SUBJECT: SUDAN - SUPPORT FOR JOINT INTEGRATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 001335 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU SUBJECT: SUBJECT: SUDAN - SUPPORT FOR JOINT INTEGRATED UNITS Classified By: Raja Seshadri ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 6. ¶2. (U) Sudan,s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),signed on January 9, 2005, calls for the formation of Joint-Integrated Units (JIUs) comprised of forces from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People,s Liberation Army (SPLA). These units, which are an important aspect of CPA implementation, are to be a symbol of national unity during the Interim Period of the CPA (the six-year span between the signing of the peace agreement and the 2011 referendum on Southern secession) and will become the locus of the new national army if unity is confirmed. ¶3. The Security Council, in its resolutions on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),has also repeatedly called for the establishment of the JIUs, as part of CPA implementation. The Council,s most recent extension of UNMIS, mandate, Resolution 1784, specifically &urges donors to offer support, via UNMIS, to enable the full establishment of JIUs as soon as possible,8 in operational paragraph nine. This resolution passed unanimously on 31 October 2007 and therefore included the support of friends of Sudan, such as China, Russia, and Qatar. ¶4. (C) Initially following the signing of the CPA in 2005, United Kingdom and Norway, with assistance from the Netherlands and other countries provided military advisors to engage in assisting the parties with the JIU formation process, through the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT). Shortly after the inception of the IMAT, security services in Khartoum raided the IMAT offices and harassed the officers, leading to the shutdown of the IMAT and withdrawal of its personnel. ¶5. (U) Presently, the formation, training and deployment of JIUs remains significantly delayed thus marring CPA implementation. According to the CPA, the force of 39,000 JIU personnel is to be deployed by January 9, 2008 throughout Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Khartoum. Despite the fact that 80% of the SAF and SPLA forces designated for the proposed JIUs have been mobilized, their training, equipping, and funding remain significantly behind schedule. Even in JIU locations where SAF and SPLA personnel are deployed together, there are almost no integration activities taking place. One of the major challenges the JIUs face is integrating forces of such disparate capacity ) the professional, well-equipped SAF with the ill-provisioned, mostly illiterate SPLA guerrilla force. ¶6. (U) To deal with the delay in operationalizing the JIU, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has created a JIU support cell comprised of Khartoum Defense Attaches (DATTs) and poloffs from those missions without DATTs, as well as UNMIS staff. The support cell members acknowledge that full JIU deployment will not happen by January 9, but they will assess short and long term assistance needs to ensure meaningful training and deployment of the JIUs occur as quickly as possible. UNMIS is currently developing a funding and equipment depository for donor donations. The JIU support cell reports that there is an immediate need for JIU air transportation, vehicles, communications equipment, tents, and medical equipment. ¶7. (SBU) Recent meetings and a preliminary agreement between Khartoum,s National Congress Party (NCP) and the South,s Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to accelerate JIU deployments may provide donor nations with a window of opportunity re-engage these two parties. We understand that UNMIS would like the USG and UK to take a leadership role in the JIU support cell. The United States continues to be legally restricted from providing direct assistance to the JIUs because of restrictions on providing assistance to the Government of Sudan. ¶8. ACTION COPENHAGEN, LONDON, THE HAGUE, OSLO, OTTAWA, ROME, STOCKHOLM, USEU BRUSSELS: Drawing from the background and talking points below, posts are requested to engage with appropriate level host country counterparts and encourage their government to support to JIUs in Sudan through UNMIS, newly established JIU support cell. Posts are requested to slug responses to AF/SPG by January 10, 2008. Points of contact on this issue are AF/SPG Pamela Fierst and Raja Seshadri. ¶9. Begin Points: -- The United States recognizes the importance of fully trained, equipped, and deployed Joint Integrated Units to implementation of the CPA and the future security of Sudan. -- We understand the UN has established a JIU Support Cell in Khartoum to study ways the international community can support the JIUs. -- We are interested in learning whether donor nations previously involved in JIU support, whether bilaterally or through IMAT, are interested in reinvigorating these efforts. -- The United States currently faces significant legal restrictions to providing assistance directly to Joint Integrated Units. --- We understand that there is an immediate requirement for transport (especially airlift support),non-lethal equipment (vehicles, communication equipment, tents and medical equipment) and training (Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Military Advisors) for the JIUs. -- We recognize that support to the JIU support cell might be challenging given Khartoum,s historic opposition to this type of support, but given the recent agreement between the NCP and SPLM to accelerate JIU deployment and the leadership of UNMIS to form a support cell, this may be a moment of opportunity to constructively re-engage. --The Security Council in Resolution 1784 also specifically &urges donors to offer support, via UNMIS, to enable the full establishment of JIUs as soon as possible.8 This resolution passed unanimously and therefore reflects the will of countries such as China and Russia as well as others, including donors. -- Facilitating the SPLA elements integration with better trained SAF elements will be one significant aspect of this effort. End Points. RICE