Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE126440
2008-12-01 19:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

DEMARCHE TO NATO AND COALTION PARTNERS ON

Tags:  PARM NATO MOPS PREL 
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DE RUEHC #6440 3361951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011943Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 126440 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PARM NATO MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO NATO AND COALTION PARTNERS ON
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Classified By: PM DAS Stephen Ganyard for Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 126440

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PARM NATO MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO NATO AND COALTION PARTNERS ON
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Classified By: PM DAS Stephen Ganyard for Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request; see paras 3-6.


2. (C) Summary: On December 3, the Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM) will be opened for signature in Oslo, Norway.
The United States will neither sign this Convention nor
participate as an observer, although many of our allies and
partners will sign this Convention. Depending on
implementation of the CCM, in particular interpretation of
Article 21, this could cause constraints on the ability of
U.S. military forces to store cluster munitions on or transit
through the territories of States Parties, or to undertake
combined operations with States Parties' militaries. The
Department requests that Posts clarify respective host
government positions on this issue, emphasizing the
importance of preserving interoperability and consultations
with the U.S. before host governments take steps that would
impact military cooperation with U.S. military forces. End
Summary.


3. (SBU) FOR BERLIN, CANBERRA, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, ROME:
Please take this cable for information; you will receive
demarches septel tailored to specific circumstances regarding
your respective host governments.


4. (U) FOR LONDON and TOKYO: Please take this cable for
information. This issue is already being addressed in
bilateral consultations with the UK and Japan. Posts may
inform host governments that the U.S. is consulting with
other key governments in advance of the December signing.

OBJECTIVES:


5. (C) FOR ANKARA, ATHENS, BUCHAREST, HELSINKI, RIGA,
WARSAW: The Department does not expect these states to sign
the CCM.

--Confirm that host government does not intend to sign the
CCM. (If they do intend to sign Posts should draw on
guidance in para 6.)


6. (SBU) FOR ALL REMAINING ADDRESSEES: If NATO Allies and
other coalition partners embrace a narrow interpretation of
Article 21, there could be consequences upon future NATO
operations and coalition contingency plans. Please pursue
the following objectives with host nation governments to
confirm that interpretation of Article 21 will ensure
continued interoperability for combined operations. Post may
draw on press guidance in reftel and background below for
these discussions.

-- Confirm whether host government intends to sign the
Convention on Cluster Munitions.

-- Communicate that while the United States shares concerns
about the potential for unintended harm to civilians, the
U.S. is not in a position to sign the CCM at this time
because of our defense requirements and far ranging security

commitments. However, we are taking technical steps to
reduce the potential for unintended harm to civilians from
cluster munitions and still hope it will be possible to
finalize a protocol in the framework of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that would require states
to phase in technical improvements to CM over time,
minimizing the potential humanitarian impact of their use.

-- Note our appreciation for the inclusion of Article 21 in
the CCM text and expectation that this provision will allow
our military forces to continue to conduct combined
operations. (For NATO Allies: Note that the NATO Military
Advice of September 30 confirms that interoperability is
protected.)
-- Request that host government bilaterally convey any
concerns about interoperability of our military forces.
Encourage them to consult with us before taking any action
that would jeopardize military cooperation.


7. (SBU) Background: The Oslo Process: On December 3, the
CCM will be open for signature in Oslo, Norway. All UN
member states are invited to attend the ceremony. Embassy
Oslo reports that the Government of Norway has chartered a
plane to bring Foreign Ministers and delegations directly
from the NATO Ministerial in Brussels on December 3. It is
anticipated at least 20 of our 25 NATO Allies and several
other key partners will sign the CCM. The United States will
not attend or sign. The CCM is widely touted by many of its
supporters as a significant advance for international
humanitarian law (IHL),although the Convention is more
properly treated as a disarmament treaty rather than an IHL
instrument. Others have claimed that the CCM will somehow
create customary international law which will bind
non-parties. This is legally inaccurate-it creates no legal
norm or restriction for states that do not agree to be bound
by it. The text of the Convention on Cluster Munitions can
be found at:
www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-solution/the -treaty/


8. (SBU) Military Utility and the Importance of Maintaining
Interoperability: The United States understands that some
states, because of their security situation, may decide that
they no longer require the use of most types of cluster
munitions. However, cluster munitions remain integral to the
military operations of the United States and many of our
coalition partners. We believe that the elimination of
cluster munitions from our stockpiles would put the lives of
our soldiers and those of our coalition partners at risk.
Without cluster munitions it becomes more difficult to
fulfill our security guarantees to others. We are not aware
of any munition that offers the same combination of range,
destructive power and responsiveness as cluster munitions.
Moreover, there are no easy substitutes, and possible
alternatives (carpet bombing, massed artillery barrages,
etc.) have pronounced and potentially more adverse
humanitarian impacts. We are working to improve our cluster
munitions in order to reduce the unintended effects on
civilians (see para 9). We were concerned during the Oslo
Process meetings, which led to the December 3 signing of the
CCM, that this Convention would severely constrain our
ability to conduct military operations with future States
Parties. Article 21 of the CCM addresses these concerns by
allowing States Parties to participate in combined operations
in which a non-state party may use cluster munitions,
notwithstanding obligations under Article 1 of the
Convention. It is our understanding that this would permit a
broad range of activities and that personnel from States
Parties would only be prohibited from directly requesting the
use of or employing cluster munitions. On September 30, the
NATO Military Committee issued advice stating that Article 21
provides the necessary flexibility to allow military
cooperation among Allies, regardless of whether they are not
Parties to the Convention. A number of CCM supporters,
however, may embrace a more narrow interpretation of Article
21, largely for political reasons.


9. (SBU) United States Policy on Cluster Munitions and
Unintended Harm to Civilian: The United States remains
concerned about the potential unintended harm to civilians
that cluster munitions can cause. On June 19, Secretary
Gates signed the new Department of Defense Policy on Cluster
Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians. The primary
feature of this policy is the commitment that by 2018, United
States armed forces will employ only those cluster munitions
that, after arming, result in no more than 1% unexploded
ordnance across the range of intended operational
environments. Post-2018, the U.S. will not transfer cluster
munitions that do not meet these criteria and, for any
cluster munitions transferred prior to 2018 not meeting this
standard, the recipient state must agree not to use them
after 2018. In addition, the Department of State and the
Agency for International Development will continue efforts to
protect civilians from unexploded cluster munitions and
explosive remnants of war through extensive survey,
clearance, risk education assistance, and victims,
assistance programs. The U.S. is the largest single donor to
these types of activities, providing over $1.4 billion since

1993. (This figure includes assistance for clearance of
landmines and all varieties of unexploded ordnance). The
Department of State programs include both immediate
post-conflict response and long-term assistance for severely
affected states.


10. (SBU) The Convention on Conventional Weapons: The fifth
round of negotiations on the issue of cluster munitions
within the framework of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) was held November 3-7 in Geneva.
This was the final round of negotiations provided for in the
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE),s 2008 mandate and was
followed by a meeting of CCW High Contracting Parties (HCP)
November 13-14. A number of countries that participated in
the Oslo Process blocked progress on the negotiations and
succeeded in ensuring that no Protocol will be completed this
year. The HCP decided to continue the GGE in 2009 with two
weeks of discussion (vice the seven weeks in 2008). The U.S.
delegation expressed its disappointment at not concluding a
protocol this year, particularly as a number of major
producers and users of cluster munitions (such as China and
Russia) may have been willing to accept a Protocol text that
would have had substantial humanitarian benefits. It should
be noted, however, that these major producers and users also
raised some issues with the text under discussion. The
United States continues to support the CCW negotiations and
will participate fully in the 2009 GGE sessions (February
16-20 and April 14-17).


11. (U) For more information please contact Katherine Baker
(202-663-0104) or Sho Morimoto (202-663-0290) in PM/WRA.
RICE

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