TALKING POINTS ON IRAN: ELECTIONS, THIRD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 013345

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: IR KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC IAEA
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON IRAN: ELECTIONS, THIRD
SANCTIONS RESOLUTION


Classified By: NEA Acting A/S Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Over the next two months, a number of key events
related to Iran will take place: the UN Security Council is
expected to adopt a third Chapter VII sanctions resolution on
Iran; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director
General ElBaradei will issue a late February report on Iran
which the IAEA Board of Governors will discuss at its March
3-7 meeting; and Iran will hold parliamentary elections on
March 14. Guidance below (please see paragraph five) urges
posts to forbear extensive public comment on the elections to
avoid making U.S. policy the story in the election. We want
to maintain focus on the internal Iranian debate about
economic problems and corruption. This approach is
consistent with our past policy of avoiding commentary (in
the run-up to elections) that might be manipulated internally
by the regime to go after critics.


2. (SBU) The timing of the effort to pass a third UNSCR and
the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, however, may well raise
questions about whether the U.S. and the P5 1 are indirectly
attempting to influence the outcome of the elections, by
pressuring the regime. Intense media attention surrounding
Iran's nuclear impasse will likely seek to draw connections
between the nuclear issues and internal Iranian politics. In
using the guidance below, posts should refrain from
juxtaposing the nuclear issues with the parliamentary
elections. This cable provides background on these events
and talking points posts may use in addressing these issues
with host governments and the press.

IRAN'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: BACKGROUND
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3. (C) On March 14, Iranians will go to the polls to elect
290 members of parliament. Iran's elections are
fundamentally flawed, in part because they include a vetting
process that prevents large numbers of candidates from
running because of their ideological preferences. Iran's
Ministry of Interior (which manages its Election Commission)
has initially disqualified 40 percent of registered
candidates, including large numbers of reformists. Iran's
Council of Guardians, a 12-person body appointed by Iran's
Supreme Leader and parliament, will announce the final list
of approved candidates on March 5.


4. (C) Although Iran's elections cannot be considered free,
fair, or transparent, U.S. statements about the election
process prior to March 14 would likely distract attention
from serious and legitimate grievances the Iranian people
have with the current government's handling of the economy,
corruption, and nuclear policy. We therefore intend to issue
a statement and prepare an op-ed condemning flaws in the
election process that will be released after election day.
Department discourages posts from commenting publicly on the
elections prior to March 14.

IRAN'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: TALKING POINTS
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5. (U) If asked, posts may use the following talking points
with the media:

-- The United States encourages governments around the world
to hold free, fair, and transparent elections. We call on
Iran to meet these international standards and respect the
will of the people.

-- If pressed: We encourage Iran to allow its people to
choose the candidates they want for their elections. While
the final list of candidates will not be made public until
shortly before the elections, Iranian media report large
numbers of candidates will be disqualified based on ideology.
Iran's elections cannot be considered free and fair if the
Guardians Council limits who Iranians can freely vote for by
vetting all candidates before they are placed on a ballot.


6. (U) If asked, posts may use the following talking points
with counterparts:

STATE 00013345 002 OF 003


-- The United States will minimize comment on the elections
prior to March 14. U.S. bilateral comment tends to distract
from the main issues of the elections: Iran's poor economy
and Ahmadi-Nejad's mismanagement of Iran's domestic and
foreign policies.

-- We do, however, intend to issue a strong statement after
the election, and want to coordinate our post-election
message with the EU and key allies.

-- What does (country) plan to do in advance of/after the
elections? How can we support internal Iranian calls for
more electoral transparency?


7. (C) USEU, select European posts, and the U.S. Mission to
the OSCE will be contacted separately about coordinating our
response to and activities surrounding Iran's elections.

THIRD UNSCR ON IRAN: BACKGROUND
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8. (C) P5 1 Foreign Ministers agreed to elements of a new
UNSC resolution on Iran on January 22 in Berlin. The EU3
(UK, France, Germany) Missions in New York convened a meeting
with the full Council on January 25 to share the elements and
begin discussions. We seek quick adoption of the resolution
by the full Council. While we cannot discuss the details of
the elements, as they are just now being reviewed and
considered by the full Council, they follow the P5 1 agreed
approach of incrementally increasing the severity and
expanding upon existing sanctions imposed on Iran in UNSCRs
1737 (December 2006) and 1747 (March 2007). The draft also
introduces a few new elements. The resolution signals to
Tehran that the international community is united in
preventing it from acquiring the technology to build a
nuclear weapon.

THIRD UNSCR ON IRAN: TALKING POINTS
--------------


9. (U) Posts may use the following talking points when
discussing the draft UNSCR:

-- On January 22, the P5 1 Foreign Ministers met in Berlin
and reached agreement on the elements of a new UNSC
resolution on Iran. The agreement demonstrates yet again
that there is international solidarity behind the proposition
that Iran can not be allowed to have the technologies that
can lead to the development of a nuclear weapon.

-- The P5 1 agreed in Berlin that the first priority is to
engage with the other ten members of the UN Security Council.
As such, the elements were shared with all members of the UN
Security Council January 25 in New York; the EU3 subsequently
shared the full resolution text with the full Council on
February 1.

-- The Council is now engaged in consultations and we expect
the resolution within the next couple of weeks.

-- The resolution follows the P5 1 agreed approach of
incrementally increasing the severity and expanding upon
existing sanctions. This resolution incrementally builds
upon sanctions imposed on Iran in UNSCRS 1737 (December 2006)
and 1747 (March 2007) and introduces a few new measures.

-- While we cannot comment on specific elements of the draft
resolution, you should be aware that it will likely contain
financial measures similar to, but an expansion of, those
adopted in past resolutions. For instance, it expands the
list of entities and individuals subject to the asset freeze.
Iran's financial activities in support of proliferation are
well known and we are committed to taking steps that will
impede them.

-- It is critical that the Council continue to stand united
on this issue and move to quickly adopt this new resolution.
Further delay by the Council sends the wrong message to Iran
and risks undermining the credibility of international
efforts towards a diplomatic solution, as well as the
credibility of the Council on this critical issue.

-- The new resolution is part of our dual track strategy to
clarify to Iran's leaders the consequences of its continued
noncompliance, while also keeping open the door to direct
negotiations. We hope the adoption of the third UNSC

STATE 00013345 003 OF 003


sanctions resolution, with further sanctions to persuade
Iran, will demonstrate to Iran that the UNSC is determined
that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations,
specifically those imposed by the Council.

-- The June 2006 P5 1 offer of significant incentives to Iran
still stands, including the historic offer of direct U.S.
talks anywhere, anytime, on any issue once Iran meets its
UNSC obligation to suspend. We reiterate our call for Iran
to comply with its UNSC obligations by suspending all of its
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, especially
enrichment, and cooperating fully with the IAEA.

-- We ask you to publicly express support for quick action by
the Council.

-- If pressed on argument for delay due to IAEA Director
General ElBaradei's report:

-- We want the IAEA process to succeed. If we delay until
the DG's report is released, we will increase the likelihood
Iran will bide its time on full disclosure to the IAEA.
Additionally, the IAEA's Work Plan with Iran is about
concerns about Iran,s past activities. The action on a new
UNSCR is driven by concerns about Iran's current activities
and Iran's failure to comply with UNSC requirement to suspend
its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, including
enrichment.

-- Iran has ignored all previous deadlines for completing the
Work Plan. If we delay the adoption of this resolution
further, we risk signaling to Tehran that it can avoid
indefinitely further sanctions by making slow, incremental
"progress" with the IAEA, vice full and immediate disclosure
and verification. This would serve no one,s interests
especially the IAEA's. The credibility of the NPT, the IAEA,
and the safeguards system is also very much at stake.


10. (U) There will be more detailed guidance and talking
points forthcoming as the UNSCR progresses through the full
Council in New York, as well as IAEA BOG guidance.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
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11. (SBU) Additional talking points on Iran policy may be
found at the NEA/IR sensitive but unclassified Intellipedia
site, https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Portal:Iran. Questions
on nuclear policy and the UNSCR can be directed to ISN/RA
Kurt Kessler at 202-647-4796 or IO/T Heather Von Behren at
202-647-2753. Questions on Iran's elections may be directed
to DRL/NESCA Kate Lurie at 202-647-4753 or NEA/IR Carolyn
Coberly at 202-647-2513.


12. Minimize considered.
RICE