UNCLAS STATE 013105

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
TOKYO FOR AYANNA HOBBS
NSC FOR MARY ALICE HAYWARD AND PAUL BROWN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The first G-8 Global Partnership
Working Group meeting (GPWG) of the Japanese G-8
Presidency, which took place on January 30, 2008
in Tokyo, focused on expanding the geographic scope
of GP activities and developing benchmarks to ensure
that current pledges for GP projects in Russia and
the former Soviet Union (FSU) are met by 2012.
Except for Russia, all G-8 nations were supportive
of GP geographic expansion, with some GP nations -
such as Germany ) noting its need to obtain
legislative authority to enable it to spend GP money
outside Russia and other FSU nations. Russia
strenuously objected to GP expansion, citing its
strong belief that GP expansion will come at the
expense of current GP commitments in Russia. Japan
continued to stress the importance of discussing
GP expansion and also agreed to address the
critical issue of new GP donor outreach during
upcoming sessions. Japan also accepted the U.S.
offer of a threat briefing in March on specific
areas of concern, while also agreeing to address
implementation issues in Russia through a working
paper outlining benchmarks for 2008-2012 and
cataloguing specific implementation issues to spur
project completion. END SUMMARY.

-------------- ---
JAPAN PLANS TO LEND STRONG SUPPORT FOR DECLARING
GP EXPANDED AT THE 2008 G-8 SUMMIT IN HOKKAIDO
-------------- ---


2. (SBU) In a breakfast meeting prior to the GPWG, Director
of Arms Control and Disarmament Yasanuri Morino spoke about
extensive contributions GP nations are already making to
reduce the WMD threat outside of Russia and Ukraine, the
only two formal GP recipient nations. He agreed with U.S.
GPWG representative, NSC Director for Counterproliferation
Strategy Mary Alice Hayward, stating that the GP has, in
fact,
already expanded. Morino seemed to also

support listing GP
nation contributions beyond Russia and Ukraine in the 2008
GP documents. He further agreed that expansion should be
extremely flexible and supported U.S. suggestions to reach
out to new GP donors in 2008 and provide a threat briefing
at the next GPWG. The intent of the threat briefing would
be to highlight specific global WMD threats that could be
addressed under an expanded GP, outlining, where possible,
specific projects that could reduce the threat. Finally,
Morino gave preliminary consideration to the U.S. proposal
for the G-8 to support the World Institute for Nuclear
Security (WINS), a concept developed by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative and Institute for Nuclear Materials Management
(INMM), with support from the U.S. Department of Energy
and the IAEA, for sharing nuclear security best practices,
particularly among facility operators. Morino said that
he would consider a further briefing on WINS at a later
GPWG meeting in 2008.

--------------
Canada and UK: Full Steam Ahead on Expansion
--------------


3. (SBU) Canada and the UK continue to strongly
support GP geographic expansion and eventual extension
beyond 2012. The UK already has authority to spend GP
funds beyond the FSU and partners with the U.S. to
engage and redirect former WMD personnel in Iraq and
Libya. Canada does not yet have approval from its
Treasury Board to spend GP funds outside the FSU, but
is likely to receive that authority sometime in 2008.
During a trilateral meeting with Canada and the UK prior
to the GPWG, all delegates agreed with U.S. primary
objectives for 2008, which are to: 1) Achieve concrete
Leaders, language at the Hokkaido Summit declaring the
geographic expansion of the GP; 2) Count GP contributions
to global WMD threat reduction beyond Russia and other
FSU nations in the 2008 GP Summit documents; 3) Add new
GP donors for 2008; and 4) Continue to stand firm in our
commitments to make good on current Kananaskis pledges
in Russia/FSU. In addition, Canada and the UK pressed
for final Summit language to include mention of GP
extension beyond 2012, recognizing that many nations
will need a long lead time to amend legislation, to
allow GP spending beyond Russia and the FSU.

-------------- --------------
Russian Opposition Remains Strong; Japan Stresses
GP has already Expanded in Fact
-------------- --------------


4. (U) Japan opened the GPWG meeting by outlining its
planned program of GP work for 2008,
which strongly supports two main focus areas: 1) Setting
benchmarks for completion of Kananaskis goals by 2012;
and 2) Expanding the geographic scope of the GP and
counting current financial commitments beyond Russia
and Ukraine. Prior to the January 30 GPWG, Japan began
its GPWG chairmanship by asking GP nations to list WMD
threat-reduction activities beyond Russia and Ukraine.
In response, G-8 nations and the EU highlighted WMD
threat reduction efforts beyond Russia and the FSU,
providing momentum for the G-8 to declare that the
GP has, in fact, already expanded. Many nations are
making modest contributions in the area of WMD threat
reduction outside of the FSU, with the U.S., UK, and
EU having the largest amount of activity. In FY 2007,
the U.S. committed approximately 350 million USD for
global WMD threat reduction programs plus an additional
70 million USD in support of international organizations
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
and other activities in support of international WMD
nonproliferation regimes. Japan laid out several
questions for further consideration in the run-up
to the Summit, including: 1) whether/how to invite
new donors; 2) whether emphasis should be placed on
any specific geographic region; 3) whether an expanded
GP should place priority on specific areas of work; and
4) how closely should an expanded GP be tied with other
activities, such as United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540 and other multilateral instruments.

--------------
Don,t Blame Mr. Rozhkov
--------------


5. (SBU) The first half of the meeting focused on
implementation of current GP projects. Russian
Representative Anatoliy Antonov strongly opposed
expansion, harking back to Russia,s sentiments in
the run-up to the 2007 Summit at Heiligendamm and
in sharp contrast to Russia,s more laid-back approach
toward expansion at the October 2007 GPWG in Berlin.
While giving lip service to geographic expansion,
Antonov took every opportunity to point the finger
at G-8 nations, which have fallen short on their
Kananaskis pledges for projects in Russia (Italy,
Japan and France in particular) as a reason why Russia
believes expansion is premature. Antonov outlined
specific conversations he had internally (with Rosatom
and Rosprom) about the status of current GP-funded
projects to complete nuclear submarine dismantlement
and chemical weapons destruction, and he called on G-8
nations to be honest with Russia about the reality
of their outstanding commitments so that Russia can
plan its own budget to complete this work, including
work required under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Deputy Foreign Minister Kisylak had foreshadowed this
stance in his January 24, 2008 letter to Japanese
Deputy Minister and Political Director Sasae; however,
it was clear that Japan was surprised by the
strength of Russian opposition relative to
previous bilateral meetings and milder
Russian sentiment at the October GPWG in Berlin.
In his opening remarks, Antonov also made
it clear that Russia,s GPWG representative for the
remainder of 2008 will be Oleg Roshkov (who Antonov
said reports to him). However, Antonov stressed that
the GPWG should not &blame Rozhkov8, because he will
be under very strict instructions from Moscow
(presumably to place roadblocks to GP expansion).

--------------
Russia: Show me the (rest of the) money
--------------


6. (SBU) Antonov stated that the U.S. is clearly meeting
its Kananaskis commitments, but noted that the U.S. had
already been spending 1 billion USD per year prior to
2002 and the GP was &supposed to be about new projects8.
While the U.S., Canada and Germany largely escaped
Russia,s criticism, Antonov stated that Russia has
had &no cooperation at all8 with Italy on GP projects
(NOTE: Italy has not obligated or spent most of its
1 billion Euro GP Pledge. END NOTE.) Antonov also
called Japan,s timeline for dismantling nuclear
submarines into question, stating that Japan had
dismantled only two submarines in five years.
He also asked where the EU pledge money has gone
and what France has done with its pledge. While
not citing specific issues with the UK, Antonov
also asked the UK to sit down with Russia to
discuss differences. (NOTE: the UK recently
told Russia it will not be able to conduct
previously planned chemical weapons destruction
work at Kizner, though the money set aside for
Kizner would continue to be made available for
other GP projects in Russia. END NOTE.)

--------------
Solutions, Please ) Not Problems
--------------


7. (SBU) In a partially successful effort to bring
Russia,s complaining during the first half of the
meeting to a close, U.S. Representative Hayward
called for all nations to submit a brief catalogue
of implementation problems for consideration at the
next GPWG, with an emphasis on how problems may be
resolved. Japan agreed to this action item, which
will also include asking GP nations to agree on a
list of benchmarks for 2008-2012 to ensure that
current commitments are met. On the meeting margins,
Canada and the U.S. tried to underscore with Russia
the importance of concrete solutions rather than
non-specific roadblocks and also tried to emphasize
the need for the GP to resolve implementation
issues in parallel with expansion. These arguments
appeared to fall on deaf ears.

--------------
Germany: Unlikely to Obstruct Expansion
--------------


8. (SBU) Germany disappointed the U.S. in the run-up
to Heiligendamm by showing little to no support for
immediate GP geographic expansion. However, during
the January 2008 GPWG, German representative Dietrich
Becker stated that, while Germany does not have any
immediate plans or authorities to spend GP funds
outside of Russia, it is now prepared to not object
to inclusion of new GP recipients worldwide under
a flexible GP expansion. Germany also noted the
practical benefit of GP expansion in the near-term
for nations that do not yet have authorization to
spend GP funds globally. Becker emphasized that the
legislature in Germany (and in other nations) is
already considering budgets for 2009 and 2010 and
would need to consider adding funding for projects
beyond Russia and other FSU nations as soon as
possible. USDEL notes that if nations are not
prepared to provide funding for GP activities
beyond 2012, the GP could face the possibility
of addressing its expansion in 2012 with no real
funding for global projects available until 2014
or 2015. USDEL plans to meet with Germany bilaterally
prior to the March GPWG to gain a better understanding
of what Germany is prepared to support in terms of
specific Summit deliverables on GP expansion and
extension.

--------------
Italy: Not Opposed to Expansion,
but no Additional Funds Likely
--------------


9. (SBU) Italian delegate Gianluca Alberini, new to the
GPWG this year, stated that Italy will make good on
its heretofore not expended GP pledge. He also made
it clear on the margins that Italy does not oppose the
concept of GP expansion, but that for Italy to fund GP
projects outside of Russia/FSU would mean a dilution of
Italy,s Kananaskis pledge. USDEL plans to hold
bilateral consultations with Italy in Washington
prior to the March GPWG to gain a better understanding
about the roadblocks to Italy spending its current
pledge and financing additional projects worldwide
to reduce the global WMD threat.

-------------- -
EU: New Cash to Support Expansion;
France: Supports flexibility in an expanded GP
-------------- -


10. (U) EU representative Luigi Narbone stated that
the EU is already spending funds to reduce the global
WMD threat in areas such as preventing nuclear
trafficking and strengthening export controls.
The EU is already planning beyond 2012 and is
particularly interested in utilizing new funding
under the EU stability instrument to deepen
activities in other parts of the world, including
specific focus in the area of biosafety and biosecurity.
French representative Jean-Hugue Simon-Michel stated
that new threats must be taken into account and
stressed that the GP should avoid too rigid a
framework for expansion.

--------------
New Donors: Cash cows for an expanded GP
--------------


11. (SBU) U.S. rep Hayward stated that most
previous G-8 Leaders statements on nonproliferation
prior to Heiligendamm included additional new donors
for the GP. Most nations agreed that new donors would
be critical under an expanded GP. The UK floated a
proposal where an expanded GP could include two
classes of new donors: 1) Aspiring global players
with increasing economic clout, such as Brazil,
Mexico, China and India, and 2) Sovereign Wealth
Fund nations, such as UAE, Kuwait, and Singapore.
The U.S. plans to suggest a notional list of
potential new GP donors to be invited to an
expanded session of the April GPWG meeting to
include: Spain, Saudi Arabia, India, China,
United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Morocco.

-------------- --------------
Global Partnership: Synergy with Global Initiative
-------------- --------------


12. (U) During the course of the GPWG, Germany
and Russia expressed their confusion about how
an expanded GP would differ from or complement
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(Global Initiative), which the U.S. co-chairs with
Russia and which includes all G-8 nations plus 57
others. Germany proposed merging the two initiatives,
and Russia mentioned their confusion about why GP
geographic expansion would be needed in light of the
global focus of the Global Initiative. Hayward made
it clear that, while activities financed by the GP
could be complementary to meeting key objectives of
the Global Initiative, the GP and Global Initiative
should remain separate. She went on to explain that
the added value of an expanded GP is its mechanism
for financing activities to meet key goals under

the Global Initiative ) as well as activities to
combat chemical and biological threats not
addressed under the GI.

-------------- --------------
Russia says &thanks, but no thanks8 to GP efforts
to improve biosafety and biosecurity in Russia
-------------- --------------


13. (SBU) During the course of the GPWG, several
nations mentioned the importance of funding projects
to improve biosafety and biosecurity under the GP.
Following a statement by the UK in support of
consideration for new projects in Russia, including
in the area of biosafety and biosecurity. Antonov
defiantly stated, &we have enough money for
biosafety and biosecurity ) forget about it.8
He then went on to assure the G-8 that there
are no biological weapons in the Russian Federation
and stated that these kinds of issues are serious
and under the mandate of the United Nations Security
Council. (NOTE: Despite this and other strong
statements from Russian MFA, the U.S. does have
ongoing cooperation with Russian institutes on
biosafety and biosecurity projects). This issue
again came up in the January 31 Nonproliferation
Directors Group meeting (NPDG) (septel), when
Antonov referenced that Russia had not been
admitted to the Australia Group, which may be
a major reason for his reluctance to discuss
these issues in either G-8 forum.

--------------
February GPWG Cancelled; Next steps toward an
expanded GP for March
--------------


14. (U) Japan wrapped up the GPWG by outlining
a plan of action for the next GPWG, which
representatives agreed should be on March 26
prior to the next NPDG meeting, rather than
at the end of February as previously agreed.
In advance of the March 26 GPWG, which will
include all GP nations, Japan asked G-8 participants
to: 1) Contribute suggestions for new GP donors;
2) Outline potential benchmarks for the GP to
meet Kananaskis commitments by 2012; and
3) Catalogue challenges to meeting current
commitments in Russia and Ukraine. Japan
also called upon the U.S. and other nations
to contribute threat briefings for the March
meeting.


15. (SBU) Prior to the March 26 GPWG, the U.S.
intends to encourage Japan to emphasize bilateral
solutions for the catalogue of challenges, in
order to ensure that the March GPWG is not diluted.
The U.S also intends to offer Japan the concept
of a web portal for the GP to catalogue achievements
and needs ) an idea also supported by Canada and
the UK. It will also revisit the question of a
possible WINS briefing. The U.S. will also hold
bilateral consultations with Italy, France,
Germany and Russia in the upcoming weeks to
explore ways to move ahead on stalled Kananaskis
commitments, including offering U.S. expert
assistance where appropriate. Finally, the U.S.
will prepare a threat briefing and will reach
out to other nations (as appropriate and in
consultation with Japan) for additional briefings.
For example, Australia is spending WMD threat
reduction funds in Southeast Asia and may be able
to deliver an enlightening briefing on threat in
that region.
RICE