DEMARCHE REQUEST ON THE HELSINKI OSCE MINISTERIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 125626 SIPDIS VILNIUS ALSO FOR MINSK E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2018 TAGS: OSCE PREL PHUM KDEM GG RU SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST ON THE HELSINKI OSCE MINISTERIAL Classified By: EUR Pricinpal Deputy Assistant Secretary Marcie Ries ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. The annual OSCE Ministerial will take place in Helsinki 4-5 December. The Secretary will attend a portion of the meeting which forty-nine ministers are expected to attend. Posts are requested to engage host country officials to garner support for U.S. objectives at the Ministerial. Background information and talking points are provided below. Info addressees are welcome to use these demarche points as well if posts believe doing so would be useful in their engagement on OSCE issues with their host governments. Embassies Minsk and Moscow may deliver this demarche, or portions thereof, at their discretion. Given how little time remains before the ministerial, posts may use their discretion in choosing how and at what level best to deliver this demarche. -------------- General Background -------------- ¶2. (C) The backdrop for this year's OSCE Ministerial will be Russian obstructionism in Vienna, preventing consensus on a lengthening list of issues, its actions in Georgia, as well as Russian proposals for a new treaty on European security and the French proposal for a future OSCE Summit. The Russian security treaty proposal, in particular, seems more about driving wedges between the U.S. and our European allies and satisfying Moscow's desire for a more prominent role than about seeking concrete answers to the real challenges to European security. The U.S. delegation, led by Secretary Rice, will address the issue at a strategic level by focusing on shared values as the basis for security; she will also ask skeptical questions about Russian adherence to its commitments and legal obligations under existing arrangements. The meeting will need to address, and hopefully come to closure on, a new mandate for OSCE monitors in Georgia without undermining Georgia,s territorial integrity. We also anticipate discussion of, and possibly progress on, frozen conflicts, especially Ngorno-Karabakh. ¶3. (C) The Finnish chairmanship hopes to achieve consensus on a short political declaration for the first time since ¶2002. The U.S. believes that such a declaration could be useful if it gives a strong and clear endorsement of OSCE principles and institutions discusses the situation in Georgia and does not cross U.S. redlines. We can accept an anodyne document, even one that permits a dialogue on Russian security proposals to move forward, so long as it protects existing "acquis" and deals forthrightly with the Georgia conflict. ¶4. (C) The OSCE is an essential component of European security architecture and one of the key tools through which the USG promotes democracy and defends human rights and fundamental freedoms across the OSCE area. We value its role in promoting democratic institutions and processes, conflict resolution, protection of human rights, and crisis prevention. The OSCE founding documents, including the Helsinki Final Act, lay out a comprehensive set of political, security, and human rights commitments. These commitments are at the heart of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, which includes human rights, political-military, and economic dimensions and have played an important part in the advance of freedom, security and prosperity across the European continent in recent decades. However, in recent years Russia has increased pressures on and attempted to sidestep the OSCE's human rights watchdog ODIHR, and otherwise sought to undermine basic OSCE commitments to human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the political-military side, its suspension of its implementation of CFE last December put in jeopardy one of the basic building blocks of security architecture in Europe. Russia's occupation of Georgian territory following the August 7 conflict and subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries calls into question Moscow's commitment to some of the OSCE's most fundamental security tenets; its failure to give the OSCE a more prominent role in post-conflict monitored has also cast doubt on the value it attaches to the OSCE. ¶5. (C) The Finnish chairmanship has proposed issuing a political declaration and intends to negotiate it directly through their diplomatic missions in the capitals of a number of OSCE participating States. Many OSCE participating States desire a declaration at almost any cost, including compromise on core issues. Our view is that a declaration is only STATE 00125626 002 OF 006 worthwhile if it forcefully addresses issues of core concern and reinforces the fundamental commitments on which 21st century European security rests. We believe it should address the importance of the OSCE's role in promoting human rights and the danger of failures by some participating States to live up to these commitments. We should focus on steps to address regional conflicts and the need for full implementation of the CFE Treaty by all thirty States Parties, including Russia. And we ought to reaffirm our support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. If, as is likely, we are unable to agree to a declaration that contains these core elements, then a serious, candid discussion of these issues among senior officials would be a satisfactory outcome of the Ministerial from the U.S. perspective. We cannot accept the watering down of commitments and issues of such significance in a misguided effort to achieve a lowest common denominator of consensus; real differences cannot be ignored. -------------- Goals for the Ministerial -------------- ¶6. (U) General Talking Points: -- Despite the many challenges confronting the OSCE at this time, we are looking forward to what we hope will be a productive Ministerial. -- The United States attaches special value to the OSCE's role in promoting democratic institutions and processes, conflict resolution, promotion and protection of human rights, and crisis prevention. -- The human dimensions commitments and values that form the core of OSCE's founding documents have played an important part in the advance of freedom, security, and prosperity across the European continent since the organization was established. -- We are ready to support a Ministerial declaration that speaks honestly about the human dimension and regional challenges we confront across the OSCE area and proposes actions and solutions based on existing OSCE principles and commitments. -- We believe that a weak Ministerial declaration that attempts to gloss over these challenges or is silent about the principles that undergird our approach to security would cause more harm than good, sending the signal that existing commitments are open for reinterpretation or readjustment. -- Similarly, we do not see how a declaration can ignore the conflict between Russia and Georgia, given the impact it has had on regional security. -- Even if no statement can ultimately be agreed upon, we see the process of negotiating a Declaration as important in itself, as it helps the participating States recommit to the core values of the organization, and also puts national positions clearly on the table. -- Finally, Foreign Ministers of the Minsk Group co-chairs will meet with their counterparts from Armenia and Azerbaijan to accelerate progress on finalizing the basic principles for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement to Nagorno Karabakh. -------------- European Security Treaty -------------- ¶7. (U) Background: Russian President Medvedev outlined on October 8 at his World Policy Forum speech in Evian, France a rationale for and possible content of a new European security treaty. He said such a treaty should affirm basic security principles, renounce the use of force, guarantee equal security and establish basic arms control parameters. He argued that the Georgia conflict had demonstrated the weakness of a "NATO-centric approach" to European security. Picking up on the theme, but not necessarily supporting the Russians' treaty proposal, French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the same meeting proposed an OSCE summit in 2009 to consider European security challenges, yet stressed that the U.S. must be part of the dialogue. Following the November 14 EU-Russia summit in Nice, President Sarkozy stated that President Medvedev supported his plan for an OSCE summit in summer 2009. Talking Points: STATE 00125626 003 OF 006 -- We have taken note of President Medvedev's Security Treaty Proposal and President Sarkozy's call for an OSCE summit next year. -- We note the irony of these calls to discuss changes to Europe's existing security architecture not long after Russia invaded one of its neighbors, recognized the "independence" of two separatist regions on that neighbor's sovereign territory, and while it illegally maintains a significant military force presence on the territory of a neighboring sovereign state, and while it has suspended its implementation of the CFE Treaty generally considered to be the cornerstone of European security. -- Any calls for a new treaty or a summit should build upon the current, rich body of security understandings and commitments that we generally regard as "acquis." -- For any European security regime to be effective, as the OSCE has demonstrated, it must be based on shared values and principles, including respect for human rights, territorial integrity, and the right of sovereign states to determine their own security arrangements. -- These are of course the very values that are already enshrined in existing Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, which offer Russia any number of means through which to engage. -- We believe any discussion on European security principles ought to start with a review of the state of play with respect to fulfilling existing commitments, such as those in the Helsinki Final Act and the legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. Russia could show its good faith by resuming its implementation of the CFE Treaty. -- Russia could also show good faith through its support for providing full and unfettered access of military monitors in Georgia (including throughout South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and extending the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia. -- We are willing to talk and we welcome ideas ) from any source ) that will strengthen the work of existing institutions to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and our common goals in all three of the OSCE dimensions ) human, economic, and security. -- But we must be clear that the existing acquis of the OSCE, developed over decades in the period since Helsinki in 1975, are precious and must be retained. The simple standard that OSCE member states need to fulfill their commitments ) such as meeting CFE Treaty obligations, respecting the human rights of their citizens or working together to resolve disputes peacefully ) cannot be placed in doubt. -- While we are prepared to discuss ways to improve European security, based on the principles above, we view any discussion of a possible OSCE Summit to consider these ideas as premature. The rationale for a summit needs to be driven by the substance, not the other way around. -------------- Georgia -------------- ¶8. (U) Russia's disproportionate use of force against Georgia on August 7 and its subsequent failure to implement the ceasefire accords vividly demonstrates Moscow's disregard for many of the commitments that underpin today's security architecture in Europe. Moreover, Russia's long policy of undermining Georgia's sovereignty, culminating in the military occupation and recognition of the two breakaway regions, undermines Georgia's territorial integrity. Russia is blocking access for international monitors, apparently willing to risk closure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia ) a demonstrated added value in the aftermath of the conflict ) in a bid to gain international acceptance of its version of Georgia's borders and territorial sovereignty. This has the effect of preventing international observers from seeing what is happening in occupied Georgia. Talking Points: -- How the OSCE handles Russia's occupation of another participating State will be a major, real-world test for the OSCE as a crisis management organization. -- Russia's continuing failure to ensure the protection of persons and guarantee personal security in the breakaway regions underscores the crucial need for OSCE monitors to have full and unimpeded access to the South Ossetia and STATE 00125626 004 OF 006 Abkhazia regions of Georgia. -- Russia's refusal to allow OSCE observers into South Ossetia is not only an attempt to undermine the mission, but also a violation of the September 8 ceasefire follow-on agreement signed by Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy. -- We hope the meeting will come to agreement to extend the OSCE monitoring mission, without undermining either its effectiveness or the international community,s support for Georgia,s territorial integrity. -------------- CFE and Other Arms Control -------------- ¶9. (U) Russia decided late last year to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),in large part because, it said, Allies had failed to ratify the adapted CFE treaty. The U.S. and Allies have repeatedly made clear their support for CFE and the future entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. The U.S. and Allies, with the support of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, have been seeking agreement on the Parallel Actions package, which includes steps by NATO Allies on ratification of the adapted CFE treaty and by Russia on outstanding commitments related to the fulfillment of its remaining Istanbul commitments on Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova. Talking points: -- The U.S. supports the full arms control acquis at the OSCE, including the CFE treaty, the Vienna Document, and the Open Skies treaty. -- The OSCE has also engaged in useful work on political-military cooperation outside the realm of traditional arms control, such as its work on small arms and light weapons, stockpiles of conventional ammunition, and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. But work in this dimension is seriously undermined by the Russia-created impasse over the CFE treaty. -- The U.S. and our Allies continue to view the CFE treaty regime as a cornerstone of European security. We are fully committed to preserving the CFE regime and have continued to meet our obligations under the treaty, despite Russia's decision to "suspend" its observance of CFE obligations in December 2007. States Parties should not be distracted by the chimera of an alternative, all-inclusive security architecture to be achieved at some unknown date in the future. -- CFE is the most successful arms control regime of its kind, providing unprecedented transparency regarding States Parties' military forces. It is impossible to envision any other agreement being negotiated at this time that would offer the same degree of transparency, limits, and verification regarding conventional forces in Europe as the CFE Treaty provides. This regime has an impact beyond the 30 CFE States Parties: it benefits all the members of the OSCE and makes a critical contribution to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. -- We have urged Russia to resume its observance of CFE and work with its partners on the basis of the generous proposals as put forth by the NATO allies in the Parallel Actions package with the ultimate goal of entry into force of the adapted CFE treaty. Russia should substantively engage with the U.S. and Allies on the plan. -------------- Other Decisions -------------- ¶11. We anticipate the larger security issues discussed above to dominate the discussions at the Ministerial. In addition, there are a number of discrete consensus decisions that the Ministers will be asked to approve. The texts of these decisions are currently being negotiated in Vienna and some will undoubtedly be under discussion in Helsinki up to the start of the Ministerial. Each of these decisions has their champions, but all are of lower importance to the U.S. Government. Following is a brief review of these decisions, should host country raise them with U.S. Embassy officials: -- Continuity in OSCE activities (the so-called "Quintet" decision) ) This seeks to establish long-term planning among Chairmen in Office, adding two future CIOs, to set OSCE priorities. We have been reluctant to see the flexibility of the OSCE replaced by a bureaucratic process like this. STATE 00125626 005 OF 006 -- Border Security -- We would like to see a strong decision that includes reference to OSCE engagement in Afghanistan, but Russia seems likely to oppose that. -- Security Aspects of Climate Change - While we are skeptical that the OSCE can find a role that adds great value to this issue, although we recognize the strong desire by a number of participating states to have the OSCE play some role. We think that with some relatively minor changes to the text we will be able to go along with it. -- Inland Maritime Waterways -- We believe the decision strays from the OSCE's areas of demonstrated competency in the Second Dimension. However, we are willing to go along with it, provided it contains language which makes clear the decision is not a mandate to provide the Secretariat with additional resources to carry out these activities. -- 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, -- We would support a strong declaration reaffirming the UDHR and OSCE human dimension commitments but will not accept the limiting language proposed by the Russian Federation. -- Trafficking in Persons -- We support the OSCE's continued work in this area and welcome the decision's emphasis on enhancing the provision of assistance to victims of human trafficking --Rule of Law, -- We support a rule of law decision with a focus on national legislation in conformance with OSCE human rights commitments. -- Roma and Sinti )- We support this decision and believe it has nearly achieved consensus. -- The Alliance of Civilizations )- The Alliance of Civilizations must develop its own operational capacity before it can be a partner for the OSCE. The Alliance must also correct troubling reports that are critical of Israel and U.S. Middle East policy. --Small Arms and Light Weapons )- It has received working-level approval with our support. --Review of activities of the Forum for Security Cooperation. )- A general catch-all which we support but is held up on how to characterize FSC discussions about the conflict in Georgia. We support this decision but do not see any negative impact on the work of the Forum should it fail to achieve consensus. -- Declaration on the 60th Anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. -) We support this declaration, though Russian and Turkish opposition suggest it is unlikely to pass. -- Tolerance and Non-Discrimination )- We strongly support a short decision that would institutionalize high level tolerance implementation meetings every two years beginning in 2009. -- Counterterrorism )- The Finnish chairmanship has been reluctant to add U.S.-supplied text which was adopted in other fora, such as the G8 and APEC. The text, adopted at the G8 Summit in July 2008 underscores the five shared principles for fighting terrorism: a) All terrorist acts are criminal and unjustifiable, and must be unequivocally condemned; b) Suicide bombings are a particularly despicable tactic, and recruiting the young or disadvantaged to carry out such acts must be uniformly condemned; c) Abductions and the taking of hostages are repugnant practices to be strongly condemned; d) Conflict, oppression, and poverty do not excuse nor justify terrorism; e) Terrorist abuse of freedoms inherent to democratic societies to spread hatred and incite violence, such as through abuse of modern technologies and open borders, will not be tolerated. Talking points: -- The United States seeks support for the inclusion of text on CT principles in the draft OSCE decision. It is essential that the OSCE, the largest regional organization in the world, strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms. -- This language is strictly a political commitment and not/not intended for specific follow-on work in the OSCE. It is intended to promote an international understanding and global consensus that all terrorist acts are criminal and unjustifiable, including specific deplorable tactics, STATE 00125626 006 OF 006 regardless of their political or religious motivation. -- (If Raised) Understand other delegations may attempt to add onerous text to this draft decision should he USG-suggested preambular text be introduced, putting this decision at risk. We will be constructive in our Helsinki negotiations, but note that this decision can be handled at the Permanent Council level as well. RICE