SECOND DEMARCHE FOR CHINA REGARDING CHINA'S JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

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S E C R E T STATE 001264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, MARR, CH 
SUBJECT: SECOND DEMARCHE FOR CHINA REGARDING CHINA'S 
JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST 
 
REF: (A)07 STATE 4837 (NOTAL),(B)07 BEIJING 331, (C)07 
STATE 6192, (D)07 BEIJING 473, (E)07 BEIJING 2106, (F)07 
BEIJING 3462, (G)07 TOKYO 2282, (H)SECDEFWASH 091500Z NOV 
07, (I)SECDEFWASH 091518Z NOV 07, (J)SECDEFWASH 061700Z 
DEC 07 
 
CLASSIFIED BY ACTING U/S FOR ARMS CONTROL AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (T) JOHN C. ROOD, REASONS, 1.4 (B) 
AND (D). 
 

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regarding many of the questions first raised on January

15, 2007. During military-to-military exchanges with

senior People's Liberation Army officials last spring,

China was only slightly more forthcoming. (REFTELs E and

F)



In these military-to-military exchanges, Chinese military

officials termed the event a "scientific experiment" and

dismissed as overblown concerns about the leftover debris

field. (REFTEL G) During a May 11, 2007, meeting with

Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Guo

Boxiong, Commander of the United States Pacific Command

(PACOM) Admiral Timothy Keating strongly challenged this

explanation. Admiral Keating pointed out that the test

had raised concern in many countries and was a "confusing"

signal, inconsistent with China's stated interest in the

peaceful use of outer space.



Senior Chinese officials have continued to decline to

provide any meaningful response to expressed U.S. concerns

about the ASAT during recent security dialogues with

Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior DoD officials.



SIPDIS

(REFTELs H, I and J) Chinese officials have also dropped

the earlier talking point they were using regarding the

position that China has "no plans for further tests."



3. (S//REL CH) BEGIN TALKING POINTS (SHOULD BE LEFT AS A

NON-PAPER):



-- As Ambassador Randt explained in a demarche to

Assistant Foreign Minister He on January 15, 2007, and in

follow-up discussions throughout 2007 between senior U.S.

and Chinese political and military officials in diplomatic

and military-to-military channels, the United States

remains concerned about the possibility of increased risk

to human spaceflight, including the International Space

Station and the U.S. Space Shuttle, resulting from China's

flight-test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT)

weapon.



-- Debris from China's ASAT test has increased hazards to

other peaceful uses of space in low earth orbit by the

United States and other space-faring nations.



-- This is a very serious matter for the entire

international community.



-- Unfettered access to space and the capabilities

provided by satellites in orbit are vital to United States

national and economic security.

-- The United States considers space systems to have the

rights of unhindered passage through, and operations in,

space without interference.



-- Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems

will be interpreted by the United States as an

infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in

a crisis or conflict.



-- The United States reserves the right, consistent with

the UN Charter and international law, to defend and

protect its space systems with a wide range of options,

from diplomatic to military.



-- Purposeful interference with the space systems of other

nations which are used by the United States for peaceful

purposes in pursuit of U.S. national interests also will

be considered as contrary to the interest of maintaining

international peace and security.



-- It has been nearly a year since China intentionally

destroyed a satellite using a ground-based direct-ascent

ASAT weapon.



-- Since this flight-test occurred on January 11, 2007,

the United States has detected and tracked over 2,500

pieces of orbital debris directly attributable to this

ground-based direct-ascent ASAT flight-test.



-- Our experts estimate that many of these pieces, and as

many as 100,000 smaller debris objects, some of which will

remain in orbit for the next 100 years.



-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and

rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45

percent has been generated by China.



-- China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low

earth orbit than any other state.



-- We have already been compelled to take precautionary

measures to maneuver U.S. satellites to reduce the

probability of collision with the debris. Our experts

predict that to avoid collisions with the debris from

China's test, the International Space Station may need to

make maneuvers that otherwise would not have been

required.



-- China's intentional destruction of a satellite, and the

resultant creation of long-lived debris, is contrary to

international Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. These

guidelines were endorsed over four years before the ASAT

test by Chinese government scientists.



-- Under the Convention on International Liability for

Damage Caused by Space Objects, China may be liable for

damage caused by debris from China's January 11, 2007,

ASAT flight-test.



-- The contradiction between China's statements and

actions in this area raise questions about the credibility

of China's declaratory policies and commitments in other

areas of national security affairs.



-- The United States believes China's development and

testing of such capabilities is inconsistent with the

constructive relationship that our Presidents have

outlined, including in the area of civil space

cooperation.



-- The inadequate nature of China's response to our

January 15, 2007, demarche and your government's continued

unwillingness to provide a full explanation for its

actions call into question China's intentions in space and

undermines trust.



-- As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his meeting with

President Hu on November 6, 2007, the United States

remains interested in talking to China about China's anti-

satellite weapons development.



-- Such a dialogue could help reduce the risk of

misunderstanding or miscalculation.



-- As we look to the future, we expect China to bear in

mind the requirement under Article IX of the Outer Space

Treaty, to which China is party, for a State Party to

"undertake appropriate international consultations" before

proceeding with any activity that it "has reason to

believe would cause potentially harmful interference with

activities of other States Parties in the peaceful

exploration and use of outer space."



-- The U.S. is refraining from any expansion of space-

related cooperation with China. One of the primary

reasons for this position is the continued lack of

transparency from China regarding the full range of

China's space activities. One sign of increased

transparency would be forthright responses to the

following questions:



-- What analysis did China perform to estimate the debris

that would be caused by the intentional destruction of

your satellite in the January 11, 2007, test?



-- What steps did China take to mitigate damage to the

satellites of other countries?



-- What are China's future intentions for its direct-

ascent ASAT development and testing program?



-- Will there be further tests of a direct-ascent anti-

satellite weapon or other anti-satellite weapons,

capabilities, or technologies?



If so:



-- How will your government ensure that further testing

does not create new hazards for human spaceflight and

other space activities?



-- What notification will China provide for any future

ASAT tests?



-- Are you planning to deploy your ground-based direct-

ascent ASAT, or other, similar weapons, capabilities, or

technologies?



END TALKING POINTS AND NON-PAPER.



4. (S//REL CH) BEGIN "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS:



a. If the Chinese counter with a statement such as: "The

United States conducted an ASAT test in 1985 and also is

responsible for most of the debris now in orbit," the U.S.

response should be:



-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and

rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45

percent was generated by China, 25 percent by the United

States, and 24 percent by Russia.

-- Hence, China is now responsible for more breakup debris

in low earth orbit than anyone else.



-- All breakup debris attributed to the U.S. that is now

in low earth orbit was caused by accidents (e.g., fuel

tank explosions) and other unintentional events.



-- The vast majority of breakup debris created by China is

the result of an intentional act.



-- The United States has not conducted an anti-satellite

test since 1985. The Cold War is over and the world

economy is now significantly more dependent on Low Earth

Orbit satellites than it was in 1985. That is why so many

countries have expressed concern about the Chinese test.



-- The majority of the debris created by the 1985 U.S.

test reentered the atmosphere within less than three

years, and none remains in orbit today.



-- The majority of trackable debris objects (e.g., those

with areas larger than 10 square centimeters) created by

China's ASAT test will remain in orbit until the late

2030s.



-- Less than three years after conducting this test, the

United States adopted the first of a series of national

policies directing all U.S. space activities to minimize

the creation of debris.



-- In fact, the longevity of the debris resulting from the

1985 ASAT test led directly to U.S. Department of Defense

and then national-level policies to minimize debris from

space tests.



-- The U.S. has actively worked with other nations to

protect the space environment for future generations.

-- These efforts include development of voluntary

guidelines in the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination (IADC)

committee and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space (COPUOS).



-- The U.S. also supports consideration at COPUOS of new

voluntary "Best Practice Guidelines" to ensure safe space

operations by all spacefaring nations.



-- China's civil national space agency participated in

developing the IADC and COPUOS debris mitigation

guidelines, which specifically call for nations to refrain

from any intentional destruction of satellites that might

create long-lived debris.



b. If the Chinese counter with an assertion such as: "We

believe the United States is pursuing space weapons," the

U.S. response should be:



-- The United States does not have any "weapons" in space,

nor do we have any plans to field such weapons.



c. If the Chinese counter with arguments related to U.S.

missile defense, the U.S. response should be:



-- The U.S. missile defense system is strictly a defensive

system. Missile defense protects people from attack. A

Chinese attack on a satellite using a weapon launched by a

ballistic missile threatens to destroy space systems that

the United States and other nations use for commerce and

national security. Destroying satellites endangers

people.



d. If China raises questions relating to cooperation on

future Shenzhou or other crewed space missions, the U.S.

response should be:



-- The United States will continue to offer basic warning

advisories which China might find helpful in protecting

Chinese spacecraft carrying astronauts from collision with

other space objects.



-- These advisories are offered in the spirit of

cooperation and mutual assistance to minimize dangers to

Chinese astronauts in their role as envoys of humanity in

outer space.



END "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS.

RICE