vehicle but is not in itself a negotiating body. Another option would be a special body set up to deal with the Treaty. Existing bodies have however the advantage of established legitimacy and membership, so avoiding some of the procedural difficulties of establishing new bodies, and avoiding to weaken existing bodies such as CD. End text. RICE NNNN End Cable Text