ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S DECEMBER 8 MEETING

S E C R E T STATE 131277 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S DECEMBER 8 MEETING WITH TURKISH UNDERSECRETARY APAKAN Classified By: EUR A/S FRIED FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: EUR Assistant Secretary Fried met December 8, 2008 with Turkish Undersecretary Apakan and a delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a two-hour discussion on European issues as part of the Shared Vision strategic dialogue. They covered U.S.-Turkish cooperation and shared interests and policies in the European Union, NATO, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. (The Turkish delegation also held a bilateral meeting and working lunch with Under Secretary Burns and a meeting on energy, which will be reported septel.) U/S Apakan emphasized his interest in working closely with the new U.S. administration, and A/S Fried undertook to advise the new team on the strategic importance of the U.S.-Turkey relationship. End summary. -------------- INTRODUCTIONS -------------- ¶2. (S) A/S Fried welcomed U/S Apakan and the Turkish delegation, emphasizing the importance of our exchange with Turkey on crucial issues. Turkey is a major player in our foreign policy priorities, and the United States looks to Turkey for collaboration, wisdom, and advice. Though the last several years have not always been easy, Turkey and the United States have ended up in a place of strength and partnership. A/S Fried recognized the challenges to our bilateral relationship in the immediate wake of the October 2007 House Foreign Affairs Committee vote on H.Res. 106, the "Armenian genocide" resolution. Avoiding the floor vote was the right thing to do for American interests, and he was pleased that the bilateral relationship had since improved. He was particularly pleased with the success of U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the fight against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorism. The United States and Turkey work together closely in NATO and will continue to work together in the years ahead. ¶3. (S) Apakan thanked A/S Fried and his team for their contributions to the bilateral relationship. He agreed that ties had been strained in the past, but they had improved because of the good working relationships between our embassies and our offices. He had been pleased to welcome Jim Jeffrey as the new U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and was sure our close cooperation would continue. Turkey would like to continue to expand this partnership with the new administration on the basis of the Shared Vision document. The United States should know that Turkey is a reliable partner that places importance on its relationship with the West -- the United States, NATO, and the European Union. Turkey and the United States have a shared vision and a shared responsibility for defense and security in the region, including Iraq, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. Countering terrorism has been a major issue, and Turkey would like to expand its cooperation in this area. Turkey also looks forward to cooperating with the United States and the international community in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and will send a delegation to Washington December 12 for UNSC consultations. Energy is also an issue on which Turkey and the United States are strategic partners. Turkey wants to work closely with the United States to ensure a strategy that balances global and regional energy needs. Turkey also understands its responsibilities as a G-20 country and wants to cooperate on economic matters. Though there may be occasional differences of interpretation and approach, the United States and Turkey share the same goals of peace and stability. Apakan repeated that he would like this close cooperation to continue with the new administration on the basis of a shared philosophy of friendship, solidarity, and partnership. -------------- EUROPEAN UNION AND REFORMS -------------- ¶4. (S) A/S Fried recognized as critical Turkey's path to deepening its democracy and the evolution of its secular democracy over the last generation as he opened a discussion of Turkey's European Union accession. Turkey's being a democracy lent great weight to our partnership. Apakan stressed that Turkey has always been oriented to the West and that the EU accession is an important element of Turkey's transformation to a modern society. Turkey may be involved in the Middle East, but Apakan said Turkey has no other option than the EU and the United States. Turkey will not identify with Russia or Iran, so its objective remains the EU. ¶5. (S) Apakan said Turkey wants to move more quickly on its accession but internal politics with some EU members, such as France, are hindering Turkey's progress. Other countries -- like Sweden, Italy, the Czech Republic, United Kingdom, and Finland -- are doing their best to be openly supportive of Turkey's accession. Turkey is working with the Czech Republic in advance of it taking the EU presidency in January ¶2009. Apakan saw the EU process not just as opening and closing chapter, but as a "way of life." While Apakan acknowledged Turkey must do more on reforms, including human rights, the Europeans should not allow the process to be left "in limbo." The Europeans should be mindful of Turkish public opinion and how it is negatively affected by European attitudes and actions, including not allowing the word "accession" to be used in EU documents or freezing certain chapters. France's insistence on dropping the word "accession" appeared to Apakan to be "antidiplomacy" because France blocks Turkey in the EU, yet wants to work with Turkey in the Middle East. Turkey appreciates U.S. support for Turkey's EU membership. ¶6. (S) A/S Fried agreed that internal politics in Europe, and Europe's own identity problems were creating disadvantages for Turkey. The United States has supported Turkey's membership and insisted on no backward movement. Fried encouraged Turkey to prepare now for future changes in the European political climate. The more Turkey does to accelerate its reforms, the more it can undercut Europe's existential concerns. Turkey's record of reform in 2003 was impressive. A second wave of reforms now, including on the status of the Ecumenical Patriarch and freedom of expression, would force Europeans to look again and overcome their hesitation. Movement on the Cyprus negotiations would also help Turkey's prospects for EU membership. Turkey should think about the timing of its efforts, and can work with its advocates in the EU like the UK or people like EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn and EU Council Secretariat Director General Robert Cooper to determine when best to push its candidacy. DAS Bryza also noted that if Europe were to close its door to Turkey, it would send the wrong signal to Europe's Muslim population. Europe should focus on its big, strategic interests. ¶7. (S) Apakan said that Europe had to prepare itself for eventual Turkish membership. However, the Turks are also becoming discouraged because of the difficulty in movement on the acquis chapters. Berk pointed out that eight chapters are frozen because of the Cyprus issue, and France has suspended four Chapters (those that imply Turkish membership in the EU, and Cyprus is blocking the energy Chapter). Turkey wants to see the energy chapter opened and sees only one state (Cyprus) blocking progress on it. Deputy U/S Berk observed that the EU commission is often encouraging and motivating other countries, but its rhetoric is the reverse with Turkey. It is serving to diminish the Turkish public's excitement about the EU, which makes it more difficult for the Turkish government to use the EU process as an incentive to implement difficult and costly reforms. Turkey is concerned there may be no chapters opened during the Swedish presidency of the EU in 2009. DAS Bryza expressed support for the opening the energy chapter, saying that we had to find a way to do so. ¶8. (S) Apakan stressed the importance of Europe and the Mediterranean countries as a center of political and economic gravity in the region. Turkey places great importance on the transatlantic alliance and the need for a strong NATO. When there is a strong NATO, there is a strong EU. EU partners need to think strategically about the realities of the 21st century. Turkey sees the UK as thinking strategically but believes other EU countries need to think more broadly. A/S Fried agreed on the importance of NATO, noting the increase in U.S. support for the EU has been predicated on a strong NATO. -------------- CSCP -------------- ¶9. (S) Apakan briefed on the expert-level meetings Turkey held on the margins of the OSCE meeting in Helsinki with Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as part of its Caucasus Security and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). Deputy U/S Cevikoz represented Turkey in the meeting, which Apakan characterized as useful. The participants worked on a paper to develop CSCP modalities and implementation. Georgia had expressed some initial hesitations about CSCP that appear to be resolved. Turkey expects to hold another meeting at the deputy under secretary level and is pleased that there has been some "modest" progress. Turkey is telling Russia and the other participants that, at the right time, it would like the United States and the EU to participate as observers. A/S Fried asked when that might be and whether Russia had objected. Apakan did not give a specific timeframe, explaining that it may be six weeks before the group meets again. He clarified that the involvement of third parties is specifically mentioned in the current draft paper and Russia had not raised concerns about that to date. Fried and Bryza indicated U.S. support for CSCP, after initial confusion when the proposal was broached to Russia and Georgia without consultation with the United States. -------------- NAGORNO-KARABAKH -------------- ¶10. (S) Turkey has heard from the Azeri and Armenian foreign ministers, as well as Azeri President Aliyev, that the Azeri-Armenian discussions about Nagorno-Karabakh have been going well and that there is a good chance they will find a settlement. DAS Bryza agreed that progress had been good, though noted it may take more time than everyone would like to get to a final agreement. He reviewed that the Azeri-Armenian talks had been improving steadily since June 6, particularly given the better dynamics between Armenian President Sargsian and Aliyev. Sargsian is more of a risk taker and a problem solver who has been willing to tackle this process head on, and Aliyev has recognized and welcomed this engagement. During the November 2, 2008, meetings in Moscow, both sides said they were ready and instructed their foreign ministers to finalize a deal. They are now thinking through the modalities of the corridor connecting the two sides. It is positive that both sides have started to prepare their publics for a settlement and the trade offs, but bad journalism continues to hinder the presidents. It looks like mid-2009 is the likely timeframe for an agreement, though everyone would like one as soon as possible. Turkey could be helpful in pushing Aliyev to finalize the agreement. ¶11. (S) Apakan said Turkey had been speaking to Aliyev, who appreciated Sargsian's constructive attitude and has a positive image of Sargsian. Turkey sees the good dynamics between the two leaders as a rare opportunity that needs to be realized and has encouraged acceleration of the negotiations. Turkey does not see a linkage between the Azeri-Armenian track and the Turkish-Armenian track, but acknowledges that progress between Turkey and Armenia could have a positive effect on the Azeri-Armenian talks. He repeated there was no link and said Turkey was working on each track on its own merits. -------------- GEORGIA -------------- ¶12. (S) A/S Fried turned to the subject of Georgia and said the U.S. strategic assessment is that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are lost to Tbilisi for a long time. Though the regions may never receive full independence, Tbilisi will not govern them. The Georgians need to think about the long-term, not the short-term, on territorial integrity, and the United States has told Saakashvili this bluntly. The good news is that Russia failed to overthrow the Georgian government, and Georgia did not lose much. Russia's recognition of the regions may have been a blow, but Russia did not gain much and was only joined by Nicaragua and Hamas. The strategy now for Georgia is to help it survive, recover, and consolidate as an independent nation even though it has been deprived of its territories. In principle, Russia cannot be a barrier for Georgia's accession to NATO. The United States was satisfied with the NATO ministerial because it left the door open for Georgia, but in reality, Georgia is years away from qualifyi ng for NATO membership. ¶13. (S) A/S Fried reiterated that being provoked was not sufficient cause for foolishness, but now it is important to focus on strengthening Georgian democracy and institutions. It is not necessary to hurry Georgia's NATO aspirations, but we can all help Georgia do the work required to qualify for membership. The situation on the ground is not encouraging, which A/S Fried saw first hand when he visited South Ossetia several weeks ago. Ambassador Tefft has also reported shootings, attacks on police, mining the border, and Russian violations of Georgia's maritime boundaries. Georgia must live with Russia's illegal recognition, and the international community must use the Geneva process to consolidate Georgia and stabilize the situation on the ground. A/S Fried has urged Georgia to remain calm and patient and to focus on rebuilding the country, not being sucked into a war it cannot win. Georgia needs enough confidence and support from the international community so it does not feel panicked and abandoned, but not so much that it is emboldened. In the long run, Georgia needs to have strong institutions, not just one charismatic leader. Georgian democracy will benefit from a healthy opposition, and Georgia may need two peaceful changes of government before it is ready for NATO. ¶14. (S) Apakan said Turkey views Georgia similarly and has repeatedly stressed respect for Georgia's territorial integrity, which is a matter of principle for Turkey. Turkey looks to the Georgians as cousins so will maintain good ties and will assist Georgia's recovery. Turkey had asked to be involved in the Geneva process, but will support that process even though it has not been invited. Apakan said the CSCP should reinforce the efforts of the Geneva process, helping with political reconciliation in the region. Apakan said Turkey would like to consult more frequently and closely with the United States on Georgia and the Caucasus more broadly. A/S Fried advised that we all continue to watch the situation in Georgia closely, and he and DAS Bryza welcomed the opportunity to consult more closely on the Caucasus. Bryza also stressed that the United States was supportive of the CSCP and looked forward to working with Turkey on these issues. ¶15. (U) Participants: United States EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried EUR DAS Matthew Bryza EUR/SE Director Kathleen Fitzpatrick EUR/SE Deputy Bridget Brink EUR/SE Turkey Desk Officer Danielle Garbe (notetaker) Turkey Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan Ambassador to the U.S. Nabi Sensoy Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Affairs Haydar Berk Director General for Policy Planning Dicle Kopuz Deputy Director General for the Americas Ersin Ercin Deputy Director General for the Middle East Omer Onhon Deputy Chief of Mission Ali Murat Ersoy Special Assistant to the Undersecretary Deniz Eke First Counselor Ihsan Kiziltan (notetaker) RICE